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Factual data are fundamental to the progress of science and to our preemi-
nent system of innovation.  Freedom of inquiry, the open availability of scien-
tific data, and full disclosure of results through publication are the cornerstones
of basic research, which both domestic law and the norms of public science have
long upheld.1
The rapid advances in digital technologies and networks over the past two
decades have radically altered and improved the ways that data can be pro-
duced, disseminated, managed, and used in science and in all other spheres of
1. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO
SCIENTIFIC DATA 2 (1997) [hereinafter BITS OF POWER].  Data are “facts, numbers, letters, and sym-
bols that describe an object, idea, condition, situation, or other factors.”  NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL DATABASES 15 (1999) [hereinafter A QUESTION OF BALANCE].
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human endeavor.2  As a result, these changes have given rise to a dramatic
increase in the amount of data produced and have fostered unprecedented
opportunities for accelerating research and creating wealth based on the exploi-
tation of data.3  Every aspect of the natural world, from the sub-atomic to the
cosmic, all human activities, and indeed every life form, can now be observed
and captured through an electronic database.4  Whole areas of science are
entirely data-driven, such as bioinformatics in molecular biology and the obser-
vational environmental sciences.  All research increasingly depends on easy
access to and use of data resources.5
Apart from the obvious technological advances that made these activities
possible, much of the success of this revolution derives from the U.S. legal and
policy regime that supports the open availability and unfettered use of scientific
data.6  This regime, which remains among the most open in the world,7 has
placed a premium on the broadest possible dissemination and use of scientific
data produced by governmental or government-funded sources.  This policy was
traditionally implemented in several complementary ways: by expressly prohib-
iting intellectual property protection of all information produced by the federal
government; by contractually reinforcing the sharing ethos of science8 through
open data terms and conditions in federal research grants and contracts;9 by
carving out a very large and robust public domain10 for non-copyrightable data;11
2. BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 2; see also A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1, at 14-38.
3. See generally PAUL A. DAVID & DOMINIQUE FORAY, ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS OF THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 01-14, 2002), avail-
able at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/01-14.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
4. J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments
and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 793, 812-13 (1999) [hereinafter
Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection].
5. BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 47-57.
6. Id. at 17.
7. See Peter N. Weiss & Peter Backlund, International Information Policy in Conflict: Open and
Unrestricted Access versus Government Commercialization, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 300, 307
(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
8. For statutory waiver of copyright in government production, see 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).  For
the sharing ethos of science, see R.K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY
OF SCIENCE 267-78 (R.K. Merton ed., 1973). See also PAUL A. DAVID, FROM KEEPING ‘NATURE’S
SECRETS’ TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ‘OPEN SCIENCE,’ 2 (Stanford Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper No. 01006, 2001) [hereinafter DAVID, NATURE’S SECRETS], available at http://www-
econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp01006.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2003); Michael Polanyi, The
Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54, 59-79 (1962); BITS OF POWER,
supra note 1, at 17-19, 21-22.  For the environmental sciences perspective, see generally NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE FULL AND OPEN EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC DATA (1995) [hereinafter
FULL AND OPEN EXCHANGE] and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESOLVING CONFLICTS
ARISING FROM THE PRIVATIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DATA 15-19 (2001) [hereinafter
RESOLVING CONFLICTS], regarding scientists’ views on the need for full and open access to environ-
mental and earth science data.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. We define “public domain” information as sources and types of data and information whose
uses are not restricted by statutory intellectual property (“IP”) laws and other legal regimes and that
are accordingly available to the public for use without authorization.  For analytical purposes, informa-
tion in the public domain, including scientific data and information, may be divided into three major
categories:
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or by applying other immunities and exceptions that favor science and educa-
tion to intellectual property rights that otherwise protect collections of informa-
tion.12
A. Countervailing Trends Affecting the Production, Distribution, and Use of
Scientific Data
A second and opposing trend, however, is characterized by the progressive
privatization and commercialization of scientific data, and by the attendant
pressures to hoard and trade them like other private commodities.13  This trend
is reinforced by the creation of new legal rights and protectionist mechanisms
that are largely extrinsic to the scientific enterprise,14 but increasingly adopted
by it.  These include greatly enhanced copyright protection of digital informa-
tion;15 new ways to control access to and use of digital data by contractual
(1) Information that is not subject to protection under exclusive IP rights.
(2) Information that qualifies as protectable subject matter under some IP regime, but that is con-
tractually designated as unprotected (for example, is transferred or donated to a public
archive or data center, or is made available directly to the public, with no rights reserved).
Typically, such material consists of scientific data collections.
(3) Information that becomes available under statutorily created immunities and exceptions,
which is also important in this context although it does not constitute public domain informa-
tion per se.
“Open access” may be defined as proprietary information that is made openly and freely available on
the Internet or through other media by the rights holder but that retains some or all of the exclusive
property rights that are granted under statutory IP laws.  Open access may be provided by all types of
public and private sector sources.  Of course, public domain information may be provided freely
through open access as well.  By no means is all public domain information freely available, however,
even though once accessed, it may be used without restriction.  This article focuses primarily on scien-
tific and technical (“S&T”) data in the public domain available through open access.  See generally
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter
NRC SYMPOSIUM].
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)-(b), 103(b) (2000); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
12. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use); § 108 (reproductions by libraries and archives); §
109(a) (first-sale doctrine); § 110(1) (face-to-face teaching activities); § 110(2) (educational broadcasts).
13. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is
this Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, at 223-49 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Bargaining] (stressing delays and high transaction costs impeding transfers of
university-generated biotech research tools); Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnol-
ogy: Opportunities and Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive
Field, in id. at 251, 263-65 (stressing “sea change in the focus of basic research” in life sciences owing to
commercialization by universities of basic science discoveries, increasingly under exclusive property
relationships).
14. See generally COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMERGING
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 96-122, 152-98 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL
DILEMMA].
15. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1203 (2000).  Irrespec-
tive of the DMCA, federal appellate courts have begun to broaden copyright protection of low author-
ship publications.  See infra text accompanying notes 286-87.
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restrictions that are technologically enforced;16 and the enactment of proposals
for novel intellectual property rights17 to protect collections of data.18
These new legal rights and mechanisms are being promoted by certain
information industry conglomerates because of economic opportunities for the
private exploitation of new digital information resources and as a legal reaction
to a possible loss of control over certain proprietary information products in the
digital environment.19  At the same time, the new laws pose the danger of dis-
rupting the normative customs at the foundation of public science, especially
the traditional cooperative and sharing ethos, by producing both the pressures
and the means to enclose the scientific commons and to greatly reduce the
scope of data in the public domain.20  Viewed dispassionately, the need to rec-
oncile these trends in a socially productive framework has become imperative,
and the goal of such a reconciliation seems clear.  A positive outcome would
maximize the dissemination of scientific data in a quasi-public space where
access and use for research purposes was ensured, without disrupting new
opportunities for commercial exploitation of scientific databases in the private
sector.21
Perhaps a single example at the outset will help to illuminate some of these
developments.  Under traditional assumptions, scientific researchers would
16. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  See generally J. H. Reichman
& Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Con-
tract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999); Symposium, Intellectual
Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce (pts. 1 & 2) 87 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999), 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998) [hereinafter Intellectual Property & Contract Law].
17. The U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary had introduced a series of bills
modeled after Directive 96/9 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 1996 on the
legal protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 2 [hereinafter E.C. Database Directive].  The most
recent officially introduced version was H.R. 354, the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (2000).
See Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 824.  In 1999, the House Committee on
Commerce (now called the House Committee on Energy and Commerce) introduced a more narrowly
drawn version of database protection legislation based on unfair competition law principles: the Con-
sumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858.
18. For detailed discussion of the E.C. Database Directive as it impacts science, see Reichman &
Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4.  See also J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 114-23 (1997).  See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, U.S.
Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Authorship, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note 13,
at 55, 68-72 [hereinafter Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives]; J. H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global
Economy, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE  455-504 (2002) [hereinafter
.Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy].
19. See generally DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 14, at 51-58, 61-67.
20. See generally PAUL A. DAVID, THE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY BOOMERANG: NEW
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS THREATEN GLOBAL ‘OPEN SCIENCE’ (Stanford Dep’t of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 00-006, 2000) [hereinafter DAVID, DIGITAL BOOMERANG], available at:
http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp00016.pdf; PAUL A. DAVID, WILL BUILDING “GOOD
FENCES” REALLY MAKE ‘GOOD NEIGHBORS’ IN SCIENCE? DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES,
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH ON THE INTERNET AND THE EC’S PUSH FOR PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 00-33, 2000)
[hereinafter DAVID, GOOD FENCES], available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/pdf/00-33.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2003).
21. For our proposals to achieve such a positive outcome, see Part IV of this article.
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publish their findings together with the supporting data.  Both the findings and
the data would enter the public domain and become part of the scientific
knowledge base.  Traditional copyright principles have supported this result, as
have the normative practices of the scientific community.22  Today, however, the
fact that the data are published with the article, whether in print or digital form,
may tell us little or nothing about the terms of their accessibility and their use
by other scientists for follow-on work, for a variety of reasons.
First, as a growing commercial or cultural phenomenon, the data may have
been conditionally deposited or imperfectly revealed at the time of publica-
tion.23  Second, recent changes to copyright law make it possible to control
online access to the supporting data, even though the data as such are techni-
cally ineligible for copyright protection.24  Third, European states have adopted
a new sui generis database right, which allows scientists to directly control
access to and reuse of aggregations of facts, whether these have been disclosed
as part of their research publications or made available as a separate database.25
Bills to enact similar legislation have been introduced in the United States.26
Finally, even disregarding these major changes in the underlying intellectual
property regime, a combination of digital rights management technologies and
standard-form contracts may enable publishers to impose limits on the redis-
semination and use of supporting data even after formal publication of a scien-
tific article.  This power of the “two-party” deal, which modern telecommunica-
tions technology has restored, would grow even stronger in the United States if
either a strong database protection bill were enacted or a pending proposal for
new and uniform contract laws regulating information products were more
widely adopted at the state level.27  If both types of laws were adopted, either
the scientist or the publisher could retain maximum power to control subse-
quent access to and use of any compilation of scientific data (but not individual
facts) otherwise disclosed to the public and previously in the public domain.
The foregoing list illustrates the very far-reaching revisions in the legal rules
that have supported traditional modes of accessing and exchanging scientific
data and databases.  The resulting problems are further complicated by the
22. See infra text accompanying notes 78-113; BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 2 (regarding the
normative practices of the scientific community); Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4,
at 800-02 (discussing user-friendly rules of copyright law).
23. See, e.g., Ari Patrinos & Dan Drell, The Times They Are A-Changin’, 417 NATURE 589, 589-90
(June 6, 2002).
24. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1203 (2000); Gins-
burg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 61-67.
25. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17.
26. See H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999) and H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999). Previous versions of the
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act introduced by the House Committee on the Judiciary
included H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997), and The Database Investment
and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
27. Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 897-99.
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changing ways in which the scientific community itself uses data and exchanges
them on both a formal and informal basis.28
B. Formal and Informal Data Exchanges
Traditionally, in “big science” projects, in disciplines such as physics, space,
and earth sciences,29 government science agencies play the predominant, con-
trolling role in the collection and dissemination of data from large facility
instruments.  The agencies themselves collect the raw data, or they fund the
production of data by academia through large, highly structured, and long-term
research programs.  Such data are then typically managed in well-organized
data centers, where they are deposited on terms of open public domain access
for the worldwide scientific community.  Other science agencies also sponsor
and fund research that makes use of these collected inputs.  The public research
that emerges is disclosed through peer-reviewed publications or applied to
commercial endeavors.  These publications or applications will then attract
exclusive intellectual property rights—copyrights, patents, or, increasingly, sui
generis rights.
What is noteworthy about this picture is the high degree of public control
over the data that flow through the system.  Because the government itself col-
lects, funds, or disseminates so much of this data, it has a great deal to say about
the rules of access and use that apply.  It has thus promoted open access to
research data as a public good, and through its use of public grants and con-
tracts has reinforced the sharing ethos to which the scientific community tradi-
tionally subscribed.  This ethos, in turn, fits comfortably within the underlying
legal infrastructure, which typically distinguished between information as
inputs, not subject to intellectual property rights, and aggregates of information
bundled as outputs, which do attract such rights.30
Of course, it would be wrong to paint too rosy a picture here or to assume
that data in “big science” programs have flowed through and supported the
public research system optimally and that the open access and sharing norms
have been rigorously and uniformly enforced.  Moreover, the areas of “small
science” have never really fit within this sociological description of the data
access system sketched above.31  Small science is being performed by individual
28. See discussion infra accompanying notes 65-157 and 183-210.
29. See generally BIG SCIENCE: THE GROWTH OF LARGE-SCALE RESEARCH (Peter L. Galison &
Bruce Hevly eds., 1994) [hereinafter BIG SCIENCE].
30. See generally Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 884-88 (“The Dual Function of Informa-
tion in the Networked Environment”) (citing authorities).
31. See generally Stephen Hilgartner, Access to Data and Intellectual Property: Scientific Exchange
in Genome Research, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH
TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT THE NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCE, Feb. 15-16, 1996, 28-39 (1997) [hereinafter Hilgartner, Access to Data]; Stephen Hilgartner
& Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, Controlling Data and Resources: Access Strategies in Molecular Genetics, in
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX (P.A. David & W.E. Steinmueller
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf, Controlling Data]; Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, The Role,
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investigators or small and autonomous research groups operating outside large,
organized research programs, often with non-federal sources of funding.  In
these areas of science, data are generated in relatively small amounts, and single
laboratories or investigators work independently.  Nevertheless, the latter also
find themselves dependent on the results of those other individuals in their field
of inquiry, to which they have no guaranteed access.  Here, the data exist in
various twilight states of accessibility, depending on the extent to which they are
published, discussed in papers but not revealed, or just known about because of
reputation or ongoing work but kept under absolute or relative secrecy.
There are few government-controlled, public domain data centers in this
type of research.  The data are thus disaggregated components of an incipient
network that is only as effective as the individual transactions that put it
together.  Openness and sharing are not ignored, but they are not necessarily
dominant, either.  These values must compete with strategic considerations of
self-interest, secrecy, and the logic of mutually beneficial exchange.
In small science, what occurs is a delicate process of negotiation, in which
data are traded as the result of informal compromises between private and
public interests that are worked out on an ad hoc and continual basis.  Small
science thus depends on the flow of disaggregated data through many different
hands, all of which collectively construct a fragile chain of semi-contractual rela-
tions in which secrecy and disclosure are pitted against a common need for
access and use of these resources.  In this sense, big science projects are more
likely to be subject to formal data access regulations while small science
research is more emblematic of informal data exchange practices.
C. The Sharing Ethos Under Stress
The picture painted herein of “big” and “small” science is overstated to
clarify the basic concepts. The big science system is not free of individual strate-
gic data transactions that are typical of the small sciences, and the latter often
benefit from access to public repositories where data are freely and openly
available, rather than through the ad hoc transactional process.  However, the
“brokered networks” typical of small science are endemic to all sciences, and
access to data is everywhere becoming more dependent on negotiated transac-
tions between private stakeholders.  These outcomes are increasingly achieved
at the expense of the public interest, and they may bypass the contributions to
public data repositories and the sharing norms of the past.32  Moreover, in recent
years the pressures to commoditize and privatize research results have extended
farther upstream in the process, which affects the government’s attitude toward
the creation and dissemination of its own data in support of research and other
public interests.
Value, and Limits of S&T Data and Information in the Public Domain for Biomedical Research, in NRC
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 10.
32. Cf. Powell, supra note 13, at 263-64 (stressing risks of undermining public science).
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The pressures on access to scientific data from privatization and commer-
cialization could, in short, be a big story even if the underlying legal infrastruc-
ture were to hold constant.33  In reality, the massive changes in the legal regime
already alluded to could have profound effects on access to and use of data in
every scientific discipline, whether a part of “big” or “small” science, or even
“basic” or “applied.”
The biggest threat to the integrity of the system is the extension of exclusive
intellectual property rights to collections of data themselves, which poses a
grave threat to the continuity of all those data exchange processes that scientists
in the United States have long taken for granted.  Moreover, this is not a battle
that science can win, in the sense that there are no legislative fixes likely to
stave off the many different legislative threats to the open exchange of data in
the public domain.  The pressures to commoditize are in many cases becoming
too great, and the legal and technical protection instruments are now too varied
and refined to be thwarted by ad hoc legal and technical responses.  Any legisla-
tive remedies that might provide narrow exceptions for public research and
education from an increasingly high-protectionist regime cannot resolve the
major obstacles to the open availability and exchange of scientific data hereto-
fore in the public domain.  Rather, precisely because these pressures on the
system are becoming so great, we contend that the scientific community can and
must assert greater control over the management of its own data supplies.
D. Scope and Structure of this Article
The aim of this article is to promote discussion and a greater understanding
within both the scientific and legal communities of the important trends and
issues noted above.  Part II examines the role and value of public domain data
in scientific research and maps the way it functions today.  It describes the legal
and policy framework for government-generated and government-funded scien-
tific data activities, the related sociological and normative structure of the scien-
tific enterprise in the formal and informal contexts, and some of the opportuni-
ties for the exploitation of data in public research that are inherent in digital
technologies and networks.
Part III begins by looking at the shifting public–private boundaries.  It then
documents many of the economic and legal pressures on scientific data tradi-
tionally in the public domain and the threats these changes pose to the estab-
lished norms and practices supporting open access to and use of data in
research.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates how the scientific community can manage its
way out of these dilemmas, but only if it is willing to come to terms with real-
world commercial pressures that will require some significant compromises to
preserve an acceptable balance of public and private interests.  Toward this end,
33. Cf. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 92-94, 109-15 (1999).
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we propose a dual strategy, one that contractually reinforces the public domain
for data that exists within the ambit of the federal government and another that
contractually reconstructs a research commons for data (and other forms of
information) in academia and the private sector.  We argue that excessively
rigid efforts to keep scientific data free of private control will end by yielding
less and less data to the public domain, whereas a contractually reconstructed
commons for data, while less pure in theory, will in practice make more data
more accessible for research purposes in the long run.  To make this strategy
work, the funding agencies, universities, and scientific organizations must agree
to a basic set of ground rules, with the goal of preserving the data commons for
research purposes without impeding institutional actors or single researchers
from enjoying the benefits of appropriate commercialization in the private
sector.
II
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN A DIGITALLY NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT
SUPPORTED BY A ROBUST PUBLIC DOMAIN
The producers of scientific data can be divided into three sectors: govern-
ment agencies (primarily but not exclusively federal), academic and other not-
for-profit research institutions, and private sector commercial enterprises.  In
the past, the research activities of the first two sectors—the government agen-
cies and the non-profits—operated largely unimpeded by the classical intellec-
tual property system.  In fact, that system indirectly supported these activities
by facilitating access to a robust public domain.  Regarding operations in the
private sector, where the objective is to commercialize data, few and relatively
weak intellectual property rights have nonetheless supported private invest-
ment in a vigorous U.S. database industry that dominates the world market.34
At the same time, this intellectual property environment has facilitated the
informal exchanges of individual scientific researchers and has not unduly
impeded research at either the government or university level, except insofar as
licensing contracts supported by new technological protection measures have
begun to cut back on pre-existing freedom of access and use.
If the pre-existing legal regime were to remain supportive, the role and
value of public domain data could potentially be magnified many times over by
34. In 1998, sixty-three percent of databases were reportedly produced in the United States.
Although the domestic database industry continued to expand, its share of the global output declined
from a ratio of U.S. to non-U.S. databases of about two-to-one in the 1985-1993 period, to a ratio of
three-to-two in 1998.  Martha E. Williams, State of Databases Today: 1999, in GALE DIRECTORY OF
DATABASES (L. Kumar ed., 1998).  These statistics, however, do not include large numbers of govern-
ment and academic databases that are not officially registered.  See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra
note 1, at 28; see also Cynthia M. Bott, Protection of Information Products: Balancing Commercial
Reality and the Public Domain, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 237 (1998); Stephen M. Maurer, Across Two
Worlds: Database Protection in the U.S. and Europe, paper prepared for Industry Canada’s Confer-
ence on Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy 8-21 (May 23-24,
2001) [hereinafter Maurer, Across Two Worlds] (comparing the U.S. database industry with that of
other countries).
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the advent of digital technologies and new research tools.  In reality, however,
this potentially enhanced role of public domain data in science is threatened by
a confluence of economic, legal, and technological pressures described in detail
in Part III.
A. Government-Generated Data: A Birthright of the Public Domain
The role of government in supporting scientific progress in general,35 and its
influence on the creation and maintenance of the research commons in par-
ticular, cannot be overstated.  The U.S. government produces the largest body
of public domain data and information used in scientific research and educa-
tion.  For example, the federal government alone now spends more than forty-
five billion dollars per year on its research programs,36 with a significant per-
centage of that money invested in the production of primary data sources, in
higher-level processed data products, statistics, and models, and in scientific and
technical information (“STI”), such as government reports, technical papers,
research articles, memoranda, and other such analytical material.
1. The Non-Proprietary Principle
The United States—unlike most other countries—overrides the canons of
intellectual property law that could otherwise endow it with exclusive rights in
government-generated collections of data or other information.  To this end,
the Copyright Act of 1976 prohibits the federal government from claiming pro-
tection of its publications.37  The bulk of the data and information produced
directly by the government automatically enter the public domain year after
year, with no proprietary restrictions.
The federal government also provides the greatest amount of funding for
the production of scientific data by the non-governmental research community,
as a significant part of that forty-five billion dollar investment in public
research,38 and many of the government-funded data collections it yields also
become available to the scientific community through the research commons.
Government-funded data follow a different trajectory from that of data pro-
duced by the government itself, however, and discussion of that topic is
deferred to the next Part.
A number of well-established reasons support the policies that promote
open access to and use of government-generated data, often at no cost to the
public.  The government needs no legal incentive to create the information; the
taxpayer has already paid once for the production of a database or report and
should not pay twice; transparency of governance and democratic values would
35. For an excellent overview of the role of the U.S. government in the domestic research system,
see DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION (1997).
36. American Association for the Advancement of Science R&D Funding Update of Mar. 14,
2002, Table 2, at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/prev03pt.htm [hereinafter AAAS R&D Funding Update].
37. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
38. AAAS R&D Funding Update, supra note 36.
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be undermined by limiting broad dissemination and use of public data and
information; citizens’ First Amendment rights might be compromised; and the
nation generally benefits from broad, unfettered access to and use of govern-
ment databases and other public information by all citizens to promote eco-
nomic, educational, and cultural values.39  It is primarily the latter justification,
which involves many positive externalities and network effects from the Inter-
net on the conduct of research and on our national system of innovation that is
this article’s focus of discussion.40
The federal government’s specific policies relating to scientific data activi-
ties date back to the advent of the era of “big science” following World War II,
which established a framework for the planning and management of large-scale
basic and applied research programs.41  Most of this research was initially con-
ducted in the physical sciences and engineering, fueled largely by the Cold War
and related national defense concerns.  Although a substantial portion of this
research was classified, at least initially, the default rule was that the research
data and information produced by the government entered the public domain.
This research model yielded a succession of spectacular scientific and techno-
logical breakthroughs and well-documented socio-economic benefits.
The hallmark of big science, more recently referred to as “megascience,”
has been the use of large research facilities or research centers and of “facility-
class” instruments, which are most usefully characterized as observational or
experimental.42  In the observational sciences, some of the most significant
advances initially occurred in the space and earth sciences as offshoots of classi-
fied military and intelligence space technologies and of NASA’s Apollo pro-
gram.  Notable examples of large observational facilities have included space
39. See Weiss & Backlund, supra note 7, at 300-05; A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1, at 52-
58.  See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 179 (Summer 1995);
40. The policies and practices of state and local governments with regard to legal protection of
their databases and other information are not as straightforward as those in the federal context.  Sec-
tion 105 of the 1976 Copyright Act does not expressly ban copyright claims in the works of non-federal
government entities. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). Some states have nonetheless enacted open records laws
that prohibit protection of their government information, that encourage open dissemination to the
public, and contain provisions analogous to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),  5 U.S.C. § 552
(2000).  See, e.g., California Public Records Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6253 (Deering 2003); 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 140/3 (2002).  There is no uniformity among the states in these areas, however, and there
are many exceptions that allow state and local jurisdictions to protect some types of information gener-
ated by selected agencies, even in those states that have enacted open records laws.  Consequently,
some state and local agencies currently protect their databases and other productions under copyright
and contract laws, and these agencies would likely make use of any additional intellectual property pro-
tection that new federal or state laws might provide.  Nevertheless, most of the same policy reasons that
support the public domain status of federal government information apply equally well at the lower
levels of government and thus should exempt information produced by state and local governments
from such protection.  For an overview of state practice and policy implications, see Perritt, supra note
39.
41. See generally BIG SCIENCE, supra note 29.
42. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 58-61; see also OECD, EVALUATION OF THE OECD
MEGASCIENCE FORUM; REPORT OF THE EXPERT PANEL (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/
M000014000/M00014730.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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science satellites for robotic solar-system exploration, ground-based astronomi-
cal telescopes, earth observation satellites, networks of terrestrial sensors for
continuous global environmental observations and global change studies, and
more recently, automated genome-decoding machines.43  Major examples in the
experimental sciences have included facilities for neutron beam and synchro-
tron radiation sources, large lasers, supercolliders for high-energy particle
physics, high-field magnet laboratories, and nuclear fusion experiments.44
The data from many of these government research projects, especially in the
last two decades, have been openly shared and archived in public repositories.
Hundreds of specialized data centers have been established by the federal sci-
ence agencies or at universities under government contract.45 
Scientific data and other kinds of information generated by the governments
of other nations may also end up in the public domain and become available
internationally.46  Generally, however, the quantities are considerably smaller
than the information resources generated by the U.S. government, and the
43. BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 58-61.
44. Id.
45. A few well-known examples of the government’s public domain data archiving and dissemina-
tion activities include the NASA Space Science Data Center, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov (last visited Feb.
18, 2003); the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (“NOAA”) National Data Centers,
http://www.nesdis.noaa.gov (last visited Feb. 20, 2003); the U.S. Geological Survey’s Earth Resources
Observation Systems (“EROS”) Data Center; http:// edc.usgs.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2003); and the
National Center for Biotechnology Information at the National Institutes of Health,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2003); among many others.  There is no comprehen-
sive list of all data centers in all areas of science and technology.  However, there are over 100 federal
data centers listed for global change research alone.  See NASA’s Global Change Master Directory,
http://gcmd.gsfc.nasa.gov (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).  It is also important to note that some of these
data repositories, such as the NOAA National Data Centers, charge substantial fees for access.  See
infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
Scientific and technical articles, reports, and other information products generated by the federal
government are also not copyrightable and available in the public domain. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
Most research agencies have well-organized and extensive dissemination activities for such information,
typically referred to as scientific and technical information, or “STI” (as distinct from data as such).
These organizations include the National Library of Medicine, http://www.nlm.nih.gov (last visited Feb.
20, 2003); the National Agricultural Library, http://www.nal.usda.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2003); the
Defense Technical Information Center, http://www.dtic.mil (last visited Feb. 20, 2003); the Office of
Scientific and Technical Information at the U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.osti.gov (last visited
Feb. 18, 2003); and the NASA Scientific and Technical Information Program, http://www.sti.nasa.gov
(last visited Feb. 20. 2003); among others.
 Most of the STI products held by these repositories are available free of charge.  Many agencies,
however, also use the National Technical Information Service in the Department of Commerce, http://
www.ntis.gov/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2003), which makes additional STI available to the public for a fee.
The Federal Depository Library Program provides yet another outlet for such information through its
regional libraries, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/SU_docs/locators/findlibs (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
Finally, the National Archives and Records Administration provides permanent access to a subset of
the STI resources, which it appraises and makes selectively available thirty years after their production,
at http://www.archives.gov/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
46. David Banisar, Freedom of Information and Access to Government Records Around the
World (July 2, 2002), at http://www.freedominfo.org/survey.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003) (indicating
that over forty countries now have comprehensive laws to facilitate access to state records, and another
thirty are in the process of enacting such statutes). For the situation in the European Union, see the
European Commission’s Green Paper, Public Sector Information: A Key Resource for Europe, annexe
1 at 20-25 COM (1998) 585 [hereinafter Green Paper].
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public-access policies are much less open than those applicable in the United
States.47  Notable examples of foreign sources of public domain data are the
World Data Centers for geophysical, environmental, and space data48 and the
human genome databases in Europe and Japan.49  However, a key issue for both
the exploitation of public data resources and for cooperative research generally
is the asymmetry between the United States and foreign government
approaches to the public domain availability of scientific data.50  This asymmetry
has been deepened by the European Union’s adoption in 1996 of an exclusive
property right in non-copyrightable collections of data, as discussed in more
detail in Part III.
2. Limiting Factors
Before delving into the growing pressures on the public domain, a number
of countervailing polices and practices that limit free or open and unrestricted
use of government-generated data and information must be noted.  Important
statutory exemptions to public domain access are based on national security
concerns,51 the need to protect personal privacy of human subjects in research,52
and the need to respect confidential information.53  These limitations on the
public domain accessibility of federal government information, while often jus-
tified, must nonetheless be balanced against the rights and needs of citizens to
access and use it.
Another limitation derives from the fact that government-generated data
are not necessarily provided cost free.  The federal policy for information dis-
semination, as set out in the Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Cir-
cular A-130, stipulates that such data should be made available at the marginal
cost of dissemination—that is, the cost of fulfilling a user request.54  That policy
expressly excludes recouping the costs of production, much less making a
profit.55  In practice, the prices actually charged vary between marginal and
47. Weiss & Backlund, supra note 7, at 307; Yvette Plujimers & Peter Weiss, Borders in Cyber-
space: Conflicting Public Sector Information Policies and their Economic Impacts (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors).
48. For a brief history of the World Data Center system and their general principles of operation,
see the International Council for Science Word Data Center System, at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/wdc/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003).  See also links to the various World Data Center home pages, at
http://www.ngdc.noaa. gov/wdc/gdhomepg.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
49. See European Human Genome Database, available at http://www.embl-heidelberg.de (last vis-
ited Feb 13, 2003); Human Genome Database of Japan, available at http://www.ddbj.nig.ac.jp (last vis-
ited Feb. 13, 2003).
50. The E.C. Directive on the legal protection of databases, supra note 17, does not prohibit pro-
prietary rights in government-generated data (some governments assert these rights vigorously), nor
does it mandate an exception for scientific uses of protected collections of data.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
54. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, § 8a(7) (“Information Management
Policy—Avoiding Improperly Restrictive Practices”) (Feb. 8, 1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/circulars/a130/ a130.html.
55. Id. at Appendix § 4.
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incremental cost pricing arrangements.56  Charges higher than the marginal cost
of dissemination can create substantial barriers to access, particularly for aca-
demic research, which may require the use of large portions or the entire con-
tents of huge databases for modeling or data mining applications.  Nevertheless,
this policy differs from that of most other countries, in which governmental or
quasi-governmental agencies may exploit public information at full cost recov-
ery rates and may also invoke the protection of that information under intellec-
tual property law.57
In practice, a major barrier to accessing government-generated data and
information arises from the failure of agencies to disseminate or preserve them
for long-term availability.  As a result, a massive amount of public domain
information is either hidden from public view or is irretrievably lost.58  Although
this generally tends to be less problematic for scientific information, the well-
known problems of inadequate documentation and organization are particu-
larly acute for some areas of scientific data and information, particularly in the
life sciences.59  When the problem is a simple failure to disseminate, the Free-
dom of Information Act (“FOIA”) may sometimes provide an antidote.60  How-
ever, the process of filing a FOIA request is time consuming and bureaucratic.
Another limitation derives from OMB Circular A-76, which bars the gov-
ernment from directly competing with the private sector in providing informa-
tion products and services.61  This policy substantially narrows the amount and
type of information that the government can undertake to produce and dis-
seminate.  As regards science, the well-accepted view is that basic research,
together with its supporting data, constitute public goods that properly fall
within the sphere of government activity, although the boundary between what
is considered appropriate public or private functions continues to shift in this
and other respects.
Finally, the government is required to respect the proprietary rights in data
and information originating from the private sector that are made available for
government use or, more generally, for regulatory and other purposes, unless
56. In some exceptional circumstances, agencies may charge full incremental cost recovery prices.
For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1534 authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to charge fair market value for
the data from the NOAA National Data Centers, although lower prices are allowed to be charged to
educational organizations.
57. For the pricing policies for government data in the European Union, see Green Paper, supra
note 46.  See also PIRA INTERNATIONAL, COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF EUROPE’S PUBLIC
SECTOR INFORMATION, FINAL REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE
GENERAL FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2000).
58. See generally 1 U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE, A
COMPREHENSIVE  ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, FINAL REPORT (2001).
In the United States, some state governments also seek copyright protection of model codes and other
quasi-legislative materials.  See, e.g., Veek v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 650 (2002).
59. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 70-74.
60. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
61. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 (Aug. 8, 1983, rev. 1999), Performance of
Commercial Activities, § 5(c), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a076.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
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expressly exempted. 62  To the extent that more of the production and dissemina-
tion functions of research data are shifted from the public to the private sector,
this limitation becomes more potent.  Moreover, this trend easily gives way to
pressures to prevent reasonable commercial uses of data that firms must submit
to government for regulatory purposes and can even result in back door, de
facto intellectual property rights that protect scientific data.63  By the same
token, foreign governments that opt to protect and commercialize their own
data may seek to restrict their open dissemination and use by the U.S. govern-
ment for research and other public-interest purposes.64
B. Government-Funded Data: Between the Research Commons and
Commercial Applications
A second major source of public domain data and information for scientific
research is that which is produced in academic or other not-for-profit institu-
tions with government and philanthropic funding.  However, databases and
other information goods produced in these settings become presumptively pro-
tectible under any relevant intellectual property regime unless affirmative steps
are taken to place such material in the public domain.  In this case, the public
domain must be actively created, rather than passively conferred.
This component of the public domain results from the contractual require-
ments of the granting agencies in combination with long-standing norms of sci-
ence.  These norms aspire to implement “full and open access” to scientific data
as well as the sharing of research results so as to promote new endeavors.  The
policy of full and open access or exchange has been defined in various U.S. gov-
ernment policy documents and in National Research Council (“NRC”) reports
in the following terms: “[D]ata and information derived from publicly funded
research are [to be] made available with as few restrictions as possible, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, for no more than the cost of reproduction and distribu-
62. See, e.g., TREVOR M. COOK, THE PROTECTION OF REGULATORY DATA IN
PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER SECTORS, Preface, 7 (2000) (stressing that concerns about the confi-
dentiality of regulatory data, including the results of clinical trials, have mainly surfaced in the past
twenty-five years).  Since 1982, the United States has adopted provisions to protect regulatory data
submitted to federal agencies in connection with pesticides, and it has imposed regulatory exclusivity
provisions for medical data since 1984.  Id. at 4-01.  These provisions reportedly “provide a de facto
measure of . . . data protection” to new chemical entities for five years and they give three years of pro-
tection for “data filed . . . in support of . . . chemical entities which have already been approved for use
in medicines but [for] which fresh authorizations are [to be] based on new clinical investigations.”  Id.
For analogous provisions that may confer even longer periods of protection in the European Union,
Australia, and New Zealand, see id. at Preface 6-7, 3-01, 5-01.
63. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984); Bayer, Inc. v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1999] F.C.A.D.J. 142.  Some obligations in this regard have even been codified as
international minimum standards under article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].  See generally Carlos Correa, Public Health and International Law: Unfair Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement Article 39.3: Protection of Data Submitted for Registration of Pharmaceuti-
cals, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69 (2002).
64. See infra notes 543-50 and accompanying text.
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
332 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:315
tion”65 (that is, the marginal cost, which on the Internet is zero).  This policy is
promoted by different U.S. government agencies with varying degrees of suc-
cess.  It also applies to most government-funded or cooperative research
arrangements, particularly in large, institutionalized research programs, such as
“global change” studies or the human genome project, and even to smaller-
scale collaborations involving individual investigators who are not otherwise
affiliated with private-sector partners.66
Because government agencies are funding these efforts, they are in a posi-
tion to reinforce the underlying norms of science by suitable contractual provi-
sions that regulate access to data before and after publication of the research
results.  Basic research grants in particular attempt to ensure that government-
funded data enter the upstream processes of scientific research as an input
available from the public domain.67
In addition, the research articles published in scientific journals will them-
selves become subject to the balancing of public and private interests that
occurs under the prevailing intellectual property regime.  For example, tradi-
tional copyright principles have consigned facts, ideas, data, and findings to the
public domain; there are codified exceptions for research and educational uses,
and exceptions for fair uses or private use to advance research and other public-
interest goals have been granted.68
Scientists also hold much data in their individual capacities, which will be
made available on a transactional basis.  In principle, the government science
agencies’ contractual specifications that promote eventual access to govern-
ment-funded data reinforce long-standing norms of science, which are tradi-
tionally premised on open access and the sharing ethos.69  While the real-world
implementation of these norms has always been imperfect and is now subject to
intense countervailing pressures that are described below, one must nonetheless
emphasize, at the outset, that the government’s baseline default rules and the
norms of science remain mutually reinforcing with respect to data as an input
into scientific research.  This convergence traditionally makes it harder for sci-
entists to violate these contractual and cultural norms with regard to access to
government-funded data as upstream inputs for research purposes.
Even so, scientific data have a dual nature in the sense that they are also
outputs of the scientific process, and these outputs—suitably aggregated—
become inputs once again into the national system of innovation.  Here,
65. BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 1.
66. See FULL AND OPEN EXCHANGE, supra note 8 at 2; NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
GRANT GENERAL CONDITIONS (GC-1) #36 (2001).
67. See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 95-26, GRANT POLICY MANUAL § 734 (1995)
[hereinafter GRANT POLICY MANUAL]; see also infra note 72.
68. See supra note 12; Thomas Dreier, Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside
or Outside Proprietary Rights, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note 13, at 295, 301, 303-
09.  See generally Jaap H. Spoor, General Aspects of Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright: General
Report, in THE BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT—ITS PROPER LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 27-41
(Libby Baulch et al. eds., 1997) (providing the most recent comparative survey of existing law).
69. See supra note 8.
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however, very different government policies may apply.  The non-proprietarial
default rule built into government-funded data exists side-by-side with a second,
posterior set of default rules that encourage research entities outside the federal
system to transfer government-funded research from the public to the private
sector, usually by means of intellectual property rights.70
It becomes necessary to look beyond the surface to gain some deeper
insights into how the stated policies and rules built around government-funded
data are actually implemented in academic science.  In this regard, it is useful to
further subdivide the producers of government-funded data into two distinct
but partially overlapping categories.
In one category, the research takes place in a highly structured academic
setting, with relatively clear rules set by government funding agencies that
determine the rights of researchers in the production, dissemination, and use of
data.  Publication of the research results constitutes the primary organizing
principle.  Traditionally, the rules and norms that apply in this sphere, which we
call the zone of formally regulated access to data, aim with varying degrees of
success to achieve a bright line of demarcation between the public and private
rights to the data being generated.
In the other category, individual scientists establish their own interpersonal
relationships and networks with other colleagues, largely within their special-
ized research communities.  In this category, which we call the zone of informal
data exchanges, scientists may generate and hold their data subject to their own
interests and to the interplay of norms, rules, and competitive strategies that
may deviate considerably from the practices established within the zone of for-
mal exchanges.
1. The Zone of Formally Regulated Access to Data
As previously noted, when federal government agencies fund research proj-
ects that include the production of scientific data in not-for-profit academic
institutions, they typically stipulate a set of rights and obligations binding the
agency and the principal investigator with regard to those data.  For example,
the grant may entitle the investigator to a period of exclusive use of the relevant
data prior to publication of the research results.  It may also mandate that the
data sets collected under the grant become freely available for others to use
following the publication of results or upon the expiration of the exclusive use
period, and to this end, it may further specify that such materials should be
deposited in government or university data centers or archives.71
70. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 95-115; see also Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions:
Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT.  L. REV. 347, 353, 395-413
(2000).
71. See, e.g., National Science Foundation Office of Polar Programs, Guidelines and Award Condi-
tions for Scientific Data (1998); National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Science Policy Guide
(1996); National Science Foundation Division of Ocean Sciences 94-126, Policy for Oceanographic
Data (1994).
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a. Contractually Reinforcing the Sharing Ethos
Contractual requirements vary by agency and discipline and even by
research programs undertaken within the same agency.  Different agencies may
address these issues with more or less attentiveness, and different offices within
the same agency may have diverse requirements as well.72
72. Although a comprehensive assessment of specific data rights across all federal science agency
grants and contracts is beyond the scope of this discussion, a brief review of some of the most common
provisions is instructive.
For example, the standard clause on “Dissemination and Sharing of Research Results” in a
National Science Foundation (“NSF”) grant provides as follows:
a. Investigators are expected to promptly prepare and submit for publication, with author-
ship that accurately reflects the contributions of those involved, all significant findings
from work conducted under NSF grants.  Grantees are expected to permit and encourage
such publication by those actually performing that work, unless a grantee intends to pub-
lish or disseminate such findings itself.
b. Investigators are expected to share with other researchers, at no more than incremental
cost and within a reasonable time, the primary data, samples, physical collections and
other supporting materials created or gathered in the course of work under NSF grants.
Grantees are expected to encourage and facilitate such sharing. . . .
c. Investigators and grantees are encouraged to share software and inventions created
under the grant or otherwise make them or their products widely available and usable.
d. The NSF normally allows grantees to retain principal legal rights to intellectual property
developed under NSF grants to provide incentives for development and dissemination of
inventions, software and publications that can enhance their usefulness, accessibility and
upkeep.  Such incentives do not, however, reduce the responsibility that investigators and
organizations have as members of the scientific and engineering community to make
results, data and collections available to other researchers.
GRANT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 67, at § 734.
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) is currently developing a statement on sharing research
data that:
[E]xpects and supports the timely release and sharing of final research data from NIH-sup-
ported studies for use by other researchers.  Investigators submitting an NIH application will
be required to include a plan for data-sharing or to state why data-sharing is not possible. This
statement will apply to extramural scientists seeking grants, cooperative agreements, and con-
tracts as well as intramural investigators.
Release, NIH Announces Draft Statement on Sharing Research Data, (March 1, 2002) (NOTICE:
NOT-OD-02-035), available at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-02-035.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
The announcement goes on to say:
There are many reasons to share data from NIH-supported studies.  Sharing data reinforces
open scientific inquiry, encourages diversity of analysis and opinion, promotes new research,
makes possible the testing of new or alternative hypotheses and methods of analysis, supports
studies on data collection methods and measurement, facilitates the education of new
researchers, enables the exploration of topics not envisioned by the initial investigators, and
permits the creation of new data sets when data from multiple sources are combined.  By
avoiding the duplication of expensive data collection activities, the NIH is able to support
more investigators that it could if similar data had to be collected de novo by each applicant.
Id.
Similarly, NASA’s Data Availability Policy states that:
[R]eady access to data from NASA research programs and missions (via modern data archiv-
ing and communications technologies) by researchers not directly involved in the program
increases the return on NASA research investments. It is therefore NASA policy that non-
proprietary scientific data obtained from NASA programs and missions will be made publicly
available in usable form as quickly as possible.
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In general, the common thrust of these different types of clauses is to ensure
that the data collected or generated by grantees will be openly shared with
other researchers, at least following some specified period of exclusive use—
typically ranging from six to twenty-four months—or until the time of
publication of the research results based on those data.73  This relatively brief
period is intended to give the grantee sufficient time to produce, organize,
document, verify, and analyze the data being used in preparation of a research
article or report for scholarly publication.  In many cases, the data are placed in
a public archive upon publication, or at the expiration of the specified period of
exclusive use and are expressly designated as free from legal protection, or they
are expected to be made available directly by the researcher to anyone who
requests access.
In most cases, publication of research results marks the point at which data
produced by government-funded investigators should become generally avail-
able.  The standard research grant requirement or norm has been that once
publication occurs, it will trigger public disclosure of the supporting data.  To
the extent that this requirement is implemented in practice, it represents the
culmination of the scientific norms of sharing.74  From this point forward, access
to the investigator’s results will depend on the method chosen to make the
underlying data publicly available and on the traditional legal norms—
especially those of copyright law—that govern scientific works.
These organizing principles derive historically from the premise that aca-
demic researchers typically are not driven by the same motivations as their
counterparts in industry.  Public-interest research is not dependent on the
maximization of profits and value to shareholders through the protection of
proprietary rights in information.  Rather, the motivations of not-for-profit sci-
entists are predominantly rooted in intellectual curiosity, the desire to create
new knowledge, peer recognition and career advancement, and the promotion
of the public interest.75  As R. Stephen Berry, the Home Secretary for the
National Academy of Sciences, recently noted:
Scientists are not, for the most part, motivated to do research to make money.  If they
were, they would be in different fields.  The primary motivation for most research sci-
entists is the desire for influence and impact on the thinking of others about the natu-
BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 80 (quoting NASA Science Policy Guide (1996)).  The policy goes on
to provide a list of competing factors that need to be considered in determining data rights, and pre-
sents examples of data rights that have been used, mostly variations on the length of the initial period
of an investigator’s proprietary use.
73. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 79.  One of the recommendations of that report was that
all scientists conducting publicly funded research should make their data available immediately, or fol-
lowing a reasonable period of time for proprietary use.  Id. at 11.
74. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMUNITY STANDARDS FOR SHARING
PUBLICATION-RELATED DATA AND MATERIALS (2002) [hereinafter COMMUNITY STANDARDS] (dis-
cussing these norms and requirements in the biological sciences).
75. See, e.g., Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 178 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights] (“The scientific
community rewards those who make original contributions to the common stock of knowledge by
giving them professional recognition.”).
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ral world—unless the desire for their own personal understanding is even stronger. . . .
The currency of the researcher is the extent to which her or his ideas influence the
thinking of others. . . . What this implies is that the distribution of the results of
research has an extremely high priority for any working scientists, apart from those
whose work is behind proprietary walls.76
Science policy in the United States has long taken for granted that these values
and goals are best served by the maximum availability and distribution of
research results, at the lowest possible cost, with the fewest restrictions on use,
and the promotion of reuse and integration of the fruits of existing results in
new research.  The placement of scientific and technical (“S&T”) data and
databases in the public domain, and the established policy of full and open
access to such resources in the government and academic sectors77 reflect these
values and serve these goals.
b. Legal Rules that Support the Sharing Ethos
Assuming that the relatively standard grant rules apply and that scientific
data are fully disclosed at the time of publication in the manner previously
described, the intellectual property norms that traditionally came into play in
the post-publication phase were, on the whole, consonant with the cultural
norms of the scientific enterprise.  First, data as such were not generally consid-
ered subject matter eligible for copyright protection in most jurisdictions, and
the few deviant jurisdictions that thought otherwise were overruled by the 1991
Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.78  Furthermore, the United States has not yet adopted a sui generis legal
regime to protect non-copyrightable collections of information as the European
Union did in 1996,79 while most claims arising under unfair competition law are
forfeited with voluntary disclosure to the public.80
Second, the power of contracts to regulate the dissemination of publicly dis-
closed data was inherently weak in the pre-digital age owing to the inability of
the contracting parties to sue third parties who obtained the relevant data out-
side of the contractual relationship.81  It was the inherent weakness of these
76. R. Stephen Berry, Is Electronic Publishing Being Used in the Best Interests of Science?  The Sci-
entists’ View,  2001 INT’L J. MOLECULAR SCI. 133, 134 (2001).
77. See supra notes 65, 72 and accompanying text.
78. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding the factual information in the white pages of a telephone book
lacked creativity and originality in selection and arrangement, and was not copyrightable).  But see
Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning from the Past in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 874
(2001); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction
Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 528, 539-40 (1981) (stressing need for compiler’s incentives);
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Commercial Value].
79. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17.
80. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 38-45 (1995) (allowing
claim of misappropriation of trade secrets, but not recognizing any broader misappropriation claim
rooted in copying as such).  However, state law doctrines of misappropriation may nonetheless apply to
wholesale duplication of databases to a still unknown extent.  See, e.g., Int’l  News Serv. v. Assoc. Press,
248 U.S. 215 (1918); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1996).
81. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 27 (1994) (noting the lack of need for copyright protection before the printing press).
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“two-party deals” to regulate generally the dissemination of intangible literary
and artistic productions that gave rise to copyright and neighboring rights laws,82
which impose an unbargained-for set of default rules upon all those who gain
access to such productions.83  If anything, the traditional use of grants and con-
tracts in the domain of government-funded data was to implement the sharing
norms of science, as shown above.84
Third, with regard to the data and information contained in published scien-
tific works, the balance of public and private interests traditionally struck by
U.S. copyright law was particularly favorable to second-comers and researchers
in general.  Collections of information distributed in hard copies, such as direc-
tories, handbooks, and other useful compilations of facts or data, are copy-
rightable only to the extent that they manifest a minimum quantum of original
and creative authorship.85  Typically, the requisite degree of authorship is
revealed in the compiler’s criteria for selecting, arranging, and documenting the
data assembled in any given compilation.86  However, the facts and data con-
tained in a copyrightable scientific work, for example, are ineligible for protec-
tion as are any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle or discovery” it contains.87
Moreover, after passing the threshold of copyright law, even those “factual
works” that do manifest the minimum degree of creative authorship are likely
to obtain only a “thin” scope of protection at the infringement stage.88  Because
the facts and data in scientific works are not copyrightable subject matter, and
only the creative selection or arrangement is protectible, a second-comer can, in
principle, borrow the first-comer’s disparate data while varying the organiza-
tional format.  As the Supreme Court noted in Feist, the traditional copyright
approach to scientific and other factual works thus strikes a balance between
incentives to invest and free competition that tends to err on the side of second-
comers.89  In effect, by severely curtailing the first-comer’s ability to control
follow-on applications of factual content,90 copyright law in this area operates as
a kind of roving unfair competition law that protects the authors of scientific
works mainly against wholesale duplication.  In the United States, these limita-
tions are thought to have constitutional underpinnings, in keeping with First
82. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 897-99.
83. See, e.g., Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a
Constitutionally—Grounded Discourse of Public-Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 595, 599-600 (1996) (stressing economic and cultural bargain between authors and users).
84. See supra note 72 (citing specific examples).
85. 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000) (definition of compilations); § 102(a)-(b); § 103; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
86. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348; see also Warren Publ’g Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950, 956
(11th Cir. 1995); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1446
(11th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Publ’g Enter., Inc., 945 F.2d. 509, 514 (2d
Cir. 1991).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
88. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
89. Id. at 349-50.
90. Notwithstanding 17 U.S.C. § 103 and § 106(2), which the Supreme Court limited in this respect.
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Amendment rights protecting freedom of speech and with the role of a robust
public domain in democratic discourse.91
One of the largest categories of scientific information in the United States
thus consists of ineligible collections of data or the non-copyrightable contents
of otherwise copyrightable works, including databases, articles, or reference
books.  This category of public domain information, while highly distributed
among all types of proprietary works, plays a fundamental role in supporting
research and education, especially in the data-intensive sciences.  However,
strenuous efforts are being made to devise new forms of protection for all of
this previously unprotectible subject matter, as explained in Part III of this arti-
cle.
When scientific works, including compilations of data and information, do
attract copyright protection, the copyright laws of most countries contain codi-
fied limitations, exceptions, or immunities that favor teaching, research, and
other educational activities.92  In European Union countries, there is a “private
use” exception, which to some extent overlaps the much broader “fair use”
exception in U.S. copyright law.93  Also, in the European Union compulsory
licenses may be enacted to promote public policy goals, including research and
education, without depriving authors of an economic return from these uses of
their works.94  For example, some countries allow the photocopying of copy-
righted journals for research purposes only in exchange for compensatory pay-
ments that are increasingly worked out with collection societies representing
authors’ interests in these matters.95
In U.S. copyright law, considerable emphasis has traditionally been placed
on the fair use exception to copyright protection,96 which permits certain uses to
91. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 582; see also Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database
Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information,
15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000) [hereinafter Benkler, Constitutional Bounds]; Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, Free as the Air]; James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:
Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Marci A. Hamilton,
A Response to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 605 (2000); Neil Netanel, Locating Copy-
right Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
92. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 68; Sam Ricketson, International Conventions and Treaties, in
BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 68, at 3, 5-10 (stressing recurring exceptions in national
copyright laws for private study, and for “use for scientific and research purposes,” in addition to provi-
sions allowing use for teaching purposes); see also Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use
Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000).
93. See Adolf Dietz, Germany, in BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 68, at 265, 269 (noting
rights of free reproduction or other private use, sometimes subject to an obligation to remunerate,
under articles 53-54(a) of German copyright law); Yves Gaubiac, France, in id. at 226, 231 (noting
exception for private noncommercial use to promote private study and research under French law).
94. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 68; Ricketson, supra note 92, at 9, 14; Spoor, supra note 68.
95. See, e.g., LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 81-82 (2002)
(discussing mandatory collective administration of reprography right under French copyright law);
Dietz, supra note 93, at 269 (stressing basic permissibility of private copying and reprography even
when subject to collective agreements on equitable remuneration).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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be made of otherwise protected content under limited circumstances, in order
to advance the public interest in certain privileged policy goals without unduly
burdening the authors’ incentive to create.97  On a case-by-case basis, this doc-
trine may permit uses of otherwise protected expression,98 especially for such
purposes as illustration, teaching, research, verification, and news reporting.99
However, the strength of this exception varies with judicial attitudes and from
period to period, and its consistency with international intellectual property law
has been called into question.100
Because many so-called fair uses are allowed only in the context of not-for-
profit research or education, this category of “public domain uses,” though rela-
tively small, is especially important in the research context.  While commenta-
tors have not typically associated fair uses and other exceptions with the “public
domain,”101 a number of traditionally practiced immunities and exceptions,
including fair use, may be construed as functional equivalents of public domain
uses, especially where science and education are concerned.102
Applications of the fair use exception tend to be controversial, however,
even with regard to educational and research activities, where publishers often
emphasize the harm to markets resulting from ad hoc judicial concessions to
users of copyrighted materials in particular situations.103  Recently, the federal
appellate courts have tended to restrict the fair use exception when technical
means to overcome market failure are shown to exist,104 and the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) has severely cut back on the application of fair
use to online transmissions.105  At the same time, there is growing interest in
doctrines of misuse of copyrights, which courts have used to strike down
97. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights
Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 468-80 (1998); William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1998); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
98. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding at preliminary injunction stage, publisher of The Wind
Done Gone was entitled to fair-use defense against copyright infringement claim); Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (preambular uses).  See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.1.5 (1996).
100. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 92.
101. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 99, at §10.1 (noting theories of fair use sounding in “privi-
lege,” “equitable rule of reason,” “market failure,” and “public benefit” theories).
102. Cf., e.g., id. at §10.2.1 (stressing cultural and social values of an educated public that follow
from preambular fair uses favoring teaching, scholarship, and research).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
104. Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geo-
physical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Gordon, supra note 97.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 1201; David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter/Spring 2003); see also Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 62-67;
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the Pro-CD Case: A Market Based Approach, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997).
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licensing restrictions that unreasonably extend the statutory bundle of exclusive
rights or that otherwise impose unreasonable restraints on trade.106
Finally, it should be recalled that copyrights eventually expire when the
statutory period of protection ends, and the public then becomes the residual
owner of all previously protected works.  The basic term of copyright protection
is very long, especially in the United States and the European Union, where it
now lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years.107  The United States sepa-
rately protects corporate works (technically, works made for hire) for either a
term of ninety-five years from first publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever is shorter.108  The relevant international minimum standard requires a
term of life plus fifty years for works by human authors and at least fifty years
of protection for works by corporate authors.109
Works whose copyrights have expired constitute an enormous body of freely
available literature and information with great cultural and historical signifi-
cance, and some materials in this category have obvious relevance to certain
types of research, especially in the social sciences and the humanities.  Even
some of the “hard” sciences can derive substantial value from public domain
data and information that are decades or even many centuries old.  For exam-
ple, the extraction of environmental information from a broad range of histori-
cal sources can help to establish climatological trends, or assist in identifying or
better understanding a broad range of natural phenomena.110  Ancient Chinese
writings are expected to be useful in identifying herbal medicines for modern
pharmaceutical development.111  Proposals for more systematic and ambitious
databases concerning traditional know-how and medicines are on the table,112
although these proposals would almost invariably subject such information to
new forms of intellectual property rights that would limit their availability in the
public domain.113  On the whole, because of the long lag time before entering the
106. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 68, at 311-12; Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving
Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 (2000).
107. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 (2000); Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing
the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9; see also Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1062, and cert.
amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
109. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 63, art. 12; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (as last revised July 24, 1971, and amended Oct. 2, 1979), 828 U.N.T.S.
221, art. 7(1) [hereinafter Berne Convention].  See generally J. H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright
and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625 (1996).
110. FULL AND OPEN EXCHANGE, supra note 8, at 3.
111. BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 73.
112. See, e.g., Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 239 (2001); Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Culture, Sympo-
sium presented at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Feb. 21-22, 2002).
113. See, e.g., William van Caenegem, The Public Domain: Scientia Nullius?, 2002 E.I.P.R. 324, 325,
328-30 (2002) (warning that some constructions of the public domain may be used to dispossess rights
of indigenous peoples deriving from different social and cultural constructs).
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public domain, most of the information in this category of lapsed protection
lacks relevance to most types of state-of-the-art research.
c. Countervailing Policies: The Commercialization of Government-
Funded Research
In the academic sector, the predominant norms remain those of open disclo-
sure and the sharing of research data at the time of publication, if not before,
and in many cases, this ethos also entails the placement of the data derived from
federally funded research in public data centers and archives.  Nevertheless,
diverse policy incentives and economic pressures have increasingly induced
research universities and academics to protect or commercialize their research
data, rather than place them in the public domain.  The costs and tuitions of
higher education have far outpaced inflation, so there are direct economic
needs for the universities to generate new sources of income wherever possi-
ble.114  Perhaps most significant, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act115 has encouraged aca-
demics to protect and commercialize the fruits of their federally funded
research,116 especially in the potentially lucrative biomedical research area.117
While Bayh-Dole technically applies only to data products otherwise eligi-
ble for patent protection,118 it supports the broader principle that universities
should seek to commercialize applications of government-funded research
products in general.  Under Bayh-Dole, universities have moved away from
policies that favor pure research, both for its own sake and as a tool for
advancing higher education.  As the costs of education skyrocket, and govern-
ment funding fails to keep up in many areas, universities have aggressively
sought to exploit commercial applications of research results, with an eye
toward maximizing returns on investment.119
There is evidence that the Bayh-Dole Act has exerted a positive effect on
technological innovation and that it has generated fruitful public–private part-
114. Regarding the steep rises in higher education costs, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC
POLICY AND HIGHER EDUCATION, LOSING GROUND: A NATIONAL STATUS REPORT ON THE
AFFORDABILITY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2002), available at http://www.highereducation.
org/reports/losing_ ground/ar.shtml/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
115. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§
200-212 (2000)).
116. “It is the policy and objective of Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally supported research or development . . . [and] to promote the collabo-
ration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities . . . .” 35 U.S.C.
§ 200 (2000).
117. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (Winter/Spring 2003); see also Frischmann, supra note 70, at 397-413;
Rai, supra note 33, at 95-100.
118. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000).
119. Note, however, that generating revenue for universities was not the goal of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 117, at 300.  Technically, the Bayh-Dole Act requires that the profits
accruing to the beneficiary nonprofit organizations “be utilized for the support of scientific research or
education.”  See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7) (2000).
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nerships for commercial exploitation of academic research.120  At the same time,
the policies promoting downstream application of university research results
under Bayh-Dole have increasingly come into conflict with the policies favoring
full and open access to research data and with the larger educational and public
interest mission of universities.121
First of all, because Bayh-Dole inclines university administrations and indi-
vidual academics to seek opportunities for the commercial exploitation of fed-
erally funded research, they are tempted to hoard data, to refrain from divulg-
ing them fully, and to conduct research operations under rules of secrecy and
confidentiality.  In doing so, they are increasingly likely to treat data collections
as private goods in support of commercial exploitation of related applications
under restrictive licensing agreements.122
A second development stemming in part from the blurring and collapse of
the boundaries between basic and applied research, especially in biotechnology,
is the discovery of ways to commercialize upstream aggregates of data as
research tools and products.123  This development greatly augments the potential
value of some scientific databases, and raises obstacles to the dissemination and
use of research data as further inputs into the research process that were seldom
previously encountered.124  In this environment, the value of the data supporting
a patent application under Bayh-Dole may ultimately exceed the value of the
invention being claimed, and more and more patent applications cover elec-
tronic information tools built around aggregates of data.
Similarly, the data supporting published scientific research may have poten-
tial commercial value to the originating institution and the responsible team of
120. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Public Research].
121. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 75, at 180 (finding that although the patent
system and the norms of science have much in common, “the conjunction may nonetheless cause delay
in the dissemination of new knowledge and aggravate inherent conflict between the norms and reward
structure of science”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruit-
ful Tension, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 92 (“Even if expected practical benefits make patentable out-
comes likely and motivate private firms to pay for the research, public funding might still be justified to
increase the open domain of commonly owned knowledge upon which scientists may draw freely in
future research.”); Rai, supra note 33, at 109-37 (stressing negative impact on public domain); see also
Avital Bar-Shalom & Robert Cook-Deegan, Patents and Innovation in Cancer Therapeutics: Lessons
from CellPro (2002) (unpublished study on file with authors).
122. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 115 (finding that “both communalism and norms against secrecy
have been eroded by delays in publication and restrictions on the sharing of [biotech] research materi-
als and tools caused by concerns about intellectual property rights,” but recognizing some reluctance to
claim property rights in certain upstream discoveries by major research universities).
123. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools and the Law, in NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, IPR AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 2 (1997)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools] (noting that, as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, “insti-
tutions that perform fundamental research have an incentive to patent the sorts of early stage discov-
eries that in an earlier era would have been dedicated to the public domain”); see also STOKES, supra
note 35, at 58-59 (regarding the lessening of well-defined distinctions between “basic” and “applied”
research in certain areas).
124. Obstacles include potentially high direct and transactions costs between publicly funded institu-
tions.
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investigators.  This prospect, in turn, puts institutional pressures on the sharing
ethos in academia, which can limit disclosure and delay the publication of
research results.  It can also result in decisions not to publish at all or efforts to
control the supporting data even after publication.
As databases become an ever more valuable commodity on the ledgers of
university technology licensing offices, the university administrations may also
become increasingly ambivalent about the established policies that promote
open access to government-funded data.125  Universities and segments of the
academic scientific community tend to view proposals for new statutory protec-
tion of databases with considerable interest, although they also have expressed
concerns about the deleterious effects that the wrong type of protection might
have on education and research.126  In addition, as a result of increased partner-
ships with private-sector firms, some universities have adopted stricter institu-
tional rules and guidelines pertaining to access, use, and distribution of research
data and data products.
2. The Zone of Informal Data Exchanges
The norms and policies described above characteristically apply to big sci-
ence, where well-defined federal research programs and institutional structures
implement the sharing ethos, and access to public domain data is facilitated by
government-controlled repositories.  However, small science presents a rather
different picture, one in which individual investigators and small teams working
independently predominate.  As noted in Part I, here there are likely to be
other, non-federal sources of funding and the federal support that is available
will be less prescriptive about the terms of data availability, especially with
respect to pre-publication data sets.  Moreover, for research involving human
subjects, strong regulations protecting personal privacy add an extra layer of
secrecy.127
In the experimental or laboratory sciences, such as chemistry or biomedical
research, scientists use large databases for advancement to a much lesser extent
than the observational sciences do, depending instead on the use of individual,
repeatable experiments.  The laboratory sciences also rely on the use of highly
evaluated data sets and on published scientific literature, rather than on raw
observational data.  Because of the extremely specialized, labor-intensive
nature of evaluated data sets, many are produced outside the government and
are made available in proprietary publications or databases.  Nevertheless,
some public domain government sources exist for these types of data, even
though they are smaller in number and volume than the sources of observa-
125. Cf. Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 235-39 (discussing universities’ dilemma).
126. H.R. 354 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th Cong. (Mar.
18, 1999) (testimony of Charles Phelps on behalf of the Association of American Universities, the
American Council on Education, and the National Association of State Universities of Land-Grant
Colleges).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). The implementing regulations can be found at 45 C.F.R § 56 (2002).
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tional data.128
The small science independent-investigator approach traditionally has also
characterized a large area of fieldwork and studies, such as biodiversity, ecol-
ogy, microbiology, soil science, and anthropology.  Here, too, many individual
or small-team data sets or samples are independently collected and analyzed.129
The data from such studies generally have been heterogeneous and unstan-
dardized, with few of the individual data holdings deposited in public data
repositories or openly shared. 130
a. Normative Conflicts
In the small science environment, individual investigators working autono-
mously are more driven by self-interest and a competitive spirit.  They are one
step removed from the top-down policies that regulate big science projects
because in most cases they are not dependent on access to and participation in
large public domain data repositories or other structured research programs
that formally promote and enforce the sharing ethos.  In this realm, scientists
have much greater freedom to limit the disclosure of their data, in keeping with
their private interests, at least until their research is formally published.  Even
then—because few institutionalized public data repositories exist—they may
choose to withhold all but the minimum amount of data needed to support their
published findings, or may provide no data at all.131
128. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 52.  Examples of evaluated laboratory physical sciences
data include the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File, and various materials science and chemical sci-
ences data.  Id. at 205-12.
129. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FINDING THE FOREST IN THE TREES: THE
CHALLENGE OF COMBINING DIVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL DATA (1995) [hereinafter FINDING THE
FOREST].
130. Id.; see also BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 83-88.  However, as discussed infra in the last sec-
tion of Part II, the advent of pervasive distributed computing and digital networks has led to the
organization of many areas of previously “small science” into “big science” types of initiatives.  Notable
examples include the Human Genome Project and several ecological and biodiversity programs with
networked and partially centralized data resources.  The U.S. Long Term Ecological Research Network
(“LTER Net”) now connects more than 1100 scientists and students investigating ecological processes
at twenty-four research sites.  Data are freely available within two to three years.  See LTER Net,
http://lternet.edu (last visited Jan. 10, 2003). The Global Biodiversity Information Facility (“GBIF”),
the purpose of which is to “make the world’s biodiversity data freely and universally available” through
an interoperable network of biodiversity databases and information technology tools, provides another
example.  See GBIF, http://www.gbif.org/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
131. In a recent national survey, “forty-seven percent of geneticists who asked other faculty for
additional information, data, or materials regarding published research reported that at least [one] of
their requests has been denied in the preceding [three] years.  Ten percent of all post publication
requests for additional information were denied.  Because they were denied access to data, [twenty-
eight percent] of geneticists reported that they had been unable to confirm published research.  Twelve
percent said that in the previous [three] years, they had denied another academician’s request for data
concerning published results.”  Eric G. Campbell, et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evi-
dence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473-80 (2002).  For a similar situation in neuroscience
research, see Peter Aldhous, Prospect of Data Sharing Gives Brain Mappers a Headache, 406 NATURE
445, 445-46 (2000), describing how proposals to make data sharing a mandatory requirement for publi-
cation produced a significant negative response from some members of the research community.  See
generally Jon Cohen, Share and Share Alike Isn’t Always the Rule in Science, SCIENCE, June 21, 1995,
at 1715.
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This lack of structure, however, may paradoxically make single scientists
more dependent on cooperative relationships with other scientists working in
the same or related disciplines to expand their data supplies and integrate data
that result from disparate investigations.  To this end, they are prompted to vol-
untarily construct informal sharing arrangements with other scientists, notwith-
standing the rivalry and competitive goals that divide them and despite the eco-
nomic opportunities that can make such disclosures risky.132  These
arrangements give rise to collective streams of data that flow through informal
networks of voluntary collaborations built from the bottom up. 133
Data in this sphere have a different configuration from that which one is
accustomed to seeing in the more formal, big science endeavors.  There, the
data resources are often centralized databases from which scientists will borrow
bits for their research, which they may combine with other similar data
resources, or with personally collected data, into individual data products.  In
the informal, mostly small science zone of data exchanges, however, data
resemble a continuous stream or assemblage that has to be constructed from the
bottom up and that flows in different directions and at different rates as infor-
mal networks evolve.  These data streams consist of “chains of products” in
which “increasingly refined materials and inscriptions downstream” play an
important role. 134
Individual investigators constantly take parts of data sets from others and
alter or refine them in ways that suit their own needs.  These value-added out-
puts are then exchanged with the value-adding contributions of other investiga-
tors.  As Stephen Hilgartner and Sherry Brandt-Rauf describe it:
Any end-point may become a starting point; every output may become an input.  One
therefore cannot assume that data somehow arrive . . . on the scene in pre-packaged
units that are transferable, shareable, or publishable, or that there is some discrete
point in time at which data should naturally be transferred.  On the contrary, there is
always more than one way of dividing a data stream into portions that may or may not
be disseminated.135
In this process timing is crucial because many of these entities are novel or
“extremely scarce” and become available only by special arrangements, if at all.
136
132. Cf. Richard Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Republic of Science 17 (July 24, 2000)
(unpublished draft, on file with authors) (“[T]he fact that most of scientific knowledge is open, and
available through open channels, is extremely important.  This enables there to be at any time a signifi-
cant number of individuals and firms who possess and can use the scientific knowledge they need in
order to compete intelligently in this evolutionary process.  The ‘communalism’ of scientific knowledge
is an important factor contributing to its productivity in downstream efforts to advance technology.”).
133. See Stephen Hilgartner & Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, Data Access, Ownership, and Control:
Toward Empirical Studies of Access Practices, 15 KNOWLEDGE: CREATION, DIFFUSION, UTILIZATION
355, 355-72 (1994) [hereinafter Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf, Access, Ownership & Control] (describing
the “data stream” dynamics in biomedical research); see also Hilgartner, Access to Data, supra note 31;
Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf, Controlling Data, supra note 31.
134. Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf, Access, Ownership & Control, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Of course, individuals and small groups operating in this zone may nucle-
ate.137  For example, “[e]nvironmental information systems frequently nucleate
around informal collaborations (including volunteers) that determine useful
partnerships.”138  If these collaborations continue to evolve on a sharing basis,
they may give rise to more formal government research program structures that
will then institutionalize the data-sharing protocols on an open access founda-
tion.139
However, the sharing that occurs to produce the data streams in many areas
of small science, particularly in the context of the laboratory life sciences, arises
from a delicate process of barter and exchange.  Here access to data is both
limited and targeted, a process that is mediated by intricate inter-, intra-, and
extra-laboratory negotiations.140  In this process, autonomy and dependence fos-
ter conflicting interests.  By withholding data, single scientists or laboratories
temporarily promote their individual comparative advantages.  At the same
time, they may lose opportunities to improve their positions by gaining medi-
ated access to others’ data.141  In making decisions and negotiating barter or
exchange transactions, the scientist’s trading mentality is tempered to some
extent by the sharing ethos, especially as expressed in peer pressure, but he or
she may be impervious at this stage, at least, to the formal institutional mecha-
nisms that might otherwise enforce that ethos.
Accordingly, it is important to reiterate that the contents of the data streams
we describe here fall largely outside the public domain that was previously
described, even though the bulk of the data that function as inputs into the
process have been funded by the government.  Rather, because these opera-
tions are proceeding on an informal, non-organized basis (typically in a pre-
publication environment), the data are likely to be held under varying degrees
137. See Powell, Networks of Learning, supra note 13, at 265 (“In fields such as biotech, where
knowledge is advancing rapidly and the sources of knowledge are widely dispersed, organizations enter
into an array of relationships to gain access to different competencies and knowledge.”).
138. RESOLVING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 73.
139. Indeed, this is exactly what appears to be occurring in the areas of ecological studies and biodi-
versity, which, until recently, were conducted by individuals or small groups in autonomous field studies
in separately funded programs.  The data collected in these investigations were heterogeneous, unstan-
dardized, lacking in rigorous data management protocols, and generally not shared or made available
for many years, if at all.  FINDING THE FOREST, supra note 129, at 84-96, 100-01.  With the advent of
the Internet, however, many of these previously disparate and autonomous research groups have begun
to share their data through formally organized networks with formal, standardized protocols.  See, e.g.,
the organizations discussed at supra note 130.
140. Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf, Access, Ownership & Control, supra note 133, at 369.  In contrast to
open publication, Hilgartner and Brandt-Rauf suggest that access here is achieved by a variety of
means, including barter; selected distribution to colleagues; patents; training; confidential sharing; pur-
chase and sale transactions; “pre-release” to corporate sponsors; or the data is held in lab for future
uses.
141. See Stephen Hilgartner, Data Access Policy in Genome Research, in PRIVATE SCIENCE 202-15
(Arnold Thakray ed., 1998) (giving examples of data-sharing within the Human Genome Project).
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of actual secrecy, much like know-how in classical industrial property rela-
tions.142
The problem is that for the process of mutually beneficial exchange to work,
individual investigators need access to others’ published and unpublished data
sets, and all the players in the relevant community find themselves in a similar
position.  While the pressure to cooperate is obvious and is reinforced by the
norms of science, self-interest—including economic self-interest and the com-
petitive spirit—may pull strongly in the opposite direction.  The system as a
whole would clearly benefit in the long term from fruitful cooperative arrange-
ments.  However, there is no guarantee that individual scientists will be willing
to absorb the short-term losses to which disclosure subjects them, nor is it cer-
tain that these losses will in fact be offset by future gains from cooperation.143  In
sum, there are strong pressures to hold out or, at least, to hold back and to
divulge no more than is necessary in the process of barter and exchange.
How well the process works in practice depends on a number of factors.
One factor is the communications networks themselves, which may or may not
provide low-cost and efficient access to the different distributed sources of data.
In the pre-digital environment, it was much harder to build these collaborative
networks owing to constraints of space and time, whereas the Internet now col-
lapses these limits and provides instantaneous, low-cost opportunities to over-
come previous barriers to data sharing in small-scale research.144  A second
factor is the extent to which the relevant community or sub-community respects
the sharing ethos and imposes peer pressure to enforce it.  A third factor is the
degree to which commercial pressures from private sector partners and univer-
sities themselves distort the sharing ethos and stimulate profit-maximizing stra-
tegic behavior in academics.145  A fourth factor is the extent to which direct per-
sonal opportunities to profit either from the economic value of the data sets,
their reputational value, or a combination of both will drive each player’s deci-
sions and further undermine the cooperative ethos.  Of course, many additional
idiosyncratic factors that may affect personal behavior and choices will come
into play as well.
There is much about this small science process that is still unknown outside
the circles of discrete research collaborations or subdisciplines because its dis-
142. Cf. STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS 1616-74 (1975)
(“The International Protection of Know-How”).
143. See Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools, supra note 123, at 7 (“Negotiating for access to
research tools might present particularly difficult problems for would-be licensees who do not want to
disclose the direction of their research in its early stages by requesting licenses.”).
144. See discussion of the LTER Net and GBIF examples, supra note 130.
145. See DAVID, NATURE’S SECRETS, supra note 8, at 10 (“In their dual capacities the administra-
tors of academic institutions (and the individuals who staff them) must continue to seek effective ways
of mediating conflicts between the societal goals that will be served by preserving the organizational
modes and norms of open scientific inquiry, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the lure of cap-
turing for their more immediate and private purposes a larger portion of the ‘information rents’—by
circumscribing free access to the new knowledge gained through the researches conducted under their
auspices.”).
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tinctive sociology has only recently become the subject of serious scholarship,
and because different scientific communities operate with different value struc-
tures and have diverse needs.  In addition, one should not overstate the relative
importance of this informal zone in relation to the more formal structures
described above, which are particularly dominant in basic research.146
What can be said is that much of science depends on this zone of informal
data exchanges, it processes more and more data of great economic value to
industry, and the value of its data streams can be greatly increased through the
use of digital networks and more refined legal tools.  At the same time, an
increasingly protectionist legal regime and the corresponding pressures to
commercialize make the voluntary nature of these exchanges ever more pre-
carious and subject to hoarding and holdout tendencies.  An already fragile,
informal process of barter and exchange that largely depends on a balance of
personal self-interest and the cooperative norms of science is coming under
intense economic and legal pressures that call its continued vitality into ques-
tion.
b. A Different Legal Regime
A salient characteristic of the zone of informal data exchanges is the extent
to which it has operated without reliance on formal legal rules.  Intellectual
property rights, including copyrights, have played no supporting role, although
patent law—as discussed below—has increasingly cast an encroaching shadow
over data transactions in which it previously played a minor part.  Contractual
agreements like those that regulate relations between funding entities and
investigators in the formal zone have seldom been used in the informal zone.
Such rules that have existed seem to derive largely from unfair competition law,
and the participating scientists appear to have been much less aware of them
than of the relevant norms of science, as expressed through peer pressure.
In the informal zone, scientists collaborate on a voluntary, cooperative basis
to produce what amounts to an inchoate common data resource, but their
access to it depends on the individual transactions they are able to negotiate.
Certain uses of the data and data products that comprise this resource may be
regulated by the granting agency’s rules and the norms of science.  Yet, until the
research results are published, the investigators typically will have enjoyed a
period of exclusive use conferred by the grants, and the grantees are not other-
wise subject to supplementary formal rules deriving either from intellectual
property rights or contractual arrangements with peers.  Even after publication,
the federal grants usually exhort the grantee to make the underlying data avail-
able, without imposing hard and fast obligations to do so.  The granting agen-
cies have, in any case, found it difficult to enforce even these moral obligations
so long as the data remain outside a public repository and under the control of
146. These relationships exist primarily at the interface of science and technology, or where the line
of demarcation between basic and applied research has collapsed.  Their importance varies by type of
investigation.
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the principal investigator.  Many other sources of research funding impose no
such obligations at all.  The upshot is that the scientist in the informal zone
retains considerable legal discretion in determining the amount and even the
conditions of disclosure, subject of course to peer pressure and his or her own
need to barter for access to the cumulative data stream.
In this raw state of affairs, the cumulative collection, although potentially of
much greater value than the sum of its parts, remains vulnerable to strategic
manipulation in keeping with the opportunities that single scientists have to
commercialize or otherwise personally exploit some or all of it.  Viewed indi-
vidually, these scientists will normally have made no formal commitment to
promote the collective interest in an inchoate data commons, and all members
of the community are wary of the opportunities for strategic behavior.
Moreover, none of the players really knows what the others actually possess,
so that the totality of the emerging common resource cannot be self-consciously
designed (as in, say, Linux),147 but is overwhelmingly dependent on single deci-
sions to collaborate and reveal—decisions that are costly and could be zero
sum.148  The vulnerability of the cumulative output to strategic behavior impedes
the extent to which any given player will be willing wholeheartedly to commit
his data holdings to the enterprise.  Thus, risk aversion is high, and there are
few if any formal legal tools to reduce it.
This is not to say that law is totally absent from this environment.  To be
more accurate, it is present in the form of legal rules that protect know-how and
confidential information generally, as a subcategory of industrial property law.
At bottom, these rules put limits on the worst forms of strategic behavior, such
as espionage and deception, in case the norms of science otherwise fail to
impede such activities.149  They also provide a source of quasi-moral rights, very
important to scientists, by impeding a scientist from passing off another’s data
contribution as his or her own.150
Moreover, the loose liability rules151 that are embodied in trade secret and
unfair competition law give some incentive to cooperate in informal exchanges
147. See discussion infra at Part IV.C.1.b.
148. See generally Hilgartner, Access to Data, supra note 31 (discussing zero-sum competition situa-
tions in the context of scientific practice).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION].
150. Because the raw values in factual data compilations remain non-copyrightable in the United
States, such information is in the public domain, free for the taking.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  While the source should be acknowledged as a matter of professional
ethics and etiquette, there is no legal recourse for the data originator against an unacknowledged use by
another scientist, except as unfair competition law allows.  Such uses probably occur quite frequently,
and in many cases the use is either undetectable or the originator of the data does not mind.  However,
unacknowledged uses sometimes erupt in a very public way.  See Eliot Marshall, DNA Sequencer Pro-
tests Being Scooped With His Own Data, 295 SCIENCE 1206, 1206-07 (2002).  In foreign countries, the
moral rights of copyright law could be invoked. See Berne Convention, supra note 109, at art. 6 bis.
151. “Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively
determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).  Under so-called property rules (in this case, the exclusive rights of intellectual
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because these rules cease to protect data that are independently discovered or
revealed without improper appropriation from another.  Unfair competition
laws do not confer an exclusive property right, but rather a set of liability rules
that impede certain market-destructive ways of depriving any individual
player’s data set of its value by improper means.152  But these liability rules will
not impede any other player from independently creating the same data by
proper means, and if the need is great enough, this may occur.  When it does,
any exchange value that the original data holder may have enjoyed will be
diminished or eliminated.  In this sense, actual or legal secrecy confers a kind of
property right—a right against improper behavior and perhaps a certain
amount of lead time—but it is also a “disappearing right” that becomes vulner-
able to discovery and disclosure by others.153
Even this incentive to cooperate, however, may be much reduced in science,
as compared to technical innovation, for the reason that it may not be possible
for a second scientist to independently recreate the data set in question, or it
may be prohibitively expensive and inefficient to do so.154  In such cases, the
generally weak liability rules governing confidential information can produce
too much protection for data held in actual secrecy because there is, in practice,
virtually no functional equivalent of reverse engineering.155  When that happens,
the temptation to hoard and holdout can be high, and the corresponding costs
of cooperation are similarly elevated.
While the legal weight of these liability rules should not be underestimated,
they are clearly of limited value in the zone of informal data exchanges.  Proba-
bly, their greatest relevance will be at the moment when commercial opportuni-
ties are most palpable and when wholesale appropriation might produce tangi-
property law), one cannot take the entitlement in question without prior permission of the owner.  In
this sense, property rules are “absolute permission rules.”  Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual
Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note
13, at 123, 131 (2001) [hereinafter Merges, Patent Pools].  “By contrast, liability rules are best described
as ‘take now, pay later.’  They allow for non-owners to take the entitlement without permission of the
owner, so long as they adequately compensate the owner later.”  Id.
152. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1989) (invalidating
Florida “plug mold” statute to protect against copying of boat hull designs); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) (state unfair competition laws not to protect unpat-
ented lamp designs in absence of source confusion); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
231-32 (1964) (preventing use of Illinois unfair competition law to block copying of an unpatented lamp
design).  Whether these rules impede “copying” or wholesale appropriation as such remains an open
question.  Compare Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n  v.
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1996) with Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141 and Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).  For the view that wholesale copying should be prohibited,
see, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitution-
ary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 165 (1992), proposing a tort of “malcompetitive copying,” and Dennis
S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594, 2601-
08 (1994) [hereinafter Karjala, Misappropriation].
153. John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962) (characterizing trade secret
rights as “disappearing rights”).
154. See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1, at 29-30 (discussing the uniqueness of many sci-
entific and technical databases).
155. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
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ble economic gains.  It is precisely here, however, where the traditional rules
governing confidential information may be the least potent, because they
cannot usually be triggered without a showing of legal, not merely actual,
secrecy, and the tenets of legal secrecy will often be too high for academic scien-
tists to meet.156  Absent some general norm against the wholesale appropriation
of another’s data production,157 the ability of scientists cooperating in the zone of
informal data exchanges to invoke rules based on unfair competition law to pre-
serve their individual and collective patrimonies remains speculative at best.
The most salient feature of the legal infrastructure as it impinges on this
zone is, therefore, the extent to which it has been largely irrelevant to the social
and scientific processes underway.  In other words, if the available legal mecha-
nisms do little to support the fragile process of barter and exchange, they also
create few barriers to that process.  However, this situation could change radi-
cally with the introduction of new technological means for controlling digital
data, new opportunities for commercial exploitation, and above all, the enact-
ment of new intellectual property rights in non-copyrightable collections of data
as discussed in Part III.
C. Private-Sector Data as a Component of the Research Commons
The private sector is both a user of public domain data and a major pro-
ducer of them.  The contribution of the private sector to the research commons
under traditional legal rules has been under-appreciated.  There is also a ten-
dency within the academic community to overlook the needs of the private
sector for access to public domain data and, accordingly, a tendency to underes-
timate the effects that restrictions on access to such data may have on private
sector research and development (“R&D”).
The private sector generates an ever-increasing amount of scientific data
that are indispensable to academic research.  Yet, more and more scientific data
produced by academics come freighted with restrictions and conditions that
arise from partnerships between academic institutions and industry.  How to
organize the research commons so that both academic and private firms can
obtain the data they need without compromising either their public or private
pursuits is a key issue for science policy and this article.158
1. Dissemination and Use of Scientific Data in Private Sector R&D
The private sector is a major producer of scientific data that enters the
public domain under existing legal rules.  Disregarding database publishers for
156. See, e.g., David Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61,
63-66 (1991).  Of course, “passing off” another’s data set as one’s own would not require legal secrecy.
See RESTATEMENT UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 149.
157. State unfair competition laws may or may not provide such a norm, depending on how courts
interpret International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  See Hilgartner & Brandt-
Rauf, Access, Ownership & Control, supra note 133.
158. See Part IV, infra, for an extensive analysis of this dilemma and the authors’ proposed
approaches for addressing it.
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a moment, private sector researchers frequently publish their findings, like aca-
demics, in which case the traditional rules of copyright law apply as previously
described, and there is a corresponding duty to release at least enough non-
copyrightable data as are needed to support the published results.  If the
research project were funded by the federal government, there would typically
be further obligations to disclose or deposit the underlying data sets following
publication or completion of the project.  If the research leads to a patent appli-
cation, then that application must also meet minimum utility and disclosure
requirements.159  If the research results are neither published nor patented and
are held under actual or legal secrecy, then any resulting innovations may be
reverse engineered by honest means.160  In that case, the technical information
or “know-how” derived from the process of reverse engineering should also
enter the public domain.161
Besides generating scientific data as a by-product of their R&D activities,
the private sector may affirmatively contribute data directly to the public
domain for a number of different reasons.  For example, companies may donate
data sets accumulated over time that are of value to science, even if they no
longer possess significant direct commercial value to the firm.  Companies may
also self-publish scientific and technical information to promote their goods and
services.  They increasingly may decide to put even commercially valuable tech-
nical data in the public domain to deter competitors from blocking fruitful lines
of research by strategic patent applications derived from the data thus dis-
closed. 162
Private sector R&D activities, of course, make use of both government-gen-
erated data and government-funded data, especially from academic research
undertaken at universities.  Of greater importance, however, is the vast infor-
mation commons that consists of the cumulative and sequential know-how and
the state-of-the-art, which the community at work on any given technical trajec-
tory has acquired and routinely shares over time.163  This know-how—that is,
information about how to achieve commercial advantages by sub-patentable
159. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 111, 112  (2000) (utility, novelty, disclosure, and enablement require-
ments in patent law).
160. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT  (USTA) § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1985).
161. For a recent discussion, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 155.  See also J. H. Reichman,
Overlapping Proprietary Rights in University-Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer Pro-
grams, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 51, 93-98 (1992).
162. See, e.g., SNP Consortium, available at http://snp.cshl.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2003), discussed
infra notes 676-78; see also Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2175, 2197-99, 2204-09 (2000); Rai, supra note 33, at 112-13 (discussing reluctance of leading
research universities to patent expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”) and single nucleotide poymorphisms
(“SNPs”).  For an explanation of SNPs, see infra note 676.
163. See, e.g., Margaret Sharp, Technological Trajectories and Corporate Strategies in the Diffusion
of Biotechnology, in TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION: CRUCIAL ISSUES FOR THE 1990S 93, 94-97
(Erico Deiaco, et al, eds., 1990) 221-35 (Giovanni Dosi et al. eds., 1988); Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual
Property Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2674, 2676 (1994) (distin-
guishing “traditional discrete invention model” from “cumulative systems model”).
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technical means—is typically acquired by trial and error and shaped by inves-
tors in R&D into incremental innovation products. 164
The information commons that underlies and pervades the realm of sub-
patentable innovation is a fundamental asset of a competitive economy based
on constant innovation.165  In principle, patents are not granted unless the
would-be inventor exceeds the level of innovation that the community at work
on a given technical trajectory would be expected to produce.  Below this line of
“non-obviousness,”166 trade secret laws do not impede employees from carrying
their skills and personal know-how—their personal quotient of the information
commons—from one job to another.  The spillover effects this produces, and
the rapid interchange of information between members of the technical com-
munity it encourages, become the engine of small-scale innovation in Silicon
Valley and its equivalents around the world.167
In recent years, however, the free flow of information between members of
the engineering community at work on given technical trajectories has increas-
ingly been slowed and disrupted by a proliferation of hybrid intellectual prop-
erty rights that fall between the patent and copyright paradigms.168  Beginning
with industrial design laws and utility model laws, which date back to the nine-
teenth century, examples include plant breeders’ rights, integrated circuit
designs, and most recently, sui generis rights in non-copyrightable databases.169
164. J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Inno-
vation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1747-53 (2000) [hereinafter Reichman, Of Green Tulips]; see also
Frischmann, supra note 70.  This information is neither copyrightable nor patentable, but is usually
kept under actual secrecy.  If, instead, investors spend the money to keep their valuable know-how
under legal secrecy, unfair competition law will protect it against misappropriation by improper
means—such as industrial espionage—but not against reverse-engineering by honest means.  The sec-
ond-comer’s duty to reverse-engineer the processes by which innovative sub-patentable products are
made gives the investor a period of natural lead time in which to recoup investments and establish a
trademark.  See UTSA, supra note 160, at § 1(4); J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent
and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2511-20 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal
Hybrids] (discussing chronic shortage of natural lead time under present-day conditions).
165. Cf. James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000) (stressing benefits of competition and need for
public domain inputs into the information economy) [hereinafter Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish].
166. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
167. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 155; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Trade Secrets:
How Well Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998) (criticizing the federal criminal Trade Secrets Act for
adverse impact on spillover effects).
168. Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 164.
169. In many countries, utility model laws protect functional designs and small-scale innovations
generally.  See, e.g., UMA SUTHERSANEN, DESIGN LAW IN EUROPE 383-93 (2000) (discussing various
European utility model laws); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151,
155-59 (1999) (classifying and discussing classical utility model regimes).  While the United States does
not have a utility model law, Congress has opted to protect two sets of functional designs.  See Vessel
Hull Design Protection Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32 (2000); Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000).  Most countries, other than the United States, have enacted sui
generis laws to protect non-functional industrial designs.  See, e.g., SUTHERSANEN, supra, at 28-54;
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized Functionalism: The Future of Design Protection in the European
Union, 24 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 611 (1999); J. H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic
and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
354 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:315
These regimes are enacted because those who invest in applications of know-
how to industrial products—”incremental innovation bearing know-how on its
face”—become increasingly vulnerable to second-comers who duplicate their
products without expending the time and money to reverse engineer or inde-
pendently create.  In supplying investors with artificial lead time, however,
these hybrid regimes tend to block follow-on applications and disrupt the
information commons that had driven sub-patentable innovation in the past. 170
As discussed in detail in Part III, the greatest threat to this information com-
mons and the innovation systems it supports is the new hybrid exclusive prop-
erty right in non-copyrightable databases, which has been promulgated
throughout Europe by the 1996 Directive on the legal protection of databases.171
This Directive provides a new and potentially perpetual intellectual property
right in exchange for mere investment, which is qualitatively different and more
far-reaching in its impact on the public domain than any traditional intellectual
property regime.172
For present purposes, it suffices to note that because relations between the
private sector and universities have flourished under the influence of the Bayh-
Dole Act and related legislation,173 the private sector on the whole tends to
make greater use of data generated by academic research than in the past.  As
these two sources of data become increasingly commingled, there is a growing
conflict between the open access norms of traditional university research and
the tendency of the private sector to restrict access to and use of data by means
of legal secrecy and the aforementioned hybrid exclusive property rights.174  In
this connection, the European database right will not only affect the distribu-
tion of academic data itself, but will also enable the private sector to restrict
access to and use of all the data within its control in ways that were not previ-
ously possible.  Any efforts to organize the scientific information commons on a
more rational basis must accordingly take account of the role that the private
sector plays both as generator and user of scientific and technical data in
research.
2. Database Publishers
One would not need to treat database publishers in a separate entry so long
as they remained subject to the same legal regime applicable to academic scien-
tists described above.  Under that regime, traditional copyright rules applied
L. J. 1143 (1983).  The United States, instead, continues to rely on design patents, 35 U.S.C. § 171
(2000).  For discussion of sui generis database protection laws, see infra Part III.B.2.d.
170. See generally Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 164, at 149-56; J. H. Reichman, Computer
Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized
University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 656-69 (1989).
171. See supra note 17.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 347-73.
173. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 110 (discussing growth of academic-industrial relationships in
the past two decades).
174. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 110-11 (“Participants in these academic-industrial relationships often
depart quite markedly from traditional research norms.”).
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only to the original and creative selections and arrangements of compilations of
data.175  As a result, the bulk of the data entered the public domain unless oth-
erwise protected either by state trade secret laws, or to a still unknown extent,
state unfair competition laws prohibiting the wholesale duplication of non-
copyrightable databases. 176
It is worth reiterating that the U.S. database industry has thrived in this
environment in which weak protection has been the rule, and it has commanded
a large share of the world database market.177  To sustain this success, the data-
base industry relies on the constant updating of its databases and new releases,
which add value as well as business protection to previously accumulated data,
and on a pronounced “niche market” effect, which makes it difficult for second-
comers to enter a given market segment once the first-mover has established a
solid reputation for quality.  In the networked environment, investors also rely
heavily on technological fences to protect their databases; electronic, standard-
form license contracts for mass markets; and negotiated licenses with institu-
tional customers to regulate access to and use of their databases.178
While the contractual regulation of online dissemination of databases poses
serious problems for science and education overall, the underlying dimensions
of the public domain are shrinking rapidly owing to new and unprecedented
legislative initiatives, such as the E.C. Database Directive179 and similar database
protection proposals in the United States.180  To glimpse the far-reaching reper-
cussions of this type of legislation, one has only to consider its potential impact
on the notion of publication as the line of demarcation between private and
public ownership of scientific and technical information.  Under traditional
copyright law and practices, a scientist who published an article will have dedi-
cated any supporting data that accompanied it to the public domain.  If the sui
generis database right applied, however, academics could publish their articles,
and they or their publisher could still retain the legal rights to control or restrict
use of the same data even after publication.181
How the academic community would ultimately react and adjust to this new
legal situation would depend on many different factors,182 and some of them are
considered later in this article.  The point for now is that the established portrait
of the public domain for published collections of data is in a state of flux.  The
radical changes stemming from legal and technical measures tending to fence
that domain make it advisable for the scientific community to consider the need
to construct and manage a research commons of its own for the dissemination
175. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34.
178. See supra note 34.
179. See supra note 17.
180. See supra notes 17, 26 and accompanying text.
181. In practice, scientific use would then depend to some extent on explicit exceptions or immuni-
ties built into the relevant database protection laws.
182. See generally Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4.
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of scientific and technical data and information that heretofore automatically
entered the public domain.
D. Potentially Enhanced Role of Public Domain Data in a Digitally
Networked Research Environment
Because science builds upon science, the production of data sets is not an
end in itself, but rather the means to an end, the first step in the creation of new
information, knowledge, and understanding.  As part of that process, the origi-
nal databases are continually refined and recombined to create new databases
and new insights.  Each level of processing adds value to an original or raw set
of data by summarizing its contents, providing different interpretations of their
meaning, or synthesizing new information products.  As Nobel laureate Joshua
Lederberg testified before a congressional committee considering the enact-
ment of a new database protection bill:
Data are the building blocks of knowledge and the seeds of discovery.  They challenge
us to develop new concepts, theories, and models to make sense of the patterns we see
in them.  They provide the quantitative basis for testing and confirming theories and
for translating new discoveries into useful applications for the benefit of society.  They
are also the foundation of sensible public policy in our democracy.  The assembled
record of scientific data and resulting information is both a history of events in the
natural world and a record of human accomplishment.183
The primary purpose of this section is to emphasize the extent to which digi-
tal technologies have revolutionized the role that data in the public domain or
available under open access policies can play in the research process.  To quote
Lederberg once again:
[The] recent advent of digital technologies for collecting, processing, storing, and
transmitting data has led to an exponential increase in the size and number of data-
bases created and used.  A hallmark trait of modern research is to obtain and use
dozens or even hundreds of databases, extracting and merging portions of each to
create new databases and new sources for knowledge and innovation.184
As will become readily apparent, the successful implementation of these data
integration functions depends to a large extent on the availability, access to, and
unrestricted use of affordable data resources in the public domain.
1. Digitally Pooled Data Resources
The enhanced role that digital technologies play in government-sponsored
data collection activities185 constantly adds new dimensions to both big and small
science.  Increasingly powerful sensor technologies are unmasking layers of
previously hidden attributes of our natural universe and documenting their
essential characteristics in automated data streams.  The resulting data sets
183. Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 189-205 (March 18, 1999) (statement of Joshua Lederberg, President, Rockefel-
ler University, on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering,
Institute of Medicine, and American Association for the Advancement of Science) [hereinafter Collec-
tions Hearings].
184. Id.
185. See supra Part II.A.1 (outlining these activities).
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become “foundational” in the sense that they establish a baseline characteriza-
tion of natural objects or processes that then becomes a common resource for
research in that particular area.  Other data sets track natural phenomena or
behavior on a longitudinal basis over long time periods.
In the observational sciences, for example, space-based and ground-based
sensors continue to collect vast amounts of digital data about our planet and
outer space in all regions of the electromagnetic spectrum.186  Moreover, the
miniaturization of sensor technologies is making it possible to place thousands
of tiny sensor arrays in different ecosystems to collect environmental data con-
cerning physical, chemical, and biological processes.187  This instrumenting of the
environment using both remote and embedded network sensing devices makes
the pervasive monitoring of the ecosphere possible, with the resulting data sets
able to be archived in public data centers or made directly available in the digi-
tally networked environment for a broad range of long-term studies and appli-
cations.
Similarly, the aforementioned large facilities in the experimental physical
sciences, such as nuclear fusion, high-energy laser, and neutron-beam devices,
create ever-larger amounts of data that are processed and analyzed for new dis-
coveries and applications.188  The data sets generated by each of these large
observational and experimental facilities and related data centers have grown
from gigabyte levels just a decade ago, to terabytes and, in some cases,
petabytes of data currently.189
Formally structured big science programs also increasingly rely on the com-
pilation of large, public domain databases composed of the contributions of
hundreds of individual investigators from government, academia, and even
industry, who generate data independently and then contribute their findings to
government or government-funded data centers.  Many of these types of
arrangements are in the rapidly growing area of bioinformatics, such as
molecular biology,190 ecological,191 and biodiversity studies,192 as well as in numer-
ous other areas of research.  Both the centralized and distributed public domain
data repositories constitute a common resource from which all researchers can
borrow freely, whether for fundamental exploratory investigations or for more
specifically applied problem-solving purposes.
The continuing advancement of observational sensors and experimental
data production technologies, particularly in miniaturized desktop computa-
186. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
187. See Gregory Bonito, Emergent Sensor Technologies, in SCALABLE INFORMATION NETWORKS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Alison Withey et al. eds., 2002).
188. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
189. The data center at the high-energy physics research center, CERN, and at the U.S. Geological
Survey’s Earth Resources Observing Systems Data Center, which archives various land remote sensing
data, are now approaching the petabyte level (petabyte = quadrillion bytes).
190. See, e.g., National Center for Biotechnology Information, supra note 45.
191. See discussion of LTER Net, supra note 130.
192. See discussion of GBIF, supra note 130.
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tional devices or portable instruments for use in fieldwork, also increasingly
empowers single scientists to collect or create their own data sets in the infor-
mal, small science domain.  As digital capabilities for autonomous data produc-
tion improve and proliferate, an immense new supply of potentially intercon-
nected information is being created within each discipline community, which
complements the large, formally structured, public-domain foundational data
sets emanating from the big science programs.  Although the availability of
individually created scientific information resources situated in the informal
research domain remain subject to the cultural and sociological impediments
described above,193 these resources nonetheless constitute a rapidly growing
corpus of potentially available inputs into the research commons.
Turning from collection to dissemination functions, the growing ability of
each community to use the Internet to provide virtually universal access to all
this information—assuming it remains otherwise available—has revolutionized
the conduct of scientific research. U.S. researchers in all scientific and engi-
neering areas are among the most active users of the Internet.  This is hardly
surprising given the primary role of the U.S. governmental and academic sci-
ence and technical community in the original development and early evolution
of the Internet.194  What may be less apparent, however, is that the architecture
and function of the Internet itself arose as a technological manifestation of
many of the same cultural attributes that characterize the public research enter-
prise.  The Internet was developed by publicly funded government and aca-
demic researchers as a voluntary and cooperative integration of highly distrib-
uted autonomous networks, operating in a largely self-regulated and
international system, through which information could pass freely and without
restrictions.195
These parallel attributes of the public research community and the early
Internet provided a natural impetus to scientists to use digital networks imme-
diately and pervasively to make access to their reciprocal inputs and outputs
generally available.196  All of the formally organized public scientific data reposi-
tories now make their holdings known and available through the Internet,
although direct access to the full set of their archived information tends to be
limited by technical or security factors. 197
193. See supra Part II.B.2.
194. See, e.g., Vinton Cerf, How the Internet Came to Be, in THE ONLINE USER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Bernard Adoba ed., 1993).
195. Id.; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (discussing
Internet architecture and its initial open design).
196. In the informal sphere, however, this reciprocity is often the product of negotiated exchanges.
197. The principal technical factor that limits direct access to large databases is insufficient band-
width in many current Internet connections, although this is expected to change rapidly with the intro-
duction of “grid” technology, particularly in the research community.  Security-based technical protec-
tion of online databases against malicious hackers further limits direct access to the entire content and
creates other inefficiencies.  See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRUST IN CYBERSPACE
(Fred B. Schneider ed., 1999).
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The opportunities for direct peer-to-peer exchanges of data, and for new
distributed research collaborations on either a formal or informal basis may be
an even more important development.198  Particularly noteworthy in the context
of this article is the stimulus and means that the Internet provides for increasing
the flow of the inchoate data stream that characterizes the informal zone of data
exchanges.  By providing a direct, instantaneous, and relatively secure means to
communicate and share data, digital networks potentiate unlimited opportuni-
ties for implementing the cooperative and sharing ethos that has been funda-
mental to the progress of science.  When most of one’s professional peers within
and outside a given area of specialization openly post their findings on their
websites or remain willing to exchange information on request, the potential for
serendipitous results and synergistic advances becomes greatly increased.199
Moreover, these integrating benefits of the Internet are not limited to single
peer-to-peer exchanges, important as they may be.  Ubiquitous digital networks
also make possible entirely new forms of organized peer production, from small
groups working in distributed collaboratories200 to network-wide, volunteer-
based, open modes of production that may have particularly significant implica-
tions and applicability in the public science context.201  Certainly, voluntary,
collaborative peer production of data, information, and knowledge was a hall-
mark trait of science long before the digital era.  The co-authoring of research
articles, joint compilations of databases, sharing of knowledge and research
results at public conferences, peer-review process for publications, and partici-
pation in large research programs over long time periods were all “peer produc-
tion” activities.  These norms and practices of the pre-digital era take on a
heightened importance in the digitally networked environment and lead to the
possibility for greatly expanded peer production opportunities ideally suited to
open, public research.202
2. Electronic Transformation Tools
While digital data production technologies and networks allow scientists to
pool and instantaneously exchange the raw materials of their research,
advanced software and ever more powerful computational tools enable them to
process, organize, and transform the raw data into discoveries and applications.
The following highlights three notable advances in this context.
A key development is the use of new software tools to process and integrate
large amounts of data to create refined data products and applications.  Soft-
ware enables scientists to take portions of pre-existing databases from different
198. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369
(2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin].
199. See discussion of network effects, infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
200. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COLLABORATORIES: IMPROVING RESEARCH
CAPABILITIES IN CHEMICAL AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES (1999).
201. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin,  supra note 198; see also DAVID, GOOD FENCES, supra note 20,
at 3-4.
202. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 198.
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sources in order to combine and reprocess them to address complex problems.
A quintessential example is geographic information systems (“GIS”) software,
which provides the means of integrating diverse environmental and socio-eco-
nomic data on geospatially referenced grids for a broad array of basic research
goals and practical applications.203
Many of the data sources used in this process are governmental or govern-
ment-funded at the federal, state, and local levels, including some of the key
foundational data sets mentioned above.  The U.S. Geological Survey estimates
that geospatial data applications in the United States alone contribute over $3.5
trillion annually to the economy.204  The successful utilization of GIS depends in
large part on easy access to the relevant data at affordable prices and, espe-
cially, on access with few restrictions on reuse and redissemination.  Conversely,
data sources that are too expensive or come freighted with many user limita-
tions can undermine or even block a research project or important application.
Of course, the same issues arise in other areas of data intensive research, such
as biotechnology, econometrics, or climate change studies.
Data mining techniques, also known as knowledge discovery in databases,
provide the means to extract salient data from very large databases and auto-
matically convert the extracted components into useful information or even new
discoveries.205  For example, data mining algorithms were used to discover
twenty new quasars in a huge astronomical database in just a few hours of proc-
essing time.  A search of the same database by a team of astronomers would
have taken forty times longer to yield the same results.206  Performing such a
search and extracting those discoveries could constitute an infringement under
the E.C. Database Directive.
The final technology highlighted here is grid computing, which may be
defined as a “super Internet” for high-performance computing by integrating
geographically and organizationally dispersed computational resources, such as
CPUs, storage systems, communication systems, data sources and instruments,
and the researchers themselves.207  By providing “pervasive, dependable, consis-
tent, and inexpensive” access to such advanced computational capabilities and
resources, researchers believe that computational grids will have a transforming
effect similar to the electric power grid a century ago, which would allow new
203. For a basic description of GIS functions, see U.S. Geological Survey, at http://www.usgs.gov/
research/gis/title.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).  See also Environmental Systems Research Institute,
Inc., at www.gis.com/whatisgis/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
204. FEDERAL GEOGRAPHIC DATA COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL IMAGERY AND REMOTE
SENSING TASK FORCE ON THE VALUE OF CIVIL IMAGERY AND REMOTE SENSING 2 (October 1,
2002).
205. Definition adapted from Introduction to Data Mining, available at http://www.andypryke.com/
university/dm_docs/dm_intro.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) (listing a variety of background resources
on this technology).
206. See Usama Fayyad, Industrial Keynote Address: Data Mining and Databases, in DATA FOR
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DATA (2000), available at http://books.nap.edu/html/codata_ 2nd/ch15.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
207. Definition adapted from What is a Grid?, available at http://www.aei.mpg.de/~manuela/
Gridweb/info/grid.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
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classes of applications to emerge.208  An example of an initial project using grid
technology is the European Union’s “Data Grid.”  This initiative is expected to
“enable next generation scientific exploration which requires intensive compu-
tation and analysis of shared large-scale databases, millions of Gigabytes, across
widely distributed scientific communities.”209  The selected applications areas
include high-energy physics, biomedical research, and satellite earth observa-
tions.210
Taken together, the new digital technologies discussed above, as well as
numerous others omitted for reasons of brevity, enable scientists to perform the
following quantitatively and qualitatively new functions:
• Collect and create unprecedented and ever increasing amounts and
types of raw data about all natural objects and phenomena;
• Collapse the space and time in which data and information can be made
available;
• Facilitate entirely new forms of distributed research collaboration and
information production; and
• Interpret and transform the raw data into unlimited new configurations
of information and knowledge.
However, the successful implementation of all these functions remains heavily
dependent on the continued existence of a robust public domain and related
open access policies and practices to realize the promise of new research and
innovation tools.
III
SCIENTIFIC DATA AS A PRIVATE GOOD:
PRESSURES ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
The map described in the preceding pages suggests the extent to which the
vast reservoir of accumulated public domain data feeds into the scientific
research infrastructure and the system of innovation to which it gives rise.  It
has often been pointed out that government-supported research plays a primary
role in making this system of innovation the most productive in the world.
However, the indispensable role of public domain data in nourishing this
system, while generally taken for granted, is less clearly understood or appreci-
ated, and new possibilities for further potentiating this role in the digital envi-
ronment constitute another “endless frontier.”  These matters require more
attention lest growing pressures to fence the scientific commons lead to unfore-
seen and unintended consequences that could seriously disrupt the national
system of innovation as a whole.
208. THE GRID: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE  xvii (Ian Foster & Carl
Kesselman eds., 1999).  See also Ian Foster’s web site, at http://www-fp.mcs.anl.gov/~foster (last visited
Feb. 14, 2003) (listing numerous Grid technology resource documents).
209. E.U. Data Grid Project, at http://web.datagrid.cnr.it (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
210. Learn More about DataGrid, http://web.datagrid.cnr.it/LearnMore/index.jsp (last visited Jan.
10, 2003).
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A. Shifting the Public–Private Boundaries
The prominent role that public domain data have played in fueling Ameri-
can science and innovation is partly explained by the economic literature con-
cerning public goods.  Public goods, unlike private goods, are characterized by
their nonrival and nonexcludable properties.211  The former means that it costs
nothing to provide the good to another person once someone has produced it,
that is, it tends to have zero marginal cost.  The latter means that once such a
good has been produced, the producer cannot exclude others from benefiting
from it.  Typical examples of public goods that fully satisfy both criteria are
national defense and the operation of lighthouses.
The problem that public goods pose is that however important their produc-
tion may be for the political body as a whole, they will attract insufficient or
suboptimal private investment because investors cannot deter free-riding
second-comers or otherwise fully recoup the return from their investments.212
Governments typically respond to this problem by making the investments that
the private sector cannot or should not be expected to provide, such as funding
public health and safety objectives, or the national defense.213  Often these
public initiatives will generate substantial additional private investment and
supplementary social benefits as the private sector finds ways to convert
upstream public investments in public goods into downstream commercial
products and services that do generate appropriable returns.214
From this perspective science itself, especially basic science, resembles a
public good, which private enterprise could not adequately support. 215  For
example, research on tropical diseases, climate change, and astrophysics falls
into the category of global public goods, as do large fundamental research facili-
ties, such as space science spacecraft missions and high-energy particle accelera-
tors for physics experiments, for which high up-front costs and noncommercial
or uncertain applications make public investment the only feasible alternative.
These public investments, in turn, contribute to the “knowledge infrastructure”
required for efficient R&D directed at exploitable commercial innovations.216
211. Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
212. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 108-18 (3d ed.
2000).
213. RESOLVING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 23 (“Most government functions are carried out by
the public sector either because of an overriding public interest in the outcome, or because the poten-
tial for high risk or low payoff makes the task unattractive to the private sector.”).
214. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 70, at 357-60 (stressing tension between maximizing consump-
tion of public goods and constraining consumption to maximize market-based efficiency).
215. Michael Callon, Is Science a Public Good?, 19 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 395, 400 (1994)
(“The qualification of science as a quasi-public good rather than as a full-fledged public good derives
essentially from the fact that it is to a certain degree appropriable—whereas in standard theory a true
public good has to be completely inappropriable.”).
216. Paul David, The Political Economy of Public Science, in THE REGULATION OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 38 (Helen Lawton Smith ed., 2001) [hereinafter David, Political Economy].  According
to a recent study, some seventy-three percent of all patents granted in the United States during the
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Notable examples include Internet communications protocols, the global posi-
tioning system, and computer simulation methods for the visualization of
molecular structures.217
As Paul David and Michael Callon have reminded us,218 there are good rea-
sons for protecting many scientific endeavors from competitive market forces
that cannot efficiently allocate resources for the production and distribution of
pure public goods.219  Because industry and business tend to under-invest in sci-
entific production, government takes up the slack either by intervening directly
or by providing incentives to the private sector to overcome market failure, in
the form of legal monopolies falling within the domestic and international
intellectual property systems.
To appreciate the full implications of the map drawn in Part II, moreover, it
is important to establish that scientific and technical data also manifest the
properties of “quasi public goods” that economists associate with science as a
whole.  Information, facts, and ideas, once divulged, cost nothing to propagate
and become difficult to keep from others.  Thus, the government intervenes to
promote potential long-term economic and social benefits because the data
produced from basic scientific research are often too commercially risky to be
developed by the private sector.220
Even when scientific data emerge from applied science, where partial
appropriability and foreseeable returns attract private investment, they may
present public good properties that justify government support.  For example,
governments invest in providing advanced weather data largely because of the
need to ensure public safety and the protection of the nation’s economic assets.
However, by electing to provide such data without intellectual property protec-
tion, either free or at no more than the marginal cost of dissemination, the U.S.
government goes beyond its mission of protecting the safety of its citizens and
their property to providing the raw material for a dynamic value-adding private
sector.  As scholars have noted:
As a result of this concept of public/private partnership, the U.S. boasts a robust pri-
vate meteorology industry with revenues in excess of $500 million annually, and a
rapidly growing weather risk management industry with risk management instruments
approaching a value of $8 billion.  The authors believe that the relatively small size of
1990s cited government or government-funded research.  Francis Narin et al., The Increasing Linkage
Between U.S. Technology and Public Science, 26 RES. POL’Y 317 (1997).
217. “Much more critical over the long run than ‘spin-offs’ from basic science programmes are their
cumulative indirect effects in raising the rate of return on private investment proprietary R&D per-
formed by business firms.”  David, Political Economy, supra note 216, at 39.
218. Id. at 35; Callon, supra note 215.
219. David, Political Economy, supra note 216, at 36 (“[T]he findings of scientific research, being
new knowledge, would be seriously undervalued were they sold directly through perfectly competitive
markets.”).
220. “Under U.S. policy, most federal government data are in the public domain and cannot be
copyrighted.  By making data easy and inexpensive to obtain, the U.S. government seeks to promote
science, create a more informed public, and foster the development of a thriving commercial informa-
tion industry.”  RESOLVING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 24.
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these sectors in the E.U. is primarily due to the restrictive data policies of a number of
governments and their national meteorological services.221
Appropriate public sector investment in the production of scientific data
benefits from what economists call “positive externalities” and “network
effects.”  A positive externality occurs when one party confers benefits on
another without the latter having to fully compensate the former.222  Basic
research, together with the creation and dissemination of scientific databases,
especially in their raw form, may have no immediate economic applications or
market, but they can lead subsequently to unanticipated or serendipitous
advances and whole new spheres of innovation and commerce.  Such activities
provide prime examples of positive externalities that direct government support
can greatly promote and that may not be undertaken at all without such sup-
port.
The other important concept here is that of a network effect, which arises
when the value of using a particular type of product depends on the number of
users.223  Examples of products with high positive feedback from network effects
include telephones and fax machines, if there are many users rather than only a
few.224  Perhaps the quintessential product with positive network effects is the
Internet.  From this perspective, scientific databases or other collections of
information can add considerably more value to society and the economy if
they are openly available on the Internet (assuming that production remains
feasible in the absence of appropriability, as would occur with government
funding).225
Scientists were the pioneers of the Internet revolution and have become
some of the most prolific users of the medium for accessing, disseminating, and
using data.226  When data are provided as a public good via the Internet, unen-
cumbered by proprietary rights, the positive externalities from network effects
can be especially high.  They become even greater to the extent that the data
are prepared and presented in a way that makes them available and usable to a
broader range of non-expert users outside the scientific community.
As Joseph Stiglitz and his colleagues point out:
The shift toward an economy in which information is central rather than peripheral
may thus have fundamental implications for the appropriate role of government.  In
221. Plujimers & Weiss, supra note 47, at 7 (citing authorities).
222. An externality may be defined as the action of one entity affecting the well-being of another,
without appropriate compensation.  A negative externality is the imposition of additional costs by
entity A (for example, through the deleterious effects of pollution created by A) on entity B, without
A’s having to pay for those costs.  Conversely, a positive externality confers benefits (innovation) from
A to B without full compensation to A.  JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., COMPUTER & COMMITTEE
INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN A DIGITAL AGE 33 (2000).
223. Id. at 42.
224. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring  1994, at  133, 133-36 (giving further examples of network effects).
225. See Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 198; cf. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (regarding the question of adequate
incentives in peer production projects).
226. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
Winter/Spring 2003] RESEARCH COMMONS 365
particular, the public good nature of production, along with the presence of network
externalities and winner-take-all markets, may remove the automatic preference for
private rather than public production.  In addition, the high fixed costs and low mar-
ginal costs of producing information and the impact of network externalities are both
associated with significant dangers of limited competition.227
These economic characteristics associated with the transmission of digital scien-
tific data on the Internet provide a strong argument for many of the activities
previously described, which are undertaken within the public domain by gov-
ernment agencies or by non-governmental entities receiving government sup-
port.
At the same time, attention to the economic literature suggests the impor-
tance of ascertaining the limits of public good analysis lest government compete
with or otherwise undermine activities that the private sector could carry out
more efficiently. 228  Scientific data, like much of science itself, are not a pure
public good to the extent that they can be bundled and embodied in physical
artifacts that make them appropriable to a certain degree.229  Information can
come in two forms: codified knowledge and incorporated knowledge.  The for-
mer may be expressed in a standardized and compact form, so as to permit easy,
low-cost transmission, verification, storage, and reproduction.  The latter, by
contrast, is inscribed in some machine.230
From this perspective, scientific data and information are both inputs into
the national system of innovation and outputs of that system, and intellectual
property rights tend to regulate the flow of private sector investments into
downstream applications of research data. 231  How this balance of public and
private interests worked out in the past was largely reflected in the map of
public domain data depicted in Part II.  Whatever imperfections that map
brings to light, its most salient feature is that the balance of interests it reflects
underlies the world’s most productive and successful system of innovation.232
However, that inherently dynamic and shifting balance of interests has come
under intense pressure in recent years for a number of different reasons.  The
“convergence technologies” that greatly improve access to information also
afford “technological means of inhibiting access in ways that were never before
practical.”233  Global competition has induced governments in developed coun-
tries to strengthen existing intellectual property rights, enact new and more
227. STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 222, at 44.
228. See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing the limits on competition with the private sector by the fed-
eral government).
229. See, e.g., Callon, supra note 215, at 398 (stressing that pure public goods are completely inap-
propriable).
230. Id. at 397.
231. See David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The U.S. National System of Innovation, in
NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29-75 (Richard R. Nelson ed.
1993); Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 884-86 (discussing dual function of information in the
networked environment).
232. See Mowery & Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 47-54, 59-64.
233. DAVID, DIGITAL BOOMERANG, supra note 20, at 10; see also Reichman & Franklin, supra
note 16, at 897-99 (restored power of the “two-party” deal in digital environment).
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powerful rights not previously experimented with, and to press for high levels of
harmonized protection at the international level.234  Of particular importance in
the United States are efforts by government “to cut expenditures by transfer-
ring to the private sector a range of data production and information distribu-
tion activities that formerly were publicly provided.”235  The end result has been
the collapse of the established lines of demarcation between public and private
interests that were codified in the classical patent and copyright paradigms,236
and the enclosure and transformation of “larger and larger portions of the
public data ‘commons’ . . . into private monopolies.”237
The question this raises is the extent to which the functions of public domain
data on which science and innovation have traditionally relied, as illustrated
above, may be compromised by ill-conceived initiatives to stimulate investment
for short-term private gain without sufficient attention to the long-term needs
of both science and innovation, as well as the broader society.  To this end, the
remainder of this Part of the article will summarize the economic and legal
assaults on the research commons that have recently occurred, and examine
some of the implications of those pressures on the ability of the commons to
continue to perform both its traditional and potentially enhanced functions in
the digitally networked environment.
B. Pressures on the Research Commons
The digital revolution has made investors acutely aware of the heightened
value that collections of data and information may acquire in the new informa-
tion economy.238  Attention has logically focused on the incentive and protective
structures for generating and disseminating digital information products, espe-
cially online.  Although most of the legal and economic initiatives have been
focused on—and driven by—the entertainment sector, software producers, and
large publishing concerns, there is growing interest in the possibility that com-
moditization of even public sector and public domain data could stimulate sub-
stantial investments by providing new means of recovering the costs of produc-
tion.239  Moreover, investors have increasingly understood the economic
234. See, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
1-14, 15-85 (2000); Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Stan-
dard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 769-83 (2002).
235. DAVID, DIGITAL BOOMERANG, supra note 20, at 8.
236. J. H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy, 13 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 475 (1993).
237. DAVID, DIGITAL BOOMERANG, supra note 20, at 11.
238. See, e.g., Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34.
239. See, e.g., The Collections Of Information Antipriracy Act and the Vessel Hull Design Protection
Act : Hearing on H.R. 2652 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony by Laura d’Andrea Tyson) [hereinafter Infor-
mation Antipiracy Hearings]. This testimony was based on a research project funded by Reed-Elsevier,
Inc., and The Thomson Corp., completed Sept. 5, 1997.  See also G. M. Hunsucker, The European
Database Directive: Regional Stepping Stone to an International Model, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697 (1997); YALE M. BRAUNSTEIN, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DATABASE
PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION (W.I.P.O. Standing
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potential that awaits those who capture and market data and information as raw
materials or inputs into the upstream stages of the innovation process.240
What follows focuses first on pressures to commoditize data in the public
sector and then on legal and technological measures that endow database pro-
ducers with new proprietary rights and novel means of exploiting the facts and
data that copyright law had traditionally left in the public domain.  These pres-
sures arise both within the research community itself and from forces extrane-
ous to it.  How that community responds to these pressures over time will
determine the future metes and bounds of the information commons that
supports scientific endeavors.
If, as we have reason to fear, current trends will greatly diminish the amount
of data available from the public domain, this decrease could initially compro-
mise the scientific community’s ability to fully exploit the promise of the digital
revolution.  Moreover, if these pressures continue unabated and become institu-
tionalized at the international level,241 they could disrupt the flow of upstream
data to both basic and applied science and undermine the ability of academia
and the private sector to convert cumulative data streams into innovative prod-
ucts and services.
The pressures discussed below also pose serious conflicts between the norms
of public science and the norms of private industry.  We contend that failure to
resolve these conflicts and properly balance the interests at stake in preserving
an effective information commons could eventually undermine the national
system of innovation.242
1. Commoditization of Data in Public Science
During the last ten years, there has been a marked tendency to shift the
production of science-relevant databases from the public to the private sector.
This development occurred against the background of a broader trend in which
the government’s share of overall funding for research and development vis-à-
vis that of the private sector has decreased from a high of sixty-seven percent in
the 1960s to twenty-six percent in 2000.243  Furthermore, since the passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, the results of federally funded research at universities
have increasingly been commercialized either by public–private partnerships
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, #SCCR/7/2, 2002), available at
http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/2002/sccr/pdf/sccr7_2.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
240. There were, of course, always concerns about incentives to produce basic data and information
as raw materials of the innovation process, especially in light of perceived gaps in intellectual property
law that seemed to leave databases in limbo.  See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 78.
241. See J. H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18, 485-500 (man-
aging transnational database protection without harmonization).
242. Cf. Mowery & Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 47-51, 53-56, 62-64 (describing the interplay of
public-private interests in the U.S. system of innovation); Richard R. Nelson & Nathan Rosenberg,
Technical Innovation and National Systems, in NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS, supra note 231, at 3,
5-9 (stressing the extent to which science and technology are intertwined).
243. Industry and Agency Concerns over Intellectual Property Rights, Testimony before the Sub-
comm. on Technology and Procurement Policy, House Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong.
(May 10, 2002) (testimony of Jack L. Brock, Jr., United States General Accounting Office).
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with industry or directly by the universities themselves.244  Industry support of
university research has increased in certain sectors, such as medical research,
even as the federally funded share of university research support has declined.245
a. Reducing the Scope of Government-Generated Data
The budgetary pressures on the government are both structural and political
in nature.  On the whole, mandated entitlements in the federal budget, such as
Medicare and Medicaid, are politically impossible to reduce, and as their costs
mount, the money available for other discretionary programs, including feder-
ally sponsored research, has shrunk as a percentage of total expenditures.
This structural limitation is compounded by the rapidly rising costs of state-
of-the-art research, including some researcher salaries, scientific equipment,
and major facilities.  With specific regard to the information infrastructure,
researchers typically earmark the lion’s share of expenses to computing and
communications equipment, with the remainder devoted to managing, pre-
serving, and disseminating the public domain data and information that results
from basic research and other federal data collection activities.  The govern-
ment’s scientific and technical data and information services are thus the last to
be funded and are almost always the first to suffer cutbacks.
For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(“NOAA”) budget for its National Data Centers remained flat and actually
decreased in real dollars between 1980 and 1994, while its data holdings
increased exponentially and the overall agency budget doubled (mostly to pay
for new environmental satellites and a ground-based weather radar system that
are producing the exponential data increases).246  Information managers at most
other science agencies have complained about reductions in funding for both
their data management and scientific and technical information budgets.247
These chronic budgetary shortfalls for managing and disseminating public
domain scientific data and information have been accompanied by recurring
244. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 132; Rai, supra note 33, at 110-11; see also Mowery & Rosenberg,
supra note 231, at 53 (stressing that closer ties between industry and universities restored a linkage that
had been weakened in the 1950s and 1960s).
245. The percentage of university medical research funded by the federal government decreased
from approximately seventy-five percent in 1976 to approximately sixty-four percent in 1997.  Between
1992 and 1999, the percent of industry funding in the same research sector increased from just under
seven percent to just under eight percent.  Hamilton Moses III, Academic Relationships with Industry,
Presentation to the Government, University, Industry Research Roundtable (Mar. 28, 2001) (on file
with authors).
246. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 62.  This trend has continued for NOAA up to the present
time.  However, in 1996, Congress authorized NOAA to charge fair market value for its data and to
institute a two-tiered pricing system with discounts for educational organizations that place their orders
for data online.  See supra note 56.  Since then, revenues from data sales have decreased about six per-
cent per year.  NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, THE NATION’S ENVIRONMENTAL DATA: TREASURES AT RISK 35-36 (2001).
247. Interviews with STI managers in the U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of Agriculture,
the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense (2002).
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political pressures on the scientific agencies to privatize their outputs.248  Until
recently, for example, the common practice of the environmental and space sci-
ence agencies was to procure data collection systems, such as observational sat-
ellites or ground-based sensor systems, from private companies.  Such procure-
ments were typically made under cost-plus contracts and pursuant to
government specifications based on consensus scientific requirements recom-
mended by the research community.249  Private contractors would build and
deliver the data collection systems, which the agencies would then operate pur-
suant to their mission.  All data from the system would belong to the
government and would enter the public domain.
Today, however, industry has successfully pursued a strategy of providing an
independent supply of the government’s needs for data and information prod-
ucts rather than building and delivering data collection systems for government
agencies to operate. 250  This solution leaves the control and ownership of the
resulting data in the hands of the company and allows it to license them to the
government and to anyone else willing to pay.  Because of this new-found role
of the government agency as cash cow, there has recently been a great deal of
pressure on the science agencies, particularly from Congress, to stop collecting
or disseminating data in-house and to obtain them from the private sector
instead.
This approach previously resulted in at least one well-documented fiasco,
namely, the privatization of the NASA–NOAA Landsat earth remote sensing
program in 1985, which seriously undermined basic and applied research in
environmental remote sensing in the United States for the better part of a
decade.251  More recently, the Commercial Space Act of 1998 directed the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) to purchase space
and earth science data collection and dissemination services from the private
sector and to treat data as commercial commodities under federal procurement
regulations.252 The meteorological data value-adding industry has directed simi-
lar lobbying pressures at NOAA.253  The photogrammetric industry has likewise
248. In other countries, notably those in the European Union, it has been a longstanding policy and
practice to commercialize data right from the public source.  See generally Green Paper, supra note 46;
Plujimers & Weiss, supra note 47.
249. The various discipline boards and committees of the National Academies are requested by the
federal science agencies periodically to provide research strategies for specific discipline or research
program areas.  See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS IN THE
NEW MILLENIUM (2001); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH STRATEGIES FOR THE U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM (1990), available at http://www.nap.edu (last visited Jan. 10
2003).
250. See, e.g., Management Association for Private Photogrammetric Surveyors (“MAPPS”),
Licensing Data, Licensing People, summary proceedings of November 2000 conference, available at
http://www.mapps.org/library.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) [hereinafter MAPPS Conference].
251. For a discussion of the adverse effects that the privatization of the Landsat program had on
basic research, see BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 121-24.
252. Commercial Space Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-303, §§ 107(a), 107(b), 112 Stat. 2843, 2853
(1998).
253. See, e.g., Hearing Before the House Science Comm., Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment,
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Michael S. Leavitt, President, Weather Services Corp., on behalf of
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indicated a desire to expand the licensing of data products to the U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey and to other federal agencies.254
Efforts have also been made by various industry groups to limit the online
information dissemination services of several federal science and technology
agencies.  In the cases of the patent database of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, the PubMed Central database of peer-reviewed life science journal
literature (provided on a free and unrestricted basis by the NIH National
Library of Medicine), and certain types of weather information disseminated by
the National Weather Service, such efforts have proved unsuccessful to date.
However, publisher groups did succeed in terminating the Department of
Energy’s PubScience web portal for physical science information. 255
b. Commercial Exploitation of Academic Research
Turning to government-funded research activities, the trend of greatest con-
cern for purposes of this article is the progressive incorporation of data and data
products into the commercialization process that is already underway in acade-
mia.  The original purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act and related legislation was
primarily to enable universities to obtain patents on applications of research
results.256  More recently, this activity has expanded to securing both patents and
copyrights in computer programs.  Now, databases used in molecular biology
have themselves become sources of patentable inventions, and the potential
commercial value of these databases as research tools has attracted consider-
able attention and controversy.257
These and other databases are increasingly the subject of licensing agree-
ments prepared by university technology transfer offices, which may be prone
to treat databases like other objects of material transfer agreements.258  The
the Commercial Weather Services Association); Contracting Out and Privitization Opportunities in
NOAA: Hearing Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., Subcomm. on Oversight Government
Management and the Dist. of Columbia, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Joel Myers, President,
AccuWeather, Inc.).
254. MAPPS Conference, supra note 250.
255. Goodbye, PubScience, We Hardly Knew Ye: Free DOE Database Goes Dark, LIBR. J. ACAD.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 12, 2002.  It should also be noted that this lobbying effort was supported vigorously in
2001 by the American Chemical Society, a major scientific society publisher.
256. Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 120, at 1665.
257. See, e.g., DAVID & FORAY, supra note 3, at 16-17 (“[C]ooperatively assembled bioinformatic
databases are permitting researchers to make important discoveries in the course of ‘unplanned jour-
neys through information space.’  If that space becomes filled by a thicket of property rights, then those
voyages of discovery will become more expensive to undertake . . . and the rate of expansion of the
knowledge base is likely to slow.”); Powell, supra note 13, at 254-55, 263-65, (“But what is striking is
how actively universities and firms are seeking to privatize new information” in biotechnology and
related fields.).
258. Empirical research has shown a growing acceptance by universities of confidentiality, nondis-
closure, and other restraints on open research as a result of increasing private-sector partnerships.  See
W.M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the Cause of Technological Advance,
in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES (R. Noll ed., 1998).  University technology transfer
offices operate on a commercial business model and view other universities as competitors.  See Jerry
G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower?  Sources of Growth in University
Licensing, 48 MGMT. SCI. 90, 90 (2002) (indicating that there has been a dramatic increase in technol-
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
Winter/Spring 2003] RESEARCH COMMONS 371
default rules that such licensing agreements tend to favor are exclusive
arrangements under onerous terms and conditions that include restrictions on
use, and even grant-back and reach-through clauses claiming interests in future
applications.259
Moreover, there is a growing awareness in academic circles generally that
data and data products may be of considerable commercial value, and individ-
ual researchers have become correspondingly more wary of making them as
available as before.260  This trend, together with the pressures on government
agencies described above, could pose serious problems for the research com-
munity’s ability to access and use needed data resources under any circum-
stances.261  In reality, these problems could become much greater as the new
legal and technological fencing measures discussed below become more broadly
implemented.
2. Intellectual Property, E-Contracts, and Technological Fences
Part II of this article showed that traditional copyright law was friendly to
science, education, and innovation by dint of its refusal to protect either facts or
ideas as eligible subject matter; by limiting the scope of protection for compila-
tions and other factual works to the stylistic expression of facts and ideas; by
carving out express exceptions and immunities for teaching, research, and
libraries; and by recognizing a catch-all, fall-back fair use exception for non-
profit research and other endeavors that advanced the public interest in the dif-
fusion of facts and ideas at relatively little expense to authors.  Reinforcing
these policies were judge-made and partially codified exceptions for function-
ally dictated components of literary works, which take the form of non-pro-
tectible methods, principles, processes, and discoveries.262  On the whole, these
principles tended to render facts and data as such ineligible for copyright pro-
tection and allow researchers to access and use facts and data otherwise
embodied in protectible works of authorship without undue legal impediments.
In contrast, recent legal developments in intellectual property and contracts
law have radically changed the pre-existing regime.  These and other related
developments now make it possible to assert and enforce proprietarial claims to
virtually all the factual matter that previously entered the public domain the
moment it was disclosed.
ogy transfer through licensing by universities as they attempt to appropriate returns from faculty
research); cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 113-15 (noting failure of post-1995 efforts to develop uniform rules
on biological materials transfer agreements to govern universities and private companies, and tendency
of universities to depart significantly in practice from 1995 inter-university agreement).
259. See Stephen M. Maurer, Promoting and Disseminating Knowledge: The Public/Private Inter-
face, paper prepared for the National Research Council’s Symposium on the Role of Scientific and
Technical Data and Information in the Public Domain 39-41 (Sept. 5-6, 2002), available at http://www7.
nationalacademies.org/biso/Maurer_background_paper.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002) (noting that
approximately half of all university licensing agreements are on an exclusive basis) [hereinafter Maurer,
Promoting and Disseminating Knowledge].
260. See, e.g., Campbell et al., supra note 131.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1.c.
261. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 264-66.
262. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; Part II.B.1.b.
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Some of the earliest changes were intended to bring U.S. copyright law into
line with long-standing norms of protection recognized in the Berne Conven-
tion.  For example, the principle of automatic copyright protection, the aboli-
tion of technical forfeiture due to lack of formal prerequisites, such as notice,
and the provision of a basic term of protection lasting for the life of the creator
plus fifty years were all measures adopted in the pre-digital era for this reason.263
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the United States took the lead in reshap-
ing the Berne Convention to accommodate computer programs, which many
commentators and governments had preferred to view as “electronic informa-
tion tools”264 subject to more pro-competitive industrial property laws, including
patents, unfair competition and hybrid (or sui generis) forms of protection.265  By
the 1990s, a coalition of content providers concerned about the online copying
of movies, music, and software in the new digital environment had persuaded
the U.S. government to press for still more far-reaching changes of international
copyright and related laws.266  These efforts led to the codification of universal
copyright norms in the TRIPS Agreement of 1994267 and to two 1996 World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) treaties on copyrights and related
rights in cyberspace,268 which endowed authors with a bevy of new exclusive
rights tailor-made for online transmissions, and which imposed unprecedented
obligations on participating governments to prohibit electronic equipment
capable of circumventing these rights.269  All of these new norms and obliga-
tions, ostensibly adopted to discourage market-destructive copying of literary
and artistic works, then became domestic law, 270 often with no regard for their
impact on science, and sometimes with deliberate disregard of measures
adopted to safeguard science and education at the international level.271
263. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 302, 401(a) (2000) (as amended).
264. See J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools: The Outer Edge of World Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 446 (1993) [hereinafter Reichman, Electonic
Information Tools].
265. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al.,  A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
266. See generally PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM 107-48
(2002); Gail Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue—The Making of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 18 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 137 (1994).
267. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 63, arts. 9-14.
268. World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1996); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M.
76. (1996).
269. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369
(1997).
270. See, e.g., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); Council
Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [here-
inafter E.C. Directive on Copyright in the Information Society].
271. The DMCA declined to enact concessions on users’ rights that the WIPO Diplomatic Confer-
ence and WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 had authorized.  See also Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda,
supra note 269.
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At the same time, and as part of the same overall movement, the coalition of
content providers that had captured Congress’ attention took aim at two closely
related areas in which much more than market-destructive copying was actually
at stake.  The first of these was to validate the uncertain status of standard-form
electronic contracts used to regulate online dissemination of works in digital
form.272  Because traditional contract and sales laws can be interpreted in ways
that limit the kinds of terms that can be imposed through “shrink-wrap” or
“click-on” licenses, and the one-sidedness of the resulting “adhesion con-
tracts,”273 the coalition pushing the high-protectionist digital agenda has spon-
sored a new uniform law, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(“UCITA”)274 to validate such contracts in the form they desire, and it has lob-
bied state legislatures to adopt it.275
The last major component of the high-protectionists’ digital agenda was an
attempt by some of the largest database companies to obtain a sui generis exclu-
sive property right in non-copyrightable collections of information, even though
facts and data had hitherto been off-limits even to international copyright law
as reformed under the TRIPS Agreement of 1994.276  These efforts culminated
in the European Community’s Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases
adopted in 1996; 277 in a proposed WIPO treaty on the international protection
of databases built on the same model, which was barely defeated at the WIPO
Diplomatic Conference in December of 1996;278 and in a series of database pro-
tection bills that have been introduced in the U.S. Congress that attempt to
enact similar measures into U.S. law.279
Most of the developments outlined above resulted from efforts that were
not undertaken with science in mind, although publishers who profit from dis-
tributing commercialized scientific products promoted some of the changes that
appear most threatening for scientific research, especially database protection
272. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual
Property, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 904-08 (1998).
273. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: the Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Beyond Preemption]; Charles R. McManis,
The Privatization or “Shrink-Wrapping” of American Copyright Law,  87 CAL. L. REV. 173 (1999).
274. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (“UCITA”) (2001), available at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/ (last visited May 13, 2002) (now adopted in Maryland and Virginia).
275. See generally Intellectual Property &  Contract Law, supra note 16.
276. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 63, at art. 10.2.
277. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17.
278. See Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property Rights in Respect of Databases, WIPO doc.
CRNR/DC/6 (1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/diplconf/pdf/6dc_e.pdf; Draft Recommenda-
tion, WIPO doc. CRNR/DC/88 (1996), available at
http://www.wipo.int/eng/diplconf/distrib/pdf/88dc.pdf.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the
U.S. Trade Representative initially supported this treaty, together with the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities.  The U.S. position changed following a series of high-level meetings of federal gov-
ernment officials in October and November of 1996, largely in response to a letter from the three presi-
dents of the National Academies to Mickey Kantor, Secretary of Commerce (Oct. 9, 1996) (on file with
authors) (expressing serious reservations about the potential effects of such a treaty on scientific
research and noting the complete absence of any interagency consultations about this matter or any
other public discussion).  See generally Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 97-113.
279. See supra note 17.
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laws.  The following sections show that all these measures—whatever their
ostensible purpose—have the cumulative effect of shrinking the research com-
mons.
We will first briefly note the impact of selected developments in both fed-
eral statutory copyright law and in contract laws at the state level.  We then dis-
cuss current proposals to confer strong exclusive property rights on non-copy-
rightable collections of data, which constitute the clearest and most overt
assault on the public domain that has fueled both scientific endeavors and tech-
nological innovation in the past.
a. Expanding Copyright Protection of Factual Compilations: The Revolt
Against Feist
The quest for a new legal regime to protect databases was triggered in part
by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,280 which denied copyright protection to the white pages
of a telephone directory.  As discussed in Part II, that decision reaffirmed the
principle that facts and data as such are ineligible for copyright protection as
“original and creative works of authorship.”281  It also limited the scope of copy-
right protection to any original elements of selection and arrangement that oth-
erwise meet the test of eligibility.  Second-comers who developed their own cri-
teria of selection and arrangement could in principle use prior data to make
follow-on products without running afoul of the copyright owner’s strong exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works.282  Taken together, these propositions
supported the customary and traditional practices of the scientific community
and facilitated access to and use of research data.
In recent years, however, judicial concerns about the compilers’ inability to
appropriate the returns from their investments have induced federal appellate
courts to broaden copyright protection of low authorship compilations in ways
that significantly deform both the spirit and the letter of Feist. 283  At the eligibil-
ity stage, so little in the way of original selection and arrangement is now
required that the only print media still certain to be excluded from protection
280. 499 U.S. 340, 349-51, 359-60 (1991).
281. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(b), 103 (2000).  See discussion of Feist supra at text accompanying
notes 88-89.  See also Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown, Today Publ’g Enter., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d
Cir. 1991) (“thin” copyright doctrine).
282. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 106(2) (2000); Feist, 499 U.S. at 354 (stressing adverse effects on free
flow of information by creating “monopol[ies] in public domain materials”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg,
No “Sweat?” Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 339 (1992) [hereinafter Ginsburg, “No Sweat?”]; Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17
U. DAYTON L. REV. 607, 609 (1992).
283. See, e.g., CDN, Inc., v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1999); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v.
Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (stressing low threshold of eligibility);
cf. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997) (taxonomies of dental
procedures not excluded subject matter); Justin Hughes, Created Facts – or the Occasional Protection
of Ideas, Names and Facts in Copyright Law (forthcoming 2003, on file with authors).
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are the white pages of telephone directories.284
More tellingly, the courts have increasingly perceived the eligibility criteria
of selection and arrangement as pervading the data themselves, in order to
restrain second-comers from using pre-existing data sets to perform operations
that are functionally equivalent to those of an initial compiler.285  In the Second
Circuit, for example, a competitor could not assess used car values by the same
technical means employed in a first-comer’s copyrightable compilation, even if
those means turned out to be particularly efficient, and even if the second-
comer combined the protected valuations with those of another rating system in
an averaged set of values.286  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit prevented even the use
of a small amount of data from a copyrighted compilation that was essential to
achieving a functional result.287
Copyright law provides a very long term of protection, and it generally
endows authors with strong rights to control follow-on applications of the pro-
tectible contents of their works.288  Stretching copyright law to cover algorithms
and aggregates of facts (and even so-called “soft” or subjective ideas), as these
recent decisions have done, conflates the idea-expression dichotomy and indi-
rectly extends protection to facts as such.289
Opponents of sui generis database protection in the United States cite these
and other cases as evidence that no sui generis database protection law is
needed.290  In reality, these cases suggest that, in the absence of a suitable mini-
malist regime of database protection to alleviate the risk of market failure with-
out impoverishing the public domain,291 courts tend to convert copyright law
into a roving unfair competition law that can protect both factual and functional
matter, including algorithms, for very long periods of time and that could create
formidable barriers to entry.  This tendency, however, ignores the historical
284. See, e.g., Warren Publ’g Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc); Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1446 (11th
Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
285. See, e.g., Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 57-61 (explaining protection of subjective
criteria of selection and arrangement as distinct from objective criteria, as set out in CCC Info. Servs, 44
F.3d at 71); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 395, 408-11
(1995).
286. CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 71-74.  But see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (denying copy-
right protection to functional aspects of literary works).
287. CDN, Inc., 197 F.3d at 1256.  See generally Hughes, supra note 283.
288. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103, 106(2), 302-304 (2000); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. granted sub nom, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1062, and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002); see
also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Improvement].
289. See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Note, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality Stan-
dard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 838-42 (2001).
290. See supra note 20; see also Johathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in
the 106th Congress, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869 (2001).
291. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 137-150 (proposing minimalist regimes of data-
base protection).
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limits of copyright protection in defiance of well-established Supreme Court
precedent,292 and ultimately jeopardizes access to the research commons.
b. The DMCA: An Exclusive Right to Access Minimally Copyrightable
Compilations of Data?
With regard to copyrightable compilations of data distributed online,
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1976, known as the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”),293 may have greatly reduced the traditional
safeguards surrounding research uses of factual works.  Technically, section
1201(a) establishes a right to prevent the direct circumvention of any electronic
fencing devices that a content provider may have employed to control access to
a copyrighted work.294  Section 1201(b) then perfects the scheme by exposing
manufacturers and suppliers of equipment capable of circumventing electronic
fencing devices to liability for copyright infringement when such equipment can
be used to violate the exclusive rights traditionally held by copyright owners.295
In enacting these provisions, Congress seems to have detached the prohibi-
tion against gaining unauthorized direct access to electronically fenced works
under section 1201(a) from the balance of public and private interests otherwise
established in the Copyright Act of 1976.296  As Professor Jane Ginsburg inter-
prets this provision, a violation of section 1201(a) is not an “infringement of
copyright” because it attracts a separate set of distinct remedies set out in sec-
tion 1203,297 and because it constitutes “a new violation” for which those reme-
dies are provided.298  On this reading, unlawful access is not subject to the tradi-
tional defenses and immunities of the copyright law, and one is “not . . .
permitted to circumvent the access controls, even to perform acts that are
lawful under the Copyright Act,”299 including presumably the user’s right to
extract unprotectible facts and ideas or to invoke the fair use defense.300  On the
292. Baker, 101 U.S. at 99; J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How:
Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639,
693-94, n.288 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman, Computer Programs] (on the deeper meaning of Baker).
293. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)).
294. “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
295. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
Manufacture and distribution of post-access circumvention devices and services are prohibited
only if they are “primarily designed” or have “only limited commercially significant purpose
or use other than” to circumvent “protection afforded by a technological measure that effec-
tively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof” or if
they are marked “as circumvention devices.”
Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 65 (interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C)).
296. See Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 62-65
297. 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000).
298. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63-64.
299. Id. at 62.
300. See id. at 62-64.  It remains possible that a court could interpret around these provisions to
reach a fair use defense in such a case, even though section 1201(c) seems to restrict that defense to
post-access uses.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c); Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63-64.  Obstruct-
ing access to non-copyrightable components might also attract the misuse defense in appropriate cir-
cumstances.  Cf. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 106.
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contrary, “Congress may in effect have extended copyright to cover ‘use’ of
works of authorship, including minimally original databases . . . because ‘access’
is a prerequisite to ‘use,’ [and] by controlling the former, the copyright owner
may well end up preventing or conditioning the latter.”301
While the precise contours of these provisions remain to be worked out in
future judicial decisions,302 they could potentiate the ability of both publishers
and scientists to protect online collections of data that were heretofore unpro-
tectible in print media.  If, for example, a database provider combined the non-
copyrightable collection of data with a nominally copyrightable component,
such as an analytical explanation of how the data were compiled, the “fig leaf”
copyrightable component might suffice to trigger the “no direct access” provi-
sions of section 1201(a).303  In that event, later scientific researchers could not
circumvent the electronic fence in order to extract or use the non-copyrightable
data, even for nonprofit scientific research, because section 1201(a) does not
recognize the normal exceptions to copyright protection that would allow such
use and scientific research is not one of the few very limited exceptions that
were codified in section 1201(d)-(j).304
Later researchers would thus have to acquire lawful access to the electroni-
cally fenced database under section 1201(a) and then attempt to extract the
non-copyrightable data for nonprofit research purposes under section 1201(b)
which does, in principle, recognize the traditional users’ defenses as well as the
privileges and immunities codified in sections 107-122 of the Copyright Act of
1976.305  Even here, however, later scientists could discover that the technical
devices they had used to extract non-protectible data from minimally copy-
rightable databases independently violated section 1201(b) of the DMCA
301. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63.
302. For the moment, they have withstood attack on constitutional grounds.  See, e.g., A&M Rec-
ords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-18 (9th Cir. 2001).  See generally DIGITAL DILEMMA,
supra note 14; JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON
THE INTERNET (2001); Pamela Samuelson & Randall Davis, The Digital Dilemma: A Perspective on
Intellectual Property in the Information Age, available at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/
~pam/papers/digdilsyn.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
303. See Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63 (finding that “the copyrightable fig leaf a
database producer affixes to an otherwise unprotectible work could, as a practical matter, obscure the
public domain nakedness of the compiled information”).
304. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(j) (2000).  But see discussion supra note 300.  In principle, scientific
bodies could petition for an exemption from § 1201(a) as adversely affected users, or they could seek to
argue that non-infringing uses of copyrightable databases should fall within a class of adversely affected
uses, but the Copyright Office has so far resisted this approach.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C), (D);
Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 64 nn.40, 41.
305. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 65-67.  Assuming that the end-user cannot circum-
vent the electronic fence without recourse to some technical device, much would depend on the extent
to which any such device could readily be used for infringing as well as non-infringing uses.
Section 1201(b) thus seems to lead to an impasse: it is permissible to circumvent anticopying
controls in order to make noninfringing use, but the software or device needed to engage in
the circumvention cannot be disseminated because it can all too easily be put to infringing use.
Id. at 66-67 (exploring the possibility of requiring content providers to identify nonprotectible compo-
nents).
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because those devices were otherwise capable of substantial infringing uses.306
In practice, moreover, the posterior scientists’ theoretical opportunity to extract
non-copyrightable data by technical devices that did not violate section 1201(b)
could already have been compromised by the electronic contracts these scien-
tists will have accepted in order to gain lawful access to the online database in
the first place to avoid the crushing power of section 1201(a).  In that event, the
scientists would almost certainly have waived any user rights they had retained
under section 1201(b), unless the electronic contracts themselves became unen-
forceable on one ground or another, as discussed below.307
In effect, the DMCA allows copyright owners to surround their collections
of data with technological fences and electronic identity marks buttressed by
encryption and other digital controls that force would-be users to enter the
system through an electronic gateway.308  To pass through the gateway, users
must accede to non-negotiable electronic contracts, which impose the copyright
owner’s terms and conditions without regard to the traditional defenses and
statutory immunities of copyright law.309
The DMCA indirectly recognized the potential conflict between proprietors
and users of ineligible material, such as facts and data, that section 1201(a) of
the statute could thus trigger, and it empowered the Copyright Office, which
reports to the Librarian of Congress, to exempt categories of users whose activi-
ties might be adversely affected.310  While representatives of the educational and
library communities petitioned for relief on various grounds, including the need
of researchers to access and use non-copyrightable facts and ideas transmitted
online, the authorities have so far declined to act.311
It is too soon to know how far owners of copyrightable compilations can
push this so-called “right of access”312 at the expense of research, competition,
and free speech without incurring resistance based on the misuse doctrine of
copyright law, the public policy and unconscionability doctrines of state con-
tract laws, and First Amendment concerns that have in the past limited copy-
right protection of factual works.313  For the foreseeable future, nonetheless, the
306. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(c).
307. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16.
308. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 97; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (prohibiting removal of
copyright management information).
309. See, e.g., McManis, supra note 273.  See generally GUIBAULT, supra note 95, at 291-304.
Attempts to bypass these electronic barriers in the name of pre-existing legal defenses then constitute
either a violation of the access right under section 1201(a), which could impede third parties from rais-
ing even the well-established traditional defenses to an action for infringement, or an independent basis
for infringement under § 1201(b).  See supra notes 296-301, 306 and accompanying text.
310. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)-(D).
311. See supra note 304; Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Sys-
tems for Access Control Technologies, 37 C.F.R § 201 (2000);.
312. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1, 32-34 (1995) (discussing thesis that copyrighted works should be accessible).
313. Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 273; Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 929-53
(proposing and applying doctrine of  “public interest unconscionability” as functional equivalent of
misuse doctrine).
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DMCA empowers owners of copyrightable collections of facts to contractually
limit online access to the pre-existing public domain in ways that contrast dras-
tically with the traditional availability of factual contents in printed works.
c. One-Sided Electronic Licensing Contracts
Data published in print media traditionally entered the public domain under
the classical intellectual property regime described above.  Further ensuring
that result is an ancillary copyright doctrine, known as “exhaustion” or “first
sale doctrine,” which limits the authors’ powers to control the uses that third
parties can make of copyrighted literary works distributed to the public in hard
copies.314
Under this doctrine, the copyright owner may extract a profit from the first
sale of the copy embodying an original and protectible compilation of data, but
cannot prevent a purchaser from reselling that physical copy or from using it in
any way the latter deems fit, say, for research purposes, unless such uses
amount to infringing reproductions, adaptations, or performances of the expres-
sive components of the copyrighted compilation.315  In effect, copyright law not
only made it difficult to protect compilations of data as such, but it denied
authors any exclusive right to control the use of a protected work once it had
been distributed to the public in hard copies.316
The first sale doctrine thus complements and perfects the other science-
friendly provisions described above, unless individual scientists, libraries, or sci-
entific entities were to contractually waive their rights to use copies of pur-
chased works in the manner described.  Such contractual waivers always remain
theoretically possible, and publishers have increasingly pressed them upon the
scientific and educational communities in the online environment for reasons
discussed below.
Nevertheless, it was not generally feasible to impose such waivers against
scientists who bought scientific works distributed to the public in hard copies,
and even when attempts to do so were made, such contracts could not bind sub-
sequent purchasers of the copies in question.  The upshot was that, precisely
because authors and publishers could not rely on contractual agreements, they
depended on the default rules of copyright law, which are binding against the
world.  These default rules, in turn, impose legislatively enacted “contracts,”
which balance public and private interests by, for example, defining the uses
that libraries can make of their copies,317 immunizing certain protected uses for
314. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); see also § 117 (allowing owner of copyrighted computer program to
use it on any computer).
315. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (delineating exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, publicly perform, distrib-
ute, and display copyrighted works, but conferring no exlcusive right to use); § 109(a) (defining right of
owner to dispose of physical copy of protected work); Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protec-
tion: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 588-89 (1985) (stressing importance of
denial of exclusive use).
316. Accord Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63.
317. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
380 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:315
educational purposes,318 and further allowing a set of fair uses that scientists and
other researchers can invoke.319
i. Restoring the Power of the “Two-Party” Deal
Against this background, online delivery of both copyrightable and non-
copyrightable productions possesses the inherent capabilities of changing the
pre-existing relationship between authors and readers or between content pro-
viders and users.  As previously discussed, by placing a collection of minimally
copyrightable data online and surrounding it with technological fencing devices,
publishers can condition access to the database on the would-be user’s acqui-
escing to the terms and conditions of the former’s “click-on,” standard-form,
non-negotiable contract (known as a contract of adhesion).320  To this end,
highly restrictive digital rights management technologies (“DRM”) are being
developed that include hardware and software based “trusted systems,” online
database access controls, and increasingly effective forms of encryption.321
The power to control online access that digital rights management technolo-
gies confers is, moreover, conceptually and empirically independent of statutory
intellectual property rights, which makes it of capital importance for the theses
discussed in this article.  It means that even if a given compilation of data lacked
any copyrightable “fig leaf” whatsoever, so that it could not trigger the so-called
“access right” that section 1201(a) of the DMCA otherwise provides,322 the elec-
tronic contract accepted at the gateway to the provider’s electronic fence may
itself enable him to control all the uses of the non-copyrightable data, which
would technically enter the public domain.  So long as third parties cannot fea-
sibly acquire the data in question except by individually accepting the online
provider’s “click-on” licensing restrictions, online delivery can solve most of the
problems that the printing press created for authors by enabling them contrac-
tually to restrict the use of productions made available to the public, whether
copyrightable or not, and in this sense it restores the “power of the two-party
318. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1), (2).
319. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 573-96 (1994); Harper &
Row Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
320. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a), 1202; McManis, supra note 273; see also GUIBAULT, supra note
95, at 3.
321. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Man-
agement” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 983-89 (1996) (discussing technologies that copyright
owners may employ to monitor and control access to information); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right
to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted
Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 137 (1997); see also PETER ECKERSLEY, VIRTUAL MARKETS FOR VIRTUAL GOODS: AN
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, Intell. Prop. Res. Inst. of Australia Working
Paper (2002), available at http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~pde/writing/virtualmarkets.pdf; Dan L. Burk & Julie
Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41-83
(2001); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need to be Revised,  14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
322. The presence of some original copyrightable expression remains a necessary prerequisite to
triggering the technical protection measures of the DMCA, which to that extent remain copyright
dependent.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(b), 103 (2000); Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63.
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deal” that publishers lost in the sixteenth century.323
Because electronic contracts are enforceable in state courts, they provide
private rights of action that tend to either substitute for or override statutory
intellectual property rights.  Electronic contracts become substitutes for intel-
lectual property rights to the extent that they make it infeasible for third parties
to obtain publicly disclosed but electronically fenced data without incurring
contractual liability for damages.  They may override statutory intellectual
property rights by, for example, forbidding the uses that libraries could other-
wise make of a scientific work under federal copyright law, or by prohibiting
follow-on applications or the reverse engineering of a computer program that
both federal copyright law and state trade secret law would otherwise permit.324
To the extent that those who draft electronic contracts are allowed to
impose terms and conditions that ignore the goals and policies of the federal
intellectual property system, they could establish “privately legislated intellec-
tual property rights” unencumbered by concessions to the public interest.325  By
the same token, a privately generated database protected by technical devices
and electronic adhesion contracts is subject to no federally imposed duration
clause and accordingly will never lapse into the public domain.
ii. The Proposed Uniform Computerized Information Transactions Act
(“UCITA”)
Whether state courts should enforce electronic contracts—especially the
non-negotiable, standard-form “click-on” and “shrink-wrap” contracts—
remains an open and controversial question.326  Besides technical obstacles to
formation sounding in general contracts law, commentators argue that courts
may deem such contracts unenforceable under the public policy defense of state
contracts law, under the preemption doctrine that supports the integrity of the
federal intellectual property system, or under some combination of the two.327
In this regard, the doctrine of unconscionability, spawned by the Uniform
Commercial Code,328 could be expanded to encompass a concept of “public
interest unconscionability,” which in effect would endow state courts with a
323. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 897-99.
324. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret?  How Article 2B
Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Difficult), 87 CAL. L. REV. 191 (1999).
But see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line
Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511 (1997); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public
Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 543 (1992).
325. See generally Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 929-53 (proposing misuse of contracts
doctrine to regulate privately legislated intellectual property rights that disrupt the public-private bal-
ance of the federal system without reasonable economic justification).
326. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
808 (1997); ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).  But see Alexander M. Meiklejohn,
Castles in the Air: Blanket Assent and the Revision of Article 2, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 599, 603
(1994).
327. See generally Intellectual Property and Contract Law, supra note 16
328. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002).
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“misuse of contracts” concept to parallel and dovetail with the doctrines of
“misuse of intellectual property rights.” 329
In practice, however, courts appear reluctant to exercise such powers even
when their right to do so is clear.  The most recent line of cases, led by the Sev-
enth Circuit’s opinion in Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg,330 has tended to validate elec-
tronic contracts of adhesion in the name of “freedom of contract.”  In this same
vein, the National Council of Commissioners for Uniform State Law
(“NCCUSL”) has proposed a Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (“UCITA”), which, if state legislatures enacted it, would broadly validate
such contracts and largely immunize them from legal challenge.331
For example, UCITA permits vendors of information products to define vir-
tually every transaction as a “license” rather than a “sale,” and it tolerates per-
petual licenses.332  It could thus override the first-sale doctrine of copyright law
and any analogous doctrine that might be embodied in the proposed database
protection laws discussed below.
The proposed uniform law would then proceed to broadly validate mass
market “click-on” and “shrink-wrap” licenses that impose all the provisions
vendors could hope for, with little regard for the interests of scientific and edu-
cational users, or the public in general.333  It would permit vendors to add fur-
ther, non-negotiated conditions to the perpetual licensing agreement even after
the product had been paid for, and in case of dispute, it would permit vendors
to block recalcitrant “licensees” who too vigorously complained about either
the product or the terms and conditions that accompany it from further access-
ing or using the information it made available.334
A detailed analysis of UCITA’s provisions is beyond the scope of this study.
Suffice it to say, however, that its less-than-transparent drafting process so
favored the interests of sellers of software and other information products at
the expense of consumers and users generally that a coalition of sixteen state
attorneys general vigorously opposed its adoption, and the American Law Insti-
tute withdrew its co-sponsorship of the original project.  Nonetheless, two
states—Maryland and Virginia—have adopted non-uniform versions of
329. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 927-37 (“Validating Non-negotiable Terms that
Respect the Balance of Public and Private Interests”); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, A Public-Regarding
Approach to Contracting Over Copyright, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note 13, at
191-222.
330. 86 F.3d at 1447; Intellectual Property and Contract Law, supra note 16.
331. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) (2001), available at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).  At the time of this writing, the NCCUSL had
just completed some revisions to UCITA that reportedly address some of the most excessive features of
the proposed act that heavily favor the rights of vendors over licensees.  Nonetheless, the American
Bar Association has refused to endorse it.
332. UCITA § 308.
333. UCITA § 209.  See generally Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 938-65.
334. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 1089 (1998).
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UCITA,335 and major software and information industry firms continue to lobby
assiduously for its enactment by other state legislatures.
If present trends continue unabated, privately generated information prod-
ucts delivered online—including databases and computer software—may be
kept under a kind of perpetual, mass market trade secret protection, subject to
no reverse engineering efforts or public-interest uses that are not expressly
sanctioned by licensing agreements. Contractual rights of this kind, backed by a
one-sided regulatory framework, such as UCITA, could conceivably produce an
even higher level of protection than that available from some future federal
database right subject to statutory public-interest exceptions.  The most power-
ful proprietary cocktail of all, however, would probably emerge from a combi-
nation of a strong federal database right with UCITA-backed contracts of
adhesion.
d. New Exclusive Property Rights in Non-Copyrightable Collections of
Data
The challenge of protecting commercially valuable collections of informa-
tion that fail to meet the technical eligibility requirements of copyright law
poses a hard problem that has existed in one form or another for two centu-
ries,336 and at least three different approaches have emerged over time. 337  One
solution would allow a domestic copyright law to accommodate low authorship
literary productions, with some adjustments to the bundle of rights at the mar-
gins.338  A second approach, adopted in the Nordic countries, would enact a
short term sui generis regime, built on a distinctly copyright-like model that
would protect catalogues, directories, and tables of data against wholesale
duplication, without conferring on proprietors any exclusive adaptation right
like that afforded to authors of true literary and artistic works.339  A third
approach, experimented with at different times and to varying degrees in differ-
ent countries, including the United States, would protect compilers of informa-
tion against wholesale duplication of their products under different theories
rooted in the misappropriation branch of unfair competition law.340
335. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 491 n.314 (2002).
336. See, e.g., Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 55.
337. This section is based on J. H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note
18, at 455, 459-84.
338. See, e.g., Desktop Mktg Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. Ltd. (2002) 192 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.)
(holding that white pages of telephone directory qualify for copyright protection under “sweat of the
brow” theory).  See generally Baron, supra note 78; Denicola, supra note 78; Ginsburg, “No Sweat?”,
supra note 282; Ginsburg, Commercial Value, supra note 78.
339. See, e.g., Gunnar W. G. Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT
67 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 1991).
340. Int’l News Serv., Inc. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola
Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law and Sui Generis Protec-
tion of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997); see also Gordon,
supra note 152; Jason R. Boyarski, The Heist of Feist: Protection for Collections of Information and the
Possible Federalization of “Hot News,” 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999); Brian F. Fitzgeral, Protecting
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What changed in the 1990s was the convergence of digital and telecommuni-
cations networks, which potentiated the role of electronic databases in the
information economy generally, and which made scientific databases in par-
ticular into agents of technological innovation whose economic potential may
eventually outstrip that accruing from the patent system.341  Notwithstanding the
robust appearance of the present day database industry under free market con-
ditions,342 analysts asked whether inadequate investment in complex digital
databases would not inevitably hinder that industry’s long-term growth pros-
pects if free-riding second-comers could rapidly appropriate the contents of
successful new products without contributing to their costs of development and
maintenance over time.  In other words, if copyright, contract law, DRM tech-
nologies, residual unfair competition laws, and various protective business prac-
tices inadequately filled a gap in the law, then regulatory action to enhance
investment might be justified.343  This utilitarian rationale, however, raised new
and still largely unaddressed questions about the unintended social costs likely
to ensue if intellectual property rights were injudiciously bestowed upon the
raw materials of the information economy in general and on the building blocks
of scientific research in particular.344
Any serious effort to find an appropriate sui generis solution to the question
of database protection should have engendered an investigation of the com-
parative economic advantages and disadvantages of regimes based on exclusive
property rights as distinct from regimes based on unfair competition laws and
other forms of liability rules.345  This investigation should also have taken
account of larger questions about the varying impacts of different legal regimes
on freedom of speech and the conditions of democratic discourse, which, in the
United States at least, are of primary constitutional importance.346  Instead, the
Commission of the European Community cut the inquiry short by adopting the
Informational Products (Including Databases) Through Unjust Enrichment Law: An Australian Per-
spective, 1998 E.I.P.R. 244 (1998).
341. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4; cf. Reichman, Electronic
Information Tools, supra note 264.  The emergence of digitally networked environments has generated
a host of new value-added services and products, and appreciably increased the importance of this seg-
ment of the database market.  David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and
the Limits of Copyright in Canada, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 175 (1997); see also Hunsucker, supra
note 239.
342. See Fewer, supra note 341 (case of Canada); Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34.  See
generally A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1.
343. See, e.g., Hunsucker, supra note 239; Information Antipiracy Hearings, supra note 239.
344. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 113-37.
345. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 164; supra note 151 (defining liability rules).
346. For example, the constitutional foundations of United States copyright law have always rested
on a clear and sharp distinction between facts and ideas that were freely available to all and the
author’s expression of facts and ideas, which could not be copied.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  Allowing
exclusive property rights to cover aggregates of data and information that had been previously unpro-
tectible must sooner or later pose fundamental constitutional questions for countries that take freedom
of speech seriously, questions that a creative use of liability rules might altogether avoid.  See generally
Benkler, Constitutional Bounds, supra note 91; Hamilton, supra note 91; Paul J. Heald, The Extrac-
tion/Duplication Dichotomy: Constitutional Line-Drawing in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 933
(2001).
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Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases in 1996. 347  This Directive
requires all E.U. member countries (and affiliated states) to pass laws that
confer a hybrid exclusive property right on publishers who make substantial
investments in non-copyrightable compilations of facts and information.348
i. The E.C. Database Directive in Brief
The hybrid exclusive right that the European Commission ultimately crafted
in its Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases does not resemble any
pre-existing intellectual property regime.  It protects any collection of data,
information, or other materials that is arranged in a systematic or methodologi-
cal way, provided that it is individually accessible by electronic or other
means.349  To become eligible for protection, the database producer must dem-
onstrate a “substantial investment,” as measured in either qualitative or quanti-
tative terms, 350 which leaves the courts to develop this criterion with little guid-
ance from the legislative history.351  The drafters explicitly recognized that the
qualifying investment may consist of no more than simply verifying or main-
taining the database.352
In return for this investment, the compiler obtains exclusive rights to extract
or reutilize all or a substantial part of the contents of the protected database.353
The exclusive extraction right pertains to any transfer in any form of all or a
substantial part of the contents of a protected database;354 the exclusive
reutilization right, by contrast, covers only the making available to the public of
all or a substantial part of the same database, typically by incorporation of those
data into another database.355  In every case, the first-comer obtains an exclusive
right to control uses of collected data as such, as well as a powerful adaptation
(or derivative work) right along the lines that copyright law bestows on “origi-
nal works of authorship,”356 even though such a right is alien to the protection of
investment under existing unfair competition laws.357  In a recent interpretation
of this provision, a United Kingdom court vigorously enforced this right to con-
trol follow-on applications of an original database against a value-adding sec-
347. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17.
348. Id. at arts. 1(2), 7(1).
349. Id. at art. 1(2).
350. Id. at art. 7(1).
351. The Recitals, and some implementing laws, state that the “substantial investment” may entail
financial, material, or human resources.  See, e.g., id., Recital 40; see also Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives,
supra note 18, at 69 n.55.
352. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at art. 7(1).
353. Id. at arts. 7(1)-(2).
354. Id. at art. 7(2)(a).  For example, any transfer of all or a substantial part of a paper or disc will
trigger this clause. “Indeed, extraction also occurs if the user simply downloads a ‘substantial part’ . . .
to ‘RAM’ to view on a screen since ‘extraction’ . . . shall mean the permanent or temporary transfer.”
Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 69.
355. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at art. 7(2)(b).
356. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (“derivative works”), 103, 106(2).
357. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 137-51.
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ond-comer. 358  It took this position even though the proprietor was the sole
source of the data in question and there was no feasible way to generate them
by independent means.359
The Directive contains no provision expressly regulating the collections of
information that member governments themselves produce.  This lacuna leaves
European governments that generate data free to exercise either copyrights360 or
sui generis rights in their own productions in keeping with their respective
domestic policies.  This result contrasts sharply with the situation in the United
States, where the government cannot claim intellectual property rights in the
data it generates and must normally make such data available to the public for
no more than a cost-of-delivery fee.361
The Directive provides no mandatory public-interest exceptions comparable
to those recognized under domestic and international copyright laws.  An
optional, but ambiguous, exception concerning “illustrations for teaching or sci-
entific research” applies to extractions but not reutilization.362  This provision
would prevent a nonprofit scientist from incorporating an extract taken from a
protected database into a new and different compilation.363
The Directive’s sui generis regime exempts from liability anyone who
extracts or reuses an insubstantial part of a protected database, and this excep-
tion may not be overridden by contract.364  However, such a user bears the risk
of accurately drawing the line between a substantial and an insubstantial part,
and any repeated or systematic uses of even an insubstantial part will forfeit this
exemption.365  Judicial interpretation has so far taken a restrictive view of this
exemption, and one cannot effectively make unauthorized extractions or uses of
an insubstantial part of any protected database without serious risk of triggering
an action for infringement.366
Qualifying databases are nominally protected for a fifteen-year period.367  In
reality, each new substantial investment in a protected database, such as the
358. British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2001 E.W.C.A. Civ. 1268 (Eng. C.A.).
359. Id.
360. See E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at ch. I, arts. 1-6; Berne Convention, supra note
109, at art. 2(4) (leaving this to discretion of governments).
361. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
362. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at arts. 9, 9(b).  This exception requires attribution and
must not exceed an amount “justified by the noncommercial purpose to be achieved”); see also id. at
art. 9(a) (broader exception for private use extractions from hard copies).
363. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 803; accord Ginsburg, U.S.
Initiatives, supra note 18, at 69-70.  This provision may be open to a more flexible interpretation, and
some member countries, notably the Nordic countries, have implemented a broader version.  Other
countries, notably France, Italy, and Greece, have simply ignored this exception altogether, which
defeats the Commission’s supposed concerns to promote uniform law.
364. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at arts. 8(1), 15.
365. Id., arts. 7(2), 7(5), 8(1).
366. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, The New Database Right: Early Case Law from Europe, paper presented
at the Ninth Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, New York (Apr. 19-20, 2001), available at http://www.inir.nl/medewerkers/
hugenholtz.htm; see also Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 87-95.
367. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at art. 10(1).
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provision of updates, can re-qualify that database as a whole for a new term of
protection.368  In this and other respects, the scope of the sui generis adaptation
right exceeds that of copyright law, which attaches only to the new matter
added to an underlying, pre-existing work and expires at a time certain.369
Finally, the Directive carries no national treatment requirement into its sui
generis component.  Foreign database producers become eligible only if their
countries of origin provide a similar form of protection or if they set up opera-
tions within the European Union.370  Non-qualifying foreign producers, how-
ever, may nonetheless seek protection for their databases under residual
domestic copyright and unfair competition laws, where available.371
The E.C.’s Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases thus broke radi-
cally with the historical limits of intellectual property protection in at least three
ways.  First, it overtly and expressly confers an exclusive property right on the
fruits of investment as such, without predicating the grant of protection on any
predetermined level of creative contribution to the public domain.  Next, it con-
fers this new exclusive property right on aggregates of information as such,
which had heretofore been considered as unprotectible raw material or basic
inputs available to creators operating under all other pre-existing intellectual
property rights.  Finally, it potentially confers the new exclusive property right
in perpetuity, with no concomitant requirement that the public ultimately
acquire ownership of the object of protection at the end of a specified period.372
The Directive thus effectively abolishes the very concept of a public domain
that had historically justified the grant of temporary exclusive rights in intangi-
ble creations.373
368. Id. at art. 10(3).
369. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 302 (2000); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 84-90.
370. E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, at art. 11, Recital 56.
371. Id. at art. 13.  Copyright protection is independent of sui generis protection, but the two
regimes may apply cumulatively.
372. In this and other respects, the E.C. Database Directive broke with the history of intellectual
property law by allowing a property rule—as distinct from a liability rule—to last in perpetuity.
Trademarks may last in perpetuity, but they do not protect innovation or investments as such, only the
signs and symbols that enable consumers to distinguish one producer’s goods from another’s.  William
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. ECON. 265 (1987).
Trademarks are thus not legal monopolies, and because they protect only against acts that yield a like-
lihood of confusion, there are historical questions about their status as “property” at all.
These historical debates in turn reflect confusion about the fundamental distinction between exclu-
sive property rights and liability rules, which have a different economic logic.  See discussion supra at
note 151.  Trademarks are property in the sense that proprietors obtain legally enforceable entitle-
ments, but that entitlement is only to avoid deceiving or confusing consumers by the adoption of similar
identifying symbols.  While the property-like status of marks has been strengthened against dilution in
recent years, a trademark confers no rights in the underlying products of innovation or investment as
such, which anyone remains free to copy and sell under a different mark.
373. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18.  See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Winter/Spring
2003) [hereinafter Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement]; David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain,
44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965 (1990).  But see van Caenegem, supra note 113, at 324, 328-30.
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ii. The Database Protection Controversy in the United States
The situation in the United States differs markedly from that which pre-
ceded the adoption of the European Commission’s Directive on the Legal Pro-
tection of Databases.  In general, the legislative process in the United States has
become relatively transparent.  Since the first legislative proposal, modeled on
the E.C. Directive, was introduced by the House Committee on the Judiciary in
May of 1996,374 this transparency has generated a spirited and often high-level
public debate.375  Very little progress toward a compromise solution had been
reached as of the time of writing, however, which is hardly surprising given the
intensity of the opposing views, the methodological distance that divides them,
and the political clout of the opposing camps.376
We are accordingly left with the two basic proposals that were still on the
table at the end of the last legislative session, which ended in an impasse.  These
proposals, as refined during that session, represent the baseline positions that
each coalition carried into the current round of negotiations.  One bill, H.R.
354, as revised in January of 2000,377 embodies the proponents’ last set of pro-
posals for a sui generis regime built on an exclusive property rights model
(although some effort has been made to conceal that solution behind a facade
that evokes unfair competition law).  The other bill, H.R. 1858, sets out the
opponents’ views of a so-called minimalist misappropriation regime as it stood
on the eve of the current round of negotiations.378
(a) The exclusive rights model.  The proposals embodied in H.R. 354
attempt to achieve levels of protection comparable to those of the E.C. Direc-
tive by means that are more congenial to the legal traditions of the United
States.379  The changes introduced in that bill softened some of the most contro-
versial provisions at the margins, while maintaining the overall integrity of a
strongly protectionist regime.380
The bill in this form continued to define “collections of information” very
374. H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).  For details, see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 102-
09.
375. See J. H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18 at 467-70.  For
developments in the period between 1996 and 1999, see Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra
note 4, at 821-28.
376. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the last series of negotiations between the stakeholder groups
in March 2001, the two committee chairmen vowed to draft a compromise bill if the interested parties
themselves failed to agree.  See Transcript of Press Conference of Rep. Billy Tauzin and Rep. James
Sensenbrenner, March 29, 2001, available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/cong107/database/
20010329.
377. See H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).  This bill was subject to proposed amendments on Jan. 11,
2000, which, however, were not formally submitted as an amended proposal.  The summary in the text
sometimes reflects changes that were introduced in publicly disclosed proposals for amendments.
378. See H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).
379. See generally Amanda Perkins, United States Still No Closer to Database Legislation, 2000
E.I.P.R. 366; Band & Kono, supra note 290; Roger L Zissu, Protection for Facts and Databases in the
New World Order, 1998 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 271 (1998).
380. Many of these changes came under pressure from agents of the past Administration seeking to
engender a compromise.
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broadly as “information . . . collected and . . . organized for the purpose of
bringing discrete items of information together in one place or through one
source so that persons may access them.”381  Like the E.C. Directive, the bill
then casts eligibility in terms of an “investment of substantial monetary or other
resources” in the gathering, organizing or maintaining of a “collection of infor-
mation.”382  It confers two exclusive rights on the investor: first, a right to make
all or a substantial part of a protected collection “available to others;” and, sec-
ond, a right “to extract all or a substantial part to make available to others.”
Here the term “others” is manifestly broader than “public” in ways that remain
to be clarified.383
H.R. 354 then superimposed an additional criterion of liability on both
exclusive rights that is not present in the E.C. Directive.  This is the require-
ment that, to trigger liability for infringement, any unauthorized act of “making
available to others” or “extraction” for that purpose must cause “material harm
to the market” of the qualifying investor “for a product or service that incorpo-
rates that collection of information and is offered or intended to be offered in
commerce.”  The crux of liability under the bill thus derives from a “material
harm to markets” test that is meant to cloud the copyright-like nature of the
bill384 and shroud it in different terminology.385
Here a number of concessions were made to the opponents’ concerns in the
last public iteration of the bill on Jan. 11, 2000, some of them real, others nomi-
nal in effect.  The addition of “material” to the market harm test,386 may, for
example, address complaints that proponents viewed one lost sale as constitut-
ing actionable harm to the market.
At the same time, the revised bill contained convoluted and tortuous defini-
tions of “market” that the previous Administration hoped would reduce the
scope of protection in the case of follow-on applications.387  On closer inspec-
381. H.R. 354,  106th Cong. §1401(1) (1999).  Here the overlap with copyright law is so palpable that
it is hard to conceive of any copyrightable assemblage of words, numbers, facts, or information that
would not also qualify as a potentially protectible collection of information.
382. Id. at §1402(a).
383. However, the second right represents a concession to the past Administration in that it fore-
goes the general right to control private use that appeared in previous versions.  This concession thus
reduces the scope of protection to a point more in line with the E.C.’s reutilization right, and it does not
impede personal use by one who lawfully acquires access to the database. See id. at §1402(a).
384. Because the Supreme Court insists that “originality” is a constitutional requirement for copy-
right protection, it “has arguably stripped Congress of power . . . to enact a copyright-like statute for
non-original databases.”  Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 73-74.
385. See H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402(a) (1999).  As originally deposited, H.R. 354 spoke of “mate-
rial harm to the primary market or a related market” of the investor.  Id.  The analysis in the text is
based on the more refined but unpublished proposals of January 11, 2000.  In fact, a “harm to markets”
test is lifted bodily from section 107(4) of the Copyright Act of 1976, and it reflects the better view of
what U.S. copyright law is all about.  See J. H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s
Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943 (1991) (reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1990)).
386. H.R. 354 § 1402(a).
387. “Market” is thus supposed to assimilate “all markets” in which a protected investor “derives or
reasonably expects to derive substantial revenue, directly or indirectly,” as well as all markets in which
that investor “has taken demonstrable steps discernable to the public, to offer in commerce within a
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tion, however, these definitions provide a static picture of a moving target that
amounts to a mostly illusory limitation on the investor’s broad adaptation
right.388  Notwithstanding these so-called concessions, the bill effectively assigns
most follow-on applications to any initial investor whose dynamic operations
expand the range of potentially protectible matter with every update, ad infini-
tum.
The bill then introduced a “reasonable use” exception that was intended to
benefit the nonprofit user communities, especially researchers and educators,389
and that conveys a sense of similarity to the fair use exception in copyright
law.390  Once again, these benefits become largely illusory on closer analysis,
because under the proposed bill, the very facts, data, and information that copy-
right law excludes have themselves become the objects of protection, and there
are no other significant exceptions.  Hence, virtually every customary or tradi-
tional use of facts or data compiled by others that copyright law would pre-
sumably have allowed scientists, researchers, or other nonprofit entities to
make in the past now becomes a prima facie instance of infringement under
H.R. 354.  These users would, in effect, either have to license such uses or be
prepared to seek judicial relief for “reasonableness” on a continuing basis.
Because university administrators dislike litigation and are risk averse by
nature, and this provision puts the burden of showing reasonableness on them,
there is reason to expect a chilling effect on customary uses by these institutions
of data heretofore in the public domain.391
short period of time a product or service” from which he expected to derive substantial revenue.  H.R.
354 §§ 1401(3)(A), (B) (with additional proviso added Jan. 11, 2000).
388. In principle, only actual, likely, or planned markets are protected under this scheme, which cre-
ates a narrow opening for a value-adding competitor who arrives on the scene with an unlikely or
unplanned application.  Even here, however, the definitions ignore the prospects that the initial inves-
tor will continue to expand the range of projected investments over time and thus convert all the tests
to moving targets that constantly expand his potential claims to protected market segments.
In practice, moreover, database proprietors would be well-advised to plan for any market segments
they can remotely foresee over time and to craft their business models in broadly worded terms
accordingly.  Should a competitor discover a surprise market niche to slip into all the same, the initial
proprietor’s most likely strategy would be to surround the competitor with applications of its own, to
limit the competitor’s field of expansion and to extract cross-licenses wherever possible.
389. H.R. 354 § 1403(2).
390. In copyright law, there is a thicket of exclusions and exceptions that must be worked through
before anyone can infringe.  In particular, one cannot infringe for a taking of unprotectible facts or
ideas, and even a taking of protectible expression may be excused by codified exceptions for, say,
teaching or research.  The “fair use” exception comes into play only as a last resort, to excuse marginal
takings by an alleged infringer that advance the public interest at a small cost to the proprietor.  See 17
U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107-122 (2000).
391. Cf. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 69; Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection,
supra note 4, at 812-20, 825-29.  A further provision then completes the sense of circularity by expressly
exempting any nonprofit educational, scientific, and research use that “does not materially harm the
market” as previously defined.  See H.R. 354 § 1403(b).  Since any use that does not materially harm
the market remains unactionable to begin with, this “concession” adds nothing but window dressing.
However, another vaguely worded exception seems to recognize at least a possibility that certain “fully
transformative uses” might nonetheless escape liability, but this ambiguous proposal defies interpreta-
tion in its present form and remains to be clarified.
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The bill recognized an “independent creation” norm, which presumably
exempts any database, however similar to an existing database, that was not the
fruit of “copying.”392  This provision codifies a fundamental norm of copyright
law, and the European Commission made much of a similar norm in justifying
its own regulatory scheme.  In reality, this “independent creation” principle
produces unintended and socially deleterious consequences when transposed to
the database milieu precisely because many of the most complex and important
databases are inherently incapable of independent regeneration.  Sometimes
the database cannot be reconstituted because the underlying phenomena are
one-time events, as often occurs in the observational sciences.393  In other
instances, key components of a complex database can no longer be reconsti-
tuted with certainty at a later date.  Any independently regenerated database
suffering from these defects would necessarily contain gaps that made it inher-
ently less reliable than its predecessor.
These problems point to a more general phenomenon that affects competi-
tion in large or complex databases.  Even when, in principle, such databases
could be reconstituted from scratch, the high cost of doing so—as compared
with the add-on costs of existing producers—will tend to make the second-
comer’s costs so high as to constitute a barrier to entry.  Meanwhile, the first-
comer’s comparative advantage from already owning a large collection that is
too costly to reconstitute will only grow more formidable over time, an eco-
nomic reality that progressively strengthens the barriers to entry and tends to
reinforce (and, indeed, to explain) the predominance of sole-source data sup-
pliers in the marketplace.394
Government-generated data remained excluded, in principle, from protec-
tion, in keeping with current U.S. practice,395 which differs from E.U. practice in
this important respect.  However, there is considerable controversy surrounding
the degree of protection to be afforded government-generated data that subse-
quently become embodied in value-adding, privately funded databases.396  All
parties agree that a private, value-adding compiler should obtain whatever
degree of protection is elsewhere provided, notwithstanding the incorporation
of government-generated data, assuming that this transaction entails a “substan-
tial investment.”397  The issue concerns the rights and abilities of third parties to
continue to access the original, government-generated data sets.  The propo-
392. H.R. 354 § 1403(c).
393. See Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 807-08.
394. See Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 91.  As more and more segments of industry come to
appreciate the market power that major database producers could acquire under the proposed legisla-
tion, one after another has petitioned the subcommittee for special relief.  Thus, H.R. 354, which grew
to some thirty pages in length, singled out various special interests that benefit, to varying degrees, from
special exemptions from liability.  At the time of writing the list of those entitled to such immunities
included news reporting organizations; churches that depend on genealogical information, notably the
Mormons; online service providers; and certain online stockbrokers.  See H.R. 354 § 1403(e)(f)(i).
395. See H.R. 354 § 1404.
396. See, e.g., Weiss & Backlund, supra note 7, at 300, 303.
397. For the view that it may not, see Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 70.
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nents of H.R. 354 have been little inclined to accept measures seeking to pre-
serve access to the original data sets, despite pressures in this direction.398
H.R. 354 imposed no restrictions whatsoever on licensing agreements,
including agreements that might overrule the few exceptions otherwise allowed
by the bill.399  Despite constant remonstrations from opponents about the need
to regulate licensing in a variety of circumstances—and especially with respect
to sole-source providers400—the bill itself does not budge in this direction.  On
the contrary, new provisions added to H.R. 354 in 2000 would set up measures
that prohibit tampering with encryption devices (“anti-circumvention meas-
ures”) and electronically embedded “watermarks” in a manner that parallels
the provisions adopted for online transmissions of copyrighted works under the
DMCA.401  Because these provisions would effectively secure the database
against unauthorized access (and so tend to create an additional “exclusive right
of access” without expressly so declaring),402 they would only add to the data-
base owner’s market power to dictate contractual terms and conditions without
regard to the public interest.  These powers are further magnified by the impo-
sition of criminal sanctions in addition to strong civil remedies for infringe-
ment.403
The one major concession that was made to the opponents’ constitutional
arguments concerns the question of duration.  As previously noted, the E.C.
Directive allows for perpetual protection of the whole database so long as any
part of it is updated or maintained by virtue of a new and substantial invest-
ment, and the proponents’ early proposals in the United States echoed this pro-
vision.404  However, the U.S. Constitution clearly prescribes some limited term
of duration for intellectual property rights,405 and the proponents have finally
bowed to pressures from many directions by limiting the term of duration to fif-
teen years.406
Any update to an existing database would then qualify for a new term of fif-
teen years, but this protection would apply, at least in principle, only to the
matter added in the update.  In practice, however, the inability to clearly sepa-
rate old from new matter in complex databases, coupled with ambiguous
language concerning the scope of protection against harm to “likely, expected,
398. See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1, at 102-05.
399. H.R. 354 § 1404(e).
400. For a recent discussion, see Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 76.
401. Cf. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860,
2863 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201, 1205).  For a discussion of the DMCA, see supra notes
286-287 and accompanying text.
402. See, e.g., Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 63-68; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001).
403. See H.R. 354 §§ 1406-1407.
404. See H.R. 3534 and H.R. 2652; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 103-09 (citing authori-
ties).
405. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub
nom, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126, and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
406. See H.R. 354 § 1409(i).
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or planned” market segments,407 may still leave a loophole for an indefinite term
of duration.408
(b) The unfair competition model.  The opponents’ bill, the Consumer
and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, was introduced by
the House Commerce Committee in 1999, as a sign of good faith,409 in response
to critics’ claims that the opponents’ coalition sought only to block the adoption
of any database protection law.410  H.R. 1858 begins with a definition of data-
bases that is not appreciably narrower than that of H.R. 354, except for an
express exclusion of traditional literary works that “tell a story, communicate a
message,” and the like.411  In other words, it attempts to draw a clearer line of
demarcation between the proposed database regime and copyright law, to
reduce overlap or cumulative protection as might occur under H.R. 354.
The operative protective language in H.R. 1858 appeared short and direct,
but it relied on a series of contingent definitions that muddy the true scope of
protection.  Thus, the bill would prohibit anyone from selling or distributing to
the public a database that is (1) “a duplicate of another database . . . collected
and organized by another person or entity,” and (2) “is sold or distributed in
commerce in competition with that other database.”412  The bill then defines a
prohibited duplicate as a database that is “substantially the same as such other
database, as a result of the extraction of information from such other data-
base.”413
Here, in other words, liability attached only for a wholesale duplication of a
pre-existing database that resulted in a substantially identical end product.
However, this basic misappropriation approach becomes further subject to both
expansionist and limiting thrusts.  Expanding the potential for liability is a pro-
viso added to the definition of a protectible database that treats “any discrete
sections [of a protected database] containing a large number of discrete items of
information” as a separably identifiable database entitled to protection in its
own right.414  The bill would thus codify a surprisingly broad prohibition of
407. Id.
408. Cf. Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives, supra note 18, at 76 (proposing measures to close this loophole).
409. See H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-350, PART I (1999); Perkins,
supra note 379.
410. This may be true of some, but not all, members of that coalition.  Both scientists and universi-
ties, for example, although allied with the opponents’ coalition for strategic reasons, prefer a minimalist
approach because they want some protection against unauthorized commercial applications of their
data without hindering access to data for public research activities.  Over time, pressures for some form
of database protection have built up to the point where the minimalist alternative bill has become a
serious basis of negotiation, even though, in our view, it remains poorly crafted and contains numerous
ambiguities.
411. See H.R. 1858 § 101(1).
412. See id. § 102.
413. See id. § 101(2).
414. See id. § 101(1)(B).
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follow-on applications that make use of discrete segments of pre-existing data-
bases,415 subject to the limitations set out below.
A second protectionist thrust resulted from the lack of any duration clause
whatsoever, with the prohibition against wholesale duplication—subject to limi-
tations set out below—conceivably lasting forever.  This perpetual threat of
liability would attach to wholesale duplication of even a discrete segment of a
pre-existing database, if the other criteria for liability were met.
These powerfully protective provisions, put into H.R. 1858 at an early stage
to weaken support for H.R. 354, were offset to some degree by other express
limitations on liability and by a codified set of misuse standards to help regulate
licensing.  To understand these further limitations, one should recall that liabil-
ity even for wholesale duplication of all, or a discrete segment, of a protected
database does not attach unless the unauthorized copy is sold or distributed in
commerce and “in competition with” the protected database.416  The term “in
competition with,” when used in connection with a sale or distribution to the
public, is then defined to mean that the unauthorized duplication “displaces
substantial sales or licenses likely to accrue from the original database” and
“significantly threatens . . . [the first-comer’s] opportunity to recover a reason-
able return on the investment” in the duplicated database.417  Both prongs must
be met before liability will attach.
It follows that even a wholesale duplication that was not commercially
exploited or did not substantially decrease expected revenues (as might occur
from, for example, nonprofit scientific research activities) could presumably
escape liability in appropriate circumstances. Similarly, a follow-on commercial
product that made use of data from a protected database might escape liability
if it were sold in a distant market segment or required substantial independent
investment.
H.R. 1858 then further reduced the potential scope of liability by imposing a
set of well-defined exceptions and limiting enforcement to actions brought by
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).418  There are express exceptions com-
parable to those under H.R. 354 for news reporting, law enforcement activities,
415. The Clinton Administration expressed reservations about this de facto derivative work right,
which is built into a regime that lasts forever.  Communication with Professor Justin Hughes (Oct. 17,
2001) (on file with authors).  At that time, Professor Hughes worked at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office and was the principal coordinator of the Administration’s submission of opinions regarding the
database protection bills introduced in Congress.
416. See H.R. 1858 § 102.
417. Id. § 101(5).
418. See id. § 107.  The provision that conditions liability for infringement on an official FTC action
was a tactical expedient devised to provide the House Commerce Committee with some basis for
asserting concurrent jurisdiction over database legislation, along with that of the House Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property.  Most observers believe that the
absence of any private right of action in H.R. 1858 as it stands constitutes a fatal flaw that would have
to be removed in any final compromise decision to adopt an unfair competition approach.  Some sup-
porters consider FTC supervision a necessary safeguard, especially in view of the First Amendment
tensions that any database protection law is certain to generate in the United States.
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intelligence agencies, online stockbrokers, and online service providers.419
There is also an express exception for nonprofit scientific, educational, or
research activities,420 in case any such uses were thought to escape other defini-
tions that limit liability to unauthorized uses in competition with the first-
comer.  Still other provisions clarify that the protection of government-
generated data or of legal materials in value-adding embodiments remains
contingent upon arrangements that facilitate continued public access to the
original data sets or materials.421  A blanket exclusion of protection for “any
individual idea, fact, procedure, system, method of operation, concept, principle
or discovery” wisely attempts to provide a line of demarcation with patent law
and to ward off unintended protectionist consequences in this direction.422
Another important set of safeguards emerged from the drafters’ real con-
cerns about potential misuses of even this so-called “minimalist” form of pro-
tection.  These concerns are expressed in a provision that expressly denies
liability in any case where the protected party “misuses the protection” that
H.R. 1858 affords.  A related provision then elaborates a detailed list of stan-
dards that courts could use as guidelines to determine whether an instance of
misuse had occurred.423  These guidelines or standards would greatly clarify the
line between acceptable and unacceptable licensing conditions, and if enacted,
they could make a major contribution to the doctrine of misuse as applied to
the licensing of other intellectual property rights as well.424
In summary, the underlying purpose of H.R. 1858 was to prohibit wholesale
duplication of a database as a form of unfair competition.  It thus set out to
create a minimalist liability rule that prohibits market-destructive conduct
rather than to enact an exclusive property right as such,425 and in this sense, ini-
tially posed a strong contrast to H.R. 354.  Over time, however, different itera-
tions of the bill, designed to win supporters away from H.R. 354, have made
H.R. 1858 surprisingly protectionist—especially in view of its de facto derivative
work right. 426
419. H.R. 1858 §§ 103(b), 103(c), 104(b), 104(e), 106(a).
420. See id. § 103(d).
421. See id. §§ 101(b), 104(f).  There are also express exclusions of telecommunications carriers’
subscription lists (for example, telephone directories) and of securities market data.  Id. § 104(g).
However, the bill proposes an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would prohibit
the misappropriation of “real-time” stock market information.  Id. § 201.
422. See id. § 104(d).
423. Id. §§ 106(b), 106(b)(1-6).  See infra note 540.
424. These provisions could particularly assist judicial regulation of shrink-wrap and click-on
licenses affecting online distribution of software and other electronic information tools.  See generally
Reichman & Franklin, supra note 16, at 929-60.
425. For early proposals to this effect, see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 139-45.  For a
definition of liability rules, see supra note 151.
426. The realities of the bargaining process are such that concessions made to the high-protectionist
camp at an earlier stage, for whatever tactical reasons, are unlikely to be withdrawn later.
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C. Implications for Science: Disintegration of the Research Commons?
Part II of this study described some of the potentially limitless possibilities
for research and innovation that might ensue from using digital technologies to
exploit scientific data available from the public domain as it was traditionally
constituted.  However, these prospects dim the moment we consider the ramifi-
cations for science of the economic, legal, and technological assaults on the
public domain currently under way.  This section explores some of the likely
negative effects that these trends could have on science and innovation unless
science policy directly addresses these risks.
1. Restricting Access to and Use of Scientific Data
In the interests of clarity, we outline the implications of present trends on a
sectoral basis, in keeping with the functional map of public domain data flows
indicated above.  We begin with the government’s role as primary producer of
such data and then consider the implications of present trends for academia and
the private sector.
a. In Government
If a basic trend is the shifting of more data production and dissemination
activities from government to the private sector, one should recognize at the
outset that the social benefits of such a shift can exceed its costs under the right
set of circumstances.  In principle, private database producers may sometimes
operate more efficiently and attain qualitatively better results than government
agencies.  Positive effects are especially likely when markets have formed, com-
petition occurs, and the public interest, including the needs of the research
community that was previously served by the government, continues to be satis-
fied.
There are also numerous drawbacks associated with this trend, however,
which require careful consideration.427  To begin with, a private data supplier
will seldom be in a position to produce the same quantity and range of data as a
government agency, charge prices that users can afford, and still make a profit.
In other words, a government agency has typically taken on the task of data
production and dissemination precisely because the social need for such data
outweighs the market opportunities for these activities.  Social costs from priva-
tization begin to rise if the profit motive induces a private supplier to unduly
reduce the quantity and range of data produced or made available.
For example, a private data producer typically markets refined data prod-
ucts to end users in relatively small quantities, whereas basic research, particu-
larly in the observational sciences, often requires raw or less commercially
427. See, e.g., DAVID, DIGITAL BOOMERANG, supra note 20, at 2 (“We really do not know how
much further the current rush toward privatization of scientific and technological knowledge can go
before it starts to seriously undermine the inherited structure of fragile conventions and institutions
that support cooperative research activities, thereby setting in motion the contraction of the global
domain of scientific inquiry.”).
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refined data in voluminous quantities.  On the whole, overzealous privatization
of the government’s data production capabilities poses real risks for both sci-
ence and innovation because the private sector simply cannot duplicate the
government’s public good functions and still make a profit.428
Unless the private sector can demonstrably produce and distribute much the
same data more effectively and with higher quality standards than a govern-
ment agency, privatization may become little more than a sham transaction.
The would-be entrepreneur merely appropriates a government function and
then licenses data back to a captive market at much higher prices and with
greatly increased restrictions on access and use.  In the absence of market-
induced competition, there is a very high risk of trading one monopolist with
favorable policies toward science and the broader society—the government—
for another monopolist driven entirely by profit and the restrictions made
necessary by this motive.
Absent a sham transaction, one cannot say a priori that any given privatiza-
tion project necessarily results in a net social loss.  The outcome will depend on
the contracts the agency stipulates and the steps it is willing to take to ensure
continued access to data for research purposes on reasonable terms and condi-
tions.  In contrast to buying data collection services, the licensing of data and
information products from the private sector raises serious questions about the
type of controls the private sector places on the redistribution and uses of such
data and information the government can subsequently undertake.  If the terms
of the license are onerous to the government, and access, use, and redistribution
are substantially restricted—as they almost always are—neither the agency nor
the taxpayer is well served.  This is particularly true in cases where the data that
need to be collected are for a basic research function or serve a key statutory
mission of the agency.
A classic example of what can go wrong was the privatization of the Landsat
earth remote sensing program in the mid-1980s.  Following the legislatively
mandated transfer of this program to EOSAT Co., the price per scene rose
more than 1000%, and significant restrictions were imposed, even on research
uses.  Use by both government and academic scientists fell sharply, and recent
studies have shown the extent to which both basic and applied research in envi-
ronmental remote sensing was set back. 429  This experiment also failed in com-
428. See Stephen Maurer, Raw Knowledge: Protecting Technical Databases for Science and Industry,
in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST,  PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP
ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN
ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS (Jan. 14-15, 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/ proceed-
ings_sci_tech/appC.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). (“Since public databases do not generate the reve-
nues needed to pay license fees, statutory protection imposes substantial (albeit inadvertent) pressures
to privatize.”).
429. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 121-24.
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mercial terms, as EOSAT Co. became unable to continue operations after sev-
eral years.430
Several lessons can be drawn from this and similar undertakings.  One is
that before a transfer to the private sector occurs, objective criteria demon-
strating net social gains from the transaction should be met.  Recent studies
have identified such criteria, and when they are met, good reasons to privatize
would exist.431  Even when objective criteria justify a transfer of data production
from the public to the private sector, government agencies should not abdicate
their contractual responsibility to ensure access for research purposes on favor-
able terms and conditions, as will be discussed further in the final Part of this
article.
We concede that, if the government lacks resources to generate data for a
public research function in the first place, obtaining it from a willing producer is
better than nothing.432  Where, however, a choice exists, the wrong decision can
impose high opportunity costs on the scientific community and the broader
society.  We also assume the government intends to continue its policy of not
commercializing its own data output—unlike the European Union and most
other countries—in view of the positive externalities this has generated in the
past.
b. In Academia
The legal and technological pressures identified above will also affect the
uses that are made of government-funded data in academic and other nonprofit
institutions.  These pressures will intensify the tensions that already exist
between the sharing norms of science and the need to restrict access to data in
pursuit of increased commercial opportunities.
Although the enhanced opportunities for commercial exploitation that new
intellectual property rights and related developments make possible are clear,
they will affect the normative behavior of the scientific community gradually
and unevenly.  Academics are already conflicted in this emerging new environ-
ment, and these conflicts are likely to grow.433  As researchers, they need contin-
ued access to a scientific commons on acceptable terms, and they are expected
to contribute to it in return.  As members of academic institutions, however,
they are increasingly under pressure to transfer research results to the private
sector for gain, and they themselves may want to profit from the new commer-
cial opportunities.434
430. The government then reassumed control of this program, but a new privatizing proposal is
under consideration.  See Landsat Data Continuity Mission, at http://ldcm.usgs.gov/ (last updated Jan.
24, 2003).
431. See BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 116-24; RESOLVING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 82-87.
432. But see Stephen Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Database Protection: Is It Broken and Should
We Fix It?, SCIENCE, May 14, 1999, at 1129 (noting that funding agencies are notoriously reluctant to
pay for intellectual property licenses).
433. See generally Rai, supra note 33, at 109-15 (describing normative changes in academia after
Bayh-Dole and countervailing efforts to redress the balance).
434. See Powell, supra note 13.
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The government itself fuels these conflicts through the potentially contradic-
tory policies that underlie its funding of research.  One message reminds scien-
tists of their duties to share and disclose data, in keeping with the traditional
norms of science.  The other, more recent message urges them to transfer the
fruits of their research to the private sector or otherwise exploit the intellectual
property protection their research may attract.435
At the moment, these conflicts are strongest where the line between basic
and applied science has collapsed and commercial opportunities inhere in most
projects.436  Obvious examples are biotechnology and computer science.  There,
progress frequently occurs through accretions of know-how, obtained by trial
and error, and theoretical explanations may follow, rather than precede, practi-
cal applications.437  Decisions about the use of intellectual property rights and
licensing contracts to exploit applications thus rebound in unexpected ways
against the possibilities of further research.
In the future, the enactment of a powerful intellectual property right in col-
lections of data might be expected to push these tensions into other areas where
the lines between basic and applied research remain somewhat clearer and the
pressures to commercialize research results have been less noticeable thus far.
In exploring the implications of these developments for academic research, we
continue to focus attention on the two distinct but overlapping research
domains previously characterized as “formal” and “informal.”
i. The Formal Zone
In what we call the formal sector, science is conducted within structured
research programs that establish guidelines for the production and dissemina-
tion of data.  Typically, data are released to the public in connection with the
publication of research results.438  Data may also be disclosed in connection with
patent applications and supporting documentation.  One should recall that,
even without regard to the mounting legal and technological pressures, there
are strong economic pressures that already limit the amount of data investiga-
tors are inclined to release at publication or in patent applications.  There are
growing delays in releasing those data as researchers consider commercializa-
tion options, and more of the data that are released come freighted with various
restrictions.439
435. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 112 (noting that the initial impetus to commercialize and corre-
sponding “norm change has . . . been tempered by some attention to the traditional values of research
science”).
436. See Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 120, at 1726 (“[A]s university patenting and private
funding of university research increase, the time-honored distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘applied’
research is becoming ever more difficult to maintain, particularly in fields that are of significant com-
mercial interest.”).
437. See, e.g., Reichman, Computer Programs, supra note 292.  See generally Reichman, Legal
Hybrids, supra note 164.
438. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
439. Id.; see also David Blumenthal et al., Witholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences:
Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 92 JAMA 1224 (1997); Rai, supra note 33, at 110-11.
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The enactment of a hybrid intellectual property right in collections of data,
such as the E.C. Directive, would introduce a disruptive new element into an
already troubled academic environment.  Suddenly, such a right would make it
possible to publish academic research for credit and reputation while retaining
ownership and control of the underlying data, which would no longer automati-
cally lapse into the public domain.  By the same token, disclosure of research
results for the purpose of filing patent applications, while continuing to count as
novelty-defeating prior art in the public domain,440 would not displace the inven-
tor’s right to control the underlying data that support the application.  Because
patent law has been encroaching progressively on collections of data that scien-
tists previously regarded as falling within the public domain,441 the database
right itself—depending on how it was structured—could become more valuable
than patent protection.
To some extent, this development tends to erase some of the preexisting dis-
tinctions between the “formal” and “informal” domains.  In both domains,
access to data might increasingly have to be secured by means of brokered,
negotiated transactions, and this outcome is rife with implications.442  For
present purposes, it seems clear that any database protection law, coupled with
the other legal and technological measures discussed above, will further under-
mine the sharing ethos and encourage the formation of a strategic, self-inter-
ested trading mentality that already predominates in the informal domain.
These pressures will necessarily tend to blur and dilute the importance of
publication as the line of demarcation between a period of exclusive use in rela-
tive secrecy and ultimate dedication of data to the public.  Once databases
attract an exclusive property right valid against the world, the legal duty of sci-
entists publishing research results to disclose or release the underlying data
could depend on codified exceptions permitting use for verification and certain
“reasonable” nonprofit research and educational purposes.443  Of course, this
new default rule would ultimately have to be reconciled in practice with the dis-
closure obligations of the federal funding agencies.  The point is that the new
default rule would nonetheless place even published data outside of the public
domain, and much academic research is not federally funded or funded in ways
that waive such disclosure requirements.
The role of academic journal publishers in this new legal environment also
warrants consideration.  At present, scientists tend to assign their copyrights to
publishers on an exclusive basis, and many of these journals now produce elec-
tronic versions—sometimes exclusive of a print version.  These practices
440. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
441. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 120 (stressing the changing interpretation of
boundaries of intellectual property law); Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13; Rai, supra note 33.
442. “Scientists report having to wait months or even years to carry out experiments, while their
insitutions attempt to negotiate the terms of  ‘Material Transfer Agreements,’ . . . database access
agreements, and patent license agreements.”  Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 225.
443. See supra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.  We assume some such provision would neces-
sarily be incorporated into any U.S. database law that Congress may adopt.
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already complicate matters because, as shown above, the data that traditional
copyright law puts into the public domain may be fenced to a still unknown
extent by the technological measures that the DMCA reinforces.  If, in addition,
a database law is enacted, any data that the scientist assigns to the publisher
with the article would become subject to the new statutory regime.  The pub-
lisher would then be in a position to control subsequent uses of the data and to
make them available online under a subscription or pay-per-use plan with addi-
tional restrictions on extraction or reuse.
Even if individual scientists are willing and able to resist the demands for
exclusive assignment of both their copyrights and any new database rights, the
fact remains that publication of the article in a journal would no longer auto-
matically release the data into the public domain.  On the contrary, and unless
the scientist waived the new default rule, even the data revealed in the publica-
tion itself would remain subject to his or her exclusive right of extraction and
reuse—at least as formulated under the E.C. database protection directive.444
With or without a new statutory database right in the United States, scien-
tists appear certain to come under increasing pressure to retain data for com-
mercial exploitation.  The research universities are already deeply committed to
maximizing income from patentable inventions under Bayh-Dole, with varying
degrees of success, and they will logically extend these practices and procedures
to the commercialization of databases as valuable research tools.445  A key ques-
tion is whether they will make the commercialized data available for academic
research on reasonable terms and conditions.446
As with government-generated data, university efforts to commercially
exploit their databases could produce net social gains under the right set of cir-
cumstances.  Besides the incentive to generate new and more refined data
products that an intellectual property right might confer, greater efforts could
be made to enhance the quality and utility of selected databases than might
otherwise be the case.  Absent such incentives, many scientists may not take
pains to organize and document their data for easy use by others, particularly
those outside their immediate disciplines, and may not refine their data beyond
the level needed to support their own research needs and related publication
objectives.  Legal incentives might thus stimulate the production of more
refined databases, especially where markets for such products had formed.
At the same time, these new commercial opportunities would tempt univer-
sity administrators and academics to attenuate or modify the sharing and open
access norms of science and to circumvent obligations in this regard that federal
444. These exclusive rights would then remain subject to any exceptions for scientific use incorpo-
rated into the database protection right.  These exceptions were negligible in the E.C. Database Direc-
tive, supra note 17, and efforts to obtain significantly broader exceptions in the U.S. proposals have not
succeeded so far.  See Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 825-27.
445. This process is already underway, even in the absence of any database protection right.  See,
e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 254-55, 263-65; Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 224-26.
446. “University technology transfer professionals report that agreements presented for the transfer
of research tools impose increasingly onerous terms.”  Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 225.
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agencies had established.447  Were this to occur, the unintended harm to research
could greatly exceed that we are accustomed to experiencing with regard to
patented inventions under Bayh-Dole448 because the licensing of academic data-
bases, reinforced by a codified intellectual property right, would limit the quan-
tity and quality of data heretofore available from the public domain.
From a qualitative perspective in particular, the data produced at universi-
ties has typically been more refined or highly processed than government data
and are developed with particular research objectives or applications in mind.449
Moreover, many of these data-intensive research activities require access to and
use of multiple sources of data.450  What has been changing is the evident com-
mercial value of this type of refined, upstream research byproduct that makes
databases both outputs as well as inputs at a much earlier stage of the research
process in many areas of science.  This raises serious doubts about their contin-
ued availability on acceptable terms or whether they will even be made avail-
able to other researchers at all.
Present university licensing practices with regard to material transfer
agreements (“MTAs”) in the biotechnology sector do not bode well in this
regard.  These contracts are not drafted by scientists with the needs of the larger
scientific community in mind.  Recent surveys of these practices show that uni-
versity technology licensing offices resort to exclusive licenses that impose
onerous terms and conditions, including aggressive grant-back or reach-through
clauses that attempt to secure a share of the return from follow-on applications
developed with the aid of the licensed technologies.451  While anecdotal and
some empirical research suggests that these offices have showed a certain will-
ingness to negotiate reasonable terms in specific instances, the legal and eco-
nomic literature foresees growing anticommons effects and ever-higher transac-
447. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 109-11 (stressing that commercial involvement in academic research
has already “undermined norms governing the sharing of research materials and tools”).
448. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 120, at 1667 (“[B]y providing incentives to
patent and restricting access to discoveries made in institutions that have traditionally been the princi-
pal performers of basic research, [Bayh-Dole] threatens to impoverish the public domain of research
science that has long been an important resource for researchers in both the public and private sec-
tors.”).
449. See Nelson, supra note 132, at 16 (“By far the lion’s share of modern scientific research,
including research done at universities, is in fields where a practical application is central in the defini-
tions of a field.  In today’s world science is useful to inventing, not so much because of Serendipity, but
because much of modern scientific research is designed exactly to help clear the path for technological
progress.”).
450. See Collections Hearings, supra note 183.
451. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 225 (stressing onerous terms and limitations
and overwhelming “burden of reviewing and renegotiating each of a rapidly growing number of agree-
ments for what used to be routine exchanges among scientists. ”); Rai, supra note 33, at 111 (noting that
many MTAs require researchers to assign or license intellectual property rights to discoveries made in
the course of using the research tools, while others “prohibit sharing tools with other researchers or
sending them to other institutions”).
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tion costs.452  There are also enormous opportunity costs for research that will
prove difficult or impossible to document.
There is no reason to expect that, left to their own devices, the university
technology licensing offices dealing on a case-by-case basis would demonstrate
any greater concern for the research needs of the larger community with respect
to databases than they have with respect to MTAs.  In fact, many university
databases could become more valuable than the corresponding patent portfo-
lios over time, owing to their cumulative nature, the potential ability to control
updates under the proposed new intellectual property right, and the existing
ability to control online dissemination and use by electronic contracts.  As the
need to exploit such databases upstream becomes more pronounced, with cor-
responding palpable commercial payoffs, university administrators could logi-
cally become less willing to make commercially valuable data available, even to
colleagues, in the absence of corresponding benefits.
If these predictions prove even partly accurate, we should then expect to see
the formation of university “database pools” and cross-licensing agreements,
like the “patent pools” of today,453 which can achieve some positive synergies
through cooperation.454  However, the evidence shows that such pools are very
difficult to form when the value of upstream research products defies easy
measurement and the relevant players in a given industry have very different
agendas, as would occur when federal agencies, academic institutions, and dif-
ferent types of private companies are all involved.455  Moreover, there are far
452. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698.  But see J. Walsh, et al., Research Tool
Patenting and Licensing and Biomedical Innovation, in W. COHEN & S. MERRILL, PATENTS AND THE
KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY (forthcoming 2003)  (finding no hard evidence of anticommons effects
in downstream patents, but emerging problems affecting research in upstream patents).
453.Describing Patent pools, Professor Rai says:
Patent pools typically function by extending membership to those firms in a given industry
that agree to assign or license their individual patent rights to the pool.  In simple pools, mem-
bership gives each party the right to royalty-free licensing of all patents in the pool.  In more
sophisticated pools, members who use a particular patent pay the pool a set fee that reflects
the economic significance of the patent; similarly royalties accumulated by the pool are
divided according to the perceived significance of the technology put in by the parties.
Rai, supra note 33, at 129.
454. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 227-28 (“Collaborative research that pools
research capabilities and funds from different institutions in the public and private sectors is increas-
ingly common, not only in the life sciences but across all fields of research.”); Gregory Graff & David
Zilberman, Towards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Ag-Biotechnology, 3-2001 IP
STRATEGY TODAY 1, 9 (2001) (“[A]n intellectual property ‘clearinghouse’ might be a most effective
way to reduce market inefficiencies that hinder the exchange of privately deemed knowledge, allowing
researchers to obtain the freedom-to-operate status necessary to commercialize . . . research.”); Merges,
Patent Pools, supra note 151, at 123, 155-56.  See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996)
[hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules].
455. Rai, supra note 33, at 133.  Professor Rai, focusing on the example of prospective biotech
patent pools, points out that the relevant academic institutions and federal agencies might logically
want to make marketable end products “widely available nonexclusively on a low or no-royalty basis,”
while “the private companies focused exclusively on upstream research might believe in more selective
licensing at a higher royalty.”  Id.
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greater risks that such pools lead to collusive, anti-competitive behavior, to the
erection of formidable barriers to entry, and to discrimination, which in this
case could adversely affect lower-tier universities that possessed few tradable
assets.456
At present, the primary bulwarks against such a breakdown of the sharing
ethos are the formal requirements of the federal funding agencies, which in
many cases continue to require that data from the research projects they fund
be transferred at some point to public repositories or made available upon
request.  To avoid these negative results, the agencies would have to strengthen
these requirements—and their enforcement—and adapt them to the emerging
high-protectionist intellectual property environment.  We elaborate further on
this topic in Part IV.  The point for now is that, absent express overrides that
universities voluntarily adopt or that funding agencies impose in their research
grants and contracts, the new default rules of ownership and control would
automatically take effect if Congress enacts a database protection law, and they
could become general practice even without such a law as the result of routine,
unregulated database licensing practices.
These new default rules of ownership and control could gradually under-
mine and dissolve the pre-existing norm that scientists publish and release their
data to the public.  No well-meaning resolution to the contrary by scientific
bodies will, by itself, avert this outcome.
ii. The Informal Zone
In the informal zone, researchers are not yet ready to publish or are working
independently on small science projects beyond the formal controls and
requirements of a federal research program mandating open access or public
deposit.  If the research project is federally funded, the investigator is still oper-
ating in the pre-publication phase, in which he enjoys a period of exclusive use
that typically lasts from six months to two years, depending on the grant.  Any
formal obligations to disclose data that derive from the grant do not yet apply,
and data exchanges in this phase depend on self-interest, competitive advan-
tages, and the sharing ethos.  In addition, much of the research falling within the
informal zone is funded by state governments, foundations, and the universities
themselves, all of which leave more discretion in these matters to researchers, as
well as by private companies, who normally require secrecy.
Our concerns about the effects of the new legal and technological pressures
on the formal academic zone apply with even greater force to the informal zone
where the impetus to commercialize data will encounter fewer regulatory con-
straints.  The changing mores likely to undermine disclosure and open access in
the formal zone would make it harder to organize cooperative networks in the
456. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 130-35 (stressing ability of pools to withhold access to those that
lack important technology to contribute or that will not pay large licensing fees).  See generally H.
HOVENKAMP, M.D. JANIS, & M.A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST §§ 34.3, 34.4 (2002).
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less structured and more unruly informal domain.457
This loss of cooperative incentives would prove troublesome even if the
informal zone were to remain stable in the face of these pressures.  In reality,
such pressures—and especially a new intellectual property right in databases—
will seriously destabilize the informal zone as depicted in recent sociological
studies.  As the new default rules make themselves felt, researchers operating in
the informal zone will become aware that they own property interests in their
data collections over and above any stipulated obligation to publish.  In other
words, a self-conscious assertion of property rights—and the corresponding
proprietary mentality—will displace the softer, more inchoate legal norms that
otherwise protect confidential information in ways that scientists in the informal
domain typically know little about.
At present, researchers in the informal zone tend to accommodate requests
to share data in response to community norms, peer pressure, the expectation
of reciprocity, and other factors shaped by perceived self-interest.  Under a
strong database protection regime, researchers will logically begin to view such
transactions as requests to waive or relinquish exclusive property rights, whose
potential value is not easily measured or foreseen.458  This outlook would tend to
make researchers more reluctant to dilute their rights and more inclined to
hoard data, demand up-front short term benefits as a quid pro quo, and even to
insist on their own versions of the reach-through and grant-back clauses that are
already routinely used by university technology licensing offices.  As university
administrators become increasingly aware of the commercial possibilities inher-
ent in database protection, they may restrict their academics’ freedom to infor-
mally exchange data with colleagues and require university approval—lest such
exchanges damage their potential commercial interests.459  Moreover, private
partners that support university research will insist that statutory property
rights in data be fully respected, and more and more private partners may
become involved in the commercialization of data produced by academics.460
At the very least, the informal data exchanges of the past, which were
already hampered by various forms of personal strategic considerations, seem
likely to become more formal and complicated, with higher transaction costs
and real risks of encountering holdouts, thickets of overlapping rights, and anti-
457. See Hilgartner, Access to Data, supra note 31, at 9 (noting that IP protection will make collabo-
ration more difficult); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1061 (1989); Rai, supra note 33, at 129-35 (documenting
difficulties of organizing collective exchange norms to address transaction costs).
458. On the difficulties of evaluation, see Rai, supra note 33, at 125-27.
459. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 264-65 (stressing the extent to which universities are “seeking
to privitize new information” and fearing erection of “costly toll booths”).
460. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 182-83 (finding that since Bayh-Dole and related legal developments
in the 1980s and 1990s, industry now funds “a non-trivial percentage of academic research in the life
sciences,” some of these relationships “resemble commercial joint ventures,” and participants “often
depart quite markedly from traditional research norms”).
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commons effects.461  To be sure, the advent of an exclusive property right in non-
copyrightable databases might facilitate some transactions that could not have
occurred in the past, owing to legal uncertainty.462  It may also stimulate new
types of transactions by reinforcing the trading mentality and encouraging par-
ties to seek deals based on their data assets, although such incentives and poten-
tial benefits are far better suited to private sector activities than to the academic
milieu.  On the whole, however, the outcome is likely to be increased obstacles
to the construction of informal academic networks of data exchanges, with a
corresponding reduction in the flow of the data streams discussed in Part II.463
Individual researchers will be strongly tempted to hold out or bargain to
impasse, at the expense of scientific cooperation.464
Examples of such phenomena are already observable.  In academia, one
promising initiative to organize a common database of human mutations data
on a quasi-commercial basis, while maintaining broad community access, failed
for a variety of anticommons effects, and the contributing entities ultimately
bargained to impasse.465
If the residual force of the sharing ethos in the informal sector started to
break down under these pressures, the process of disintegration would encoun-
ter fewer bulwarks protecting the public domain than in the formal sector.  Sci-
entists operating in the informal zone are, by definition, less constrained by
formal federal data access requirements, and they are often closer to industry.
Indeed, the more the cooperative spirit dissipates, the more likely it becomes
that the commercial ethos of the private sector will fill the vacuum and pervade
the informal domain.
These tendencies would predictably become more pronounced over time, as
more scientists become aware of the new possibilities to retain ownership and
control of data, even after publication of research results.  Indeed, one would
logically expect that strategic behavior in the informal zone would increasingly
be geared to efforts to maximize advantages from post-publication opportuni-
ties.  Should this occur, academics themselves would exert pressure on the fed-
461. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 452; Powell, supra note 13, at 264; cf. Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL.
& ECON. 119 (2001).
462. But see Mowery & Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 49 (finding that, in “biotechnology, continu-
ing uncertainty over the strength and breadth of intellectual property protection may have discouraged
litigation”).
463. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 266 (fearing “turf wars, with rival networks of partners
looking to delay, deter, and defend themselves against competitors and poachers rather than advancing
both their efforts and those of the overall field”).
464. See, e.g., id. at 265 (stressing risk of “disputes, duplication, and discord”); cf. Rai, supra note 33,
at 127-29 (stressing risk of holdups in biotechnology because patentee seeks to appropriate much of the
value of the improvements).
465. See Stephen M. Maurer, Inside the Anticommons: Academic Scientists’ Struggle to Commer-
cialize Human Mutations Data, 1999-2001, paper given at the Franco-American Conference on the
Economics, Law, and History of Intellectual Property Rights, Haas School of Business, University of
California at Berkeley,  Oct. 5-6, 2001 [hereinafter Maurer, Inside the Anticommons].
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eral system and their universities to fall in line with the needs of commercial
partners.
One can thus project a kind of cascading effect if a strong database protec-
tion right were enacted and the scientific community failed to take steps to pre-
serve and reinforce the research commons.  On this view, today’s formal zone,
built around the release of data into the public domain at publication, would
begin to resemble the informal zone, as sociologists have recently portrayed it,466
while that same informal zone would look more and more like the private
sector.  Under these circumstances, one cannot necessarily assume the open
access policies currently supporting the formal sector would continue in force,
in which case even basic research could be adversely affected—as occurred in
the United Kingdom in the 1980s through 1990s.467
What the new equilibrium—resulting from the conflict between these pri-
vatizing and commercializing pressures on the one hand and the traditional
norms of public science on the other—will look like cannot be predicted with
any degree of certainty.  In a previous article, however, we outlined the cumula-
tive negative effects such tendencies would likely have on scientific endeavor.
For the sake of brevity, they are recalled here in summary form:
(1) Less effective domestic and international scientific collaboration, with
serious impediments to the use, reuse, and transformation of factual
data that are the building blocks of research;
(2) Increased transaction costs driven by the need to enforce the new legal
restrictions on data obtained from different sources, and the implemen-
tation of new administrative guidelines concerning institutional acquisi-
tions and uses of databases, and associated legal fees;
(3) Monopoly pricing of data and anti-competitive practices by entities that
acquire market power, or by first-entrants into niche markets that pre-
dominate in many research areas; and
(4) Less data intensive research and opportunity costs.468
What could well be the greatest casualty of all are the new opportunities
that digital networks provide to create virtual information commons within and
across discipline-specific communities built around optimal access to and
exchange of scientific data.  To the extent that public science becomes domi-
nated by brokered intellectual property transactions, the resulting combination
of high transaction costs, unbridled self-interest, and anticommons effects could
defeat the fragile cooperative arrangements needed to create and maintain such
466. See generally Hilgartner & Brandt-Rauf, Controlling Data, supra note 31.
467. See, e.g., P.J. Runei, Energy R&D in the United Kingdom, BATTELLE, Mar. 2000, at 7 (paper
prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830) (citing govern-
ment statistics showing that the U.K. government has downsized its support for R&D over the past two
decades and that the British government has acknowledged that this policy has not worked well and
that the “country’s R&D had reached a critical level of ill health and a condition that threatens future
economic growth and international competitiveness”).
468. Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 812-21.
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virtual information commons and the distributed research opportunities they
make possible.
In industry.  Proponents of a strong database protection law claim it is
needed to stimulate investment in more databases than would otherwise
become available.469  However, there is no credible evidence that the market for
databases has been under-supplied or under-invested in the United States, even
though the share of U.S. commercial databases in the world market has
declined somewhat in the last ten years.470  On the contrary, the European
Union’s production since the enactment of the Directive, which reportedly
showed an initial short-term spike, has subsequently remained stable. 471
The emergence of digitally networked environments “has generated a host
of new value-added services and products, and appreciably increased the impor-
tance of this segment of the database market.”472  In a previous article, Profes-
sors Reichman and Samuelson explained why digital technology would cause
the market for value-added database products to flourish in the near future,473
and their predictions have held up over time.  The database industry as a whole,
and its value-adding components, have in fact flourished, despite constant alle-
gations of market failure.474
It remains, of course, logical to consider whether that industry’s long-term
growth prospects would suffer in the absence of additional legal protection
against free-riding expropriations from databases that were costly to develop
and maintain.  In so doing, however, one must discount the availability and
effectiveness of self-help measures,475 and the relative social costs of removing
vast quantities of technological information from the public domain, which have
functioned as basic inputs of the knowledge economy.476  At the very least, these
and other considerations should focus attention on the choice of legal instru-
469. See, e.g., E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, Recitals 6-12; Maurer, Across Two Worlds,
supra note 34 (critically evaluating this thesis); Information Antipiracy Hearings, supra note 239;
BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 239; see also Hunsucker, supra note 239.
470. Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34, at 11.
471. Id. at 35-40.
472. Fewer, supra note 341, at 177.
473. First, “digital technologies facilitate the disaggregation of value-added functions” and permit
new forms of data aggregation and presentation that were unavailable in print media.  Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 18, at 125.  Second, “digital technologies foster new functions, such as reformat-
ting, filtering, and hot-linking, which have no counterparts in print media.”  Id.
474. See Fewer, supra note 341 (finding no evidence of market failure in Canada); Maurer, Across
Two Worlds, supra note 34, at 11.  See generally A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1.
475. For example, electronic fencing through encryption devices, coupled with tagging or water-
marking of data, make it possible for online database providers to impose standardized contractual
restrictions on all would-be users.  See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1, at 68-69; Kenneth W.
Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note 13, at 103,
107-10, 117-19.
476. See, e.g., Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 373.
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ments to remedy any perceived market failure, and on the relative social costs
and benefits of different approaches.477
For present purposes, it suffices to emphasize that any de facto exclusive
property right in the non-copyrightable contents of databases would automati-
cally empty the public domain of most of the factual matter the Feist478 decision
had consigned to that domain in 1991.  While government-generated data
would probably remain available to the public under domestic (but not foreign)
law,479 all non-governmental databases would become presumptively proprie-
tary, whether made available online or in hard copies.  Access to, and use of,
such data for research purposes would depend on negotiated licenses or on any
research exceptions to the proprietary rights that happened to be adopted in the
end.480  Depending on the type and strength of the database protection law ulti-
mately adopted, there are good reasons to fear that barriers to entry could be
high, unlicensed follow-on applications could be stifled, and sole-source provid-
ers would likely predominate.481
While industry would thus contribute significantly less aggregate data to the
public domain than in the past,482 its ability to bank on these same proprietary
rights might induce the private sector to disclose certain kinds of data previ-
ously kept secret, especially to potential partners in the universities.  Much
would depend on the willingness and ability of the academic community to
accommodate the private sector’s needs to restrict access to or use of data made
available for nonprofit research pursuits483 and to deny access or use to would-be
competitors.
To the extent that a more protectionist database regime would facilitate
more public-private partnerships with universities, the social benefits likely to
ensue from such interaction would have to be weighed against the risks that the
norms of industry would increasingly pervade academia and foster pressure for
less public disclosure of data, in potential conflict with the norms of science.  At
the very least, industry usually insists on confidentiality in joint projects, and
would further want any end product to benefit from any new database protec-
477. Critics argue that, given the power of self-help remedies in the digital environment, contract
and unfair competition law would suffice to close any regulatory gaps that were likely to ensue in the
short or medium term, without further encumbering access to the public domain.  See e.g., Bott, supra
note 34; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 137-50.
478. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 449 U.S. 340 (1991).
479. All previous versions of database protection legislation introduced in Congress have exempted
both federal and state collections of information from the scope of protection.
480. See Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 822-28; supra notes 362-363, 389-
391, 420,  and accompanying text.
481. See generally Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 813-21.
482. This is clear under the E.C. Database Directive, where duration is potentially limitless in time.
See E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17.  Where duration is limited, long-term gains of public
domain data are at least conceivable, at the expense of short and medium-term losses.  See, e.g., van
Caenegem, supra note 113, at 325.
483. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 111 (“Companies that license . . . [biotech] materials and tools to aca-
demic researchers often force researchers to sign material transfer agreements (MTAs) that tightly
restrict the researchers’ use of these materials.”).
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tion right that Congress ultimately enacted. 484  To parry these and other antici-
pated negative developments, concerted efforts to accommodate and protect
the research goals of government funding agencies, university administrations,
and academic scientists would have to be made.  Detailed proposals to this
effect are set out in Part IV.
Major repercussions from database protection would also be felt in those
sectors of the economy where subpatentable innovation depends on the con-
stant exchange of technical information and know-how among the members of
engineering communities working on given technical trajectories.485  As shown
above, this vibrant component of the innovation economy currently depends on
liability rules that protect confidential information and on a robust public
domain in which members of the technical community exchange sub-patentable
know-how and information that automatically enters the public domain with
disclosure or independent creation.486  The advent of a strong exclusive database
right that displaced the existing pro-competitive liability rules could hamper
these exchanges, reduce spillover effects, hinder value-adding innovation, and
elevate the costs of R&D, all of which could slow the pace of sub-patentable
innovation generally.
2. Broader Implications for the Innovation System
Much of the economic literature that so far has addressed the topic of data-
base protection tends unconsciously to assume the premises that ultimately
yield the authors’ expected conclusions.  Because most economists uncritically
equate “property rights” with “exclusive rights,” and because the risk of market
failure inherent in public goods is often efficiently overcome with “property
rights,” these studies usually end where they began: by endorsing property
rights and taking the view that stronger is better.487  Such studies beg the impor-
tant questions that a deeper knowledge of intellectual property law might raise,
namely, what level and mode of protection would produce the greatest amount
of investment with the most acceptable degree of social costs.488
a. Underestimating the Potential Social Costs
In this connection, a codified, federal unfair competition law, based on the
misappropriation rationale, could constitute a minimalist response to a poten-
484. Id. at 111 (noticing that corporate sponsors of research demand secrecy); cf. Nelson, supra note
132, at 33 (“Discussions with industry executives suggest that, until recently, industry often gave
research a de facto research exemption.  However, now they often are very reluctant to do so.  In many
cases they see university researchers as direct competitors to their own research efforts aimed to
achieve a practical result which is patentable.  And they feel themselves burdened by the requirement
to take out licenses to use university research results that are patented, and see no reason why they
shouldn’t make the same demands on universities.”).
485. Cf. Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 164; Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 155.
486. See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
487. See, e.g., Information Antipiracy Hearings, supra note 239; BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 239.  For
trenchant criticism of this approach, see Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish, supra note 165.
488. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property
Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 897 (1988).
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tial gap in the law whose true dimensions remain unknown.  It could also pro-
vide the uniform model needed for proper administration of the national system
of innovation and for negotiating an international arrangement.489  Moreover, a
growing number of innovative proposals rooted in liability rules490 have been put
on the table in recent years, in addition to the better-known proposals for a
more traditional unfair competition approach.491
Most economists engaged in this topic, however, have so far ignored these
and other proposals largely because their economic models and premises either
do not allow them to take liability rules into account or incline them to postu-
late their inherent inferiority to exclusive rights. 492  In so doing, they fail to
devote any serious attention to the social costs that critics of such rights—
including strong database protection—continue to fear.  As a result, formal
economic analysis has so far taught us very little about how to craft an
alternative protective regime so as to avoid market failure without erecting
barriers to entry and impoverishing the public domain.
The most fundamental question these economists largely ignore is the extent
to which any exclusive property right might a priori constitute the wrong kind of
solution for a legal regime that aims to protect investment in large-scale aggre-
gates of data as such.493  Consider, for example, the interactions that might occur
once the line between patentable inventions and the new intellectual property
right in data began to blur.  In the past, patent disclosures entered the public
489. See, e.g., Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18, at 493-96 (dis-
cussing a model international treaty based on the repression of wholesale duplication of databases
under a menu of legal options); Zissu, supra note 379.
490. See definition of liability rules supra note 151.
491. For example, Wendy Gordon has proposed a tort of “malcompetitive copying” that would rest
on specific economic criteria.  Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 152; see also Karjala, Mis-
appropriation, supra note 152.  William Kingston has proposed a new type of liability regime that would
transform intellectual property protection from a duration-based calculus of rights to an accounting-
based calculus of rights based on multiples of R&D costs.  William Kingston, Unlocking the Potential of
Intellectual Property, paper presented to Swedish International Symposium on Economics, Law and
Intellectual Property, Gotheberg 4 (June 26-30, 2000); see also WILLIAM KINGSTON, THE DIRECT
PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-124 (William Kingston ed., 1987).  J. H. Reichman and Pamela
Samuelson have elsewhere proposed a “compensatory liability” regime that would allow second-
comers freely to extract data from a protected database to develop value-adding follow-on products, so
long as adequate compensation was paid under an “automatic license” (not a compulsory license) for a
specified period of time.  See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, at 145-51; see also Reichman, Of
Green Tulips, supra note 164.
492. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2655 (1994); Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 454.  On this view, even the new
transactional economic theories, which do worry about the use of intellectual property rights after they
are granted, are miraculously advanced by a total dependence on exclusive rights, despite the need for
patent pools and other institutions of dubious social value, to attenuate anticommons and other anti-
competitive effects.  See, e.g., Merges, Patent Pools, supra note 151, at 124-32.
493. Cf. Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information Goods
Versus the Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note 13, at 267, 269-74.
One would, indeed, expect or prefer economic analysis to focus on the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of using either exclusive property rights or liability rules to address the underlying risks
of market failure.  See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 151.
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sector immediately after the patent issued.494  Patented inventions expressed in
claims approved by the patent office expired after twenty years,495 and any rele-
vant sub-patentable know-how remained subject to reverse engineering by
“proper means” under the liability rules that protect trade secrets.496
If a strong database right were eventually enacted, however, the ability of a
second-comer to practice the claims to a patented invention that nominally
expired could in fact depend on his or her gaining access to underlying data in a
database that the patent holder, or his assignees, continued to hold under the
database right.  Even if the original data supporting the claims also lapsed
under the database right, 497 the patent holder could attempt to generate new
data to surround the original patent claims in order to make the second-comer’s
exercise of follow-on improvements more difficult.498
If the initial patent claims were narrowly drawn, in keeping with present day
approaches to many biotech, software, and business method patents,499 the pat-
entee’s independent rights in data might enable him or her to project an aura
surrounding these narrow claims that would actually magnify the exclusionary
power of the resulting patents.  Conversely, when broad patent claims were
allowed, as has allegedly occurred with respect to some biotech research tools,500
there are already well-known risks of impeding follow-on applications and
blocking progress.501  An exclusive property right in data could further magnify
these risks.  It would expose second-comers to further allegations of unlawfully
using data from databases that surround and integrate these claims and thus
reinforce the social disutilities already associated with broad patent claims.
Moreover, even as regards sub-patentable innovation, once the aggregates
of information that constitute an entrepreneur’s technical know-how were
reduced to data embodied in a protectible database, the resulting proprietary
494. If the patent failed to issue, the traditional U.S. rule preserved trade secrecy.  35 U.S.C. §
122(a) (2000).  However, the virtually universal practice is to publish the contents of patent applications
after eighteen months, and U.S. law has begun to conform to this practice in recent years.  See 35
U.S.C. §§ 122(b)(1)(A), 122(b)(2).
495. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154(2).
496. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UTSA), §1(4), comment, 14 U.L.A. 449 (1985) (“Proper means
include . . . [d]iscovery by ‘reverse engineering’ . . . .”).
497. As must occur in the United States, but not in the European Union.
498. In this event, the database right would generate some of the problems currently associated with
so-called “blocking patents.”  See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, Blocking
Patents].
499. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980);
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
500. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 104 (stating that “[m]any . . . [expressed sequence tag (“EST”)]
applications are notable for the broad scope of their patent claims: the applications claim not only the
EST but also the full genre of which it is a part and future uses of the gene”) (citing Christopher
Anderson, A New Model for Gene Patents, 260 SCIENCE 23 (1993)).  Some companies have reportedly
filed patent applications on hundreds or thousands of ESTs.  Rai, supra, at 104.
501. See generally Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 225-26, 231-47; Heller & Eisenberg,
supra note 452; Rai, supra note 33, at 126; Lemley, Improvement, supra note 288, at 1053-54; Merges,
Blocking Patents, supra note 498.
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
Winter/Spring 2003] RESEARCH COMMONS 413
rights could make it much harder or more costly for third parties to obtain that
know-how by reverse engineering.502  Similarly, the database right could be used
to discourage efforts to work around patents or to add value to either patented
inventions or sub-patentable innovations.503  Over time, if the cumulative data-
base rights extended into related fields of innovation, they could become the
“wheel” that actually governed the “spokes,” and in this sense, acquire more
value—and impose more anti-competitive effects—than a given firm’s patent
portfolio.
One could thus conceive of an interlocking web of data rights that enabled a
proprietor with strategic patents and copyrights to surround and control a spec-
trum of knowledge in given fields.  On this scenario, the database proprietors
could agglomerate the prior art into a kind of expanding arctic shelf of privat-
ized information, with ever lower costs for aggregators, ever higher costs for
users in the absence of competition, and ever higher barriers to entry.  In such a
case, antitrust laws might provide the only form of relief, and that is always a
cumbersome and uncertain course of action.504
It is not that these negative synergies are certain to occur, but rather that
these potential social costs must be weighed against any social benefits thought
to derive from a strong exclusive property right in collections of data.  Because
the social costs of striking the wrong balance are manifestly so high, and the
uncertainties attendant upon database protection are so great, the most credible
economic advice has been that of Maurer and Scotchmer, who advise against
taking any premature action that might make the end result far worse than the
predicament from which we started.505
b. A Market-Breaking Approach
While the E.U. authorities proclaim the success of their Directive,506 the evi-
dence is inconclusive and at most supports a finding that the Directive has, as
yet, failed to produce the harmful long-term consequences that critics expect. 507
The list of critics who predict such consequences has grown, however, and the
longer the sui generis database law is implemented in practice, the more likely
its socially harmful, over-protectionist consequences will become evident.
502. Cf. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 155.
503. Cf. Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 164.
504. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001); Hanns Ullrich, Intellectual Property,
Access to Information, and Antitrust: Harmony, Disharmony, and International Harmonization, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF IP, supra note 13, 35, 381-98.  “Too much or too easy reliance on
antitrust relief will never solve deficiencies that the intellectual property system is likely to show.”  Id.
at 383.
505. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 432.
506. See Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34.
507. This section is based on Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18, at
482-84.
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To see why critics in the United States and elsewhere508 harbor deep con-
cerns about the long-term consequences of the E.U.’s approach, it suffices to
grasp how radical a change it would introduce into the U.S. system of innova-
tion and to consider how great the risks of such change really are.  Tradition-
ally, United States intellectual property law did not protect investment as
such—a tradition that still has constitutional underpinnings.509  At the same
time, the national system of innovation depends on enormous, upstream flows
of mostly government-generated or government-funded scientific and technical
information, which everyone is free to use,510 and on free competition with
respect to downstream information goods.
The domestic intellectual property laws protected downstream bundles of
information in two situations only: copyrightable works of art and literature,
and patentable inventions.  However, the following conditions apply in both
cases:
(1) These regimes require palpably significant creative contributions based
on free inputs of information and ideas.
(2) They presuppose a flow of unprotected information and data upstream.
(3) They presuppose free competition with regard to the products of mere
investment that are neither copyrightable nor patentable.511
As previously observed, the E.C.’s Database Directive changes this
approach, as would the parallel proposal, H.R. 354, to enact strong database
rights in the United States.  Specifically, these sui generis regimes confer a
strong and, in the European Union, potentially perpetual exclusive property
right on the fruits of mere investment, without requiring any creative contribu-
tion.  They also convert data and information—the previously unprotectible raw
materials and basic inputs of the modern information economy—into the sub-
ject matter of this new exclusive property right.
The sui generis database regimes would thus effectuate a radical change in
the economic nature and role of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”).  Until
now, the economic function of IPRs was to make markets possible where previ-
ously there existed a risk of market failure due to the public good nature of
intangible creations.  Exclusive rights make embodiments of intangible public
goods artificially appropriable, create markets for those embodiments, and
make it possible to exchange payment for access to these creations.512
508. For a recent discussion, see MARK DAVISON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES (forth-
coming 2003), which is highly critical of the E.C. Directive.  Davison is Associate Professor of  Law,
Monash University, Australia.
509. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111 (1938) (rejecting Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)).
510. See A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 1, at 4-8, 9, 52-58; Mowery & Rosenberg, supra
note 231, at 40-48, 55-61.
511. See Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4, at 832-38.
512. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 212, at 108-09, 126-35.
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In contrast, an exclusive IPR in the contents of databases breaks existing
markets for downstream aggregates of information that were formed around
inputs of information largely available from the public domain.  It conditions
the very existence of all traditional markets for intellectual goods on:
(1) The willingness of information suppliers to supply at all (they can hold
out or refuse to deal);
(2) The willingness of suppliers not to charge excessive or monopoly prices
(i.e., more than downstream aggregators can afford to pay in view of
their own risk management assessment); and
(3) The willingness and ability of suppliers to pool their respective chunks
of information in contractually constructed cooperative ventures.
This last constraint is perhaps the most telling of all.  In effect, the sui gene-
ris database regimes create new and potentially serious barriers to entry to all
existing markets for intellectual goods owing to the multiplicity of new owners
of upstream information in whom they invest exclusive rights—any one of
whom can hold out and all of whom can impose onerous transaction costs
(analogous to the problem of expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”) and single
nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”) in patent law).513  This thicket of rights fos-
ters anticommons effects,514 and the database laws appear to be ideal generators
of this phenomenon.
In short, under the new sui generis database regimes, there is a built-in risk
that too many owners of information inputs will impose too many costs and
conditions on all the information processes we now take for granted in the
information economy.  At best, the costs of R&D activities seem likely to rise
across the entire economy, well in excess of benefits, owing to the potential
stranglehold of data suppliers on raw materials.  This stranglehold will increase
with market power if many databases are owned by sole-source providers.
Over time, the comparative advantage from owning a large, complex database
will tend progressively to elevate barriers to entry.515
The potential social gains of a strong database law cannot justify incurring
these risks of disrupting or deforming the national system of innovation.  It
hardly seems logical to break up all existing markets for intellectual goods just
to cure an alleged market failure for investments in a single type of intellectual
good, that is non-copyrightable collections of information.  At present, the
United States dominates this market, and there is no credible empirical evi-
dence of market failure that could not be cured by more traditional means.516
513. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 125-28.
514. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 452.
515. Accord Benkler Constitutional Bounds, supra note 91.  All nonprofit activities will be especially
hard hit.  Over time, lost opportunity costs in neglected R&D projects owing to these balkanized inputs
could become staggering, and many forms of innovation may stagnate as a result.  Even so, it will not
be easy to document these lost opportunity costs, although the past experience of science in this regard
will be repeated across the whole information economy.  For details, see Reichman & Uhlir, Database
Protection, supra note 4, at 812-20.
516. See, e.g., Fewer, supra note 341; Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34.
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The foregoing analysis reinforces the hypothesis that an exclusive property
right is the wrong way to address the problem of legal protection for electronic
databases, and it reconfirms the desirability of considering a modern liability
rule that could avoid market failure without impoverishing the public domain.517
Supporters of strong database protection laws (and strong contractual regimes
to reinforce them) believe that the benefits of private property rights are with-
out limit, and that more is always better. 518  They expect that these powerful
legal incentives will attract huge resources to the production of electronic
information tools.519
In contrast, critics fear that an exclusive property right in non-copyrightable
collections of data, coupled with the proprietors’ unlimited power to impose
electronic adhesion contracts in the course of online delivery, will compromise
the operation of the national system of innovation, which depends on the free
flow of upstream data and information.  In place of the explosive production of
new databases that proponents envision, opponents of a strong database right
predict a steep rise in the cost of information across the global information
economy and a progressive balkanization or feudalization of that economy,520 in
which fewer knowledge goods may be produced as more tithes have to be paid
to more and more information conglomerates along the way.521  In the critics’
view, the information economy most likely to emerge from an exclusive prop-
erty right in data will resemble models already familiar from the Middle Ages,
when goods flowing down the Rhine River or moving from Milan to Genoa
were subject to dozens, if not hundreds, of gatekeepers demanding tribute.
IV
A CONTRACTUALLY RECONSTRUCTED RESEARCH COMMONS
FOR SCIENCE AND INNOVATION
The foregoing exposition has described the growing efforts underway to pri-
vatize and commercialize scientific and technical information that was hereto-
fore freely available from the public domain or on an open access basis.  If these
pressures continue unabated, they will result in the disruption of long-estab-
lished scientific research practices and in the loss of new research opportunities
that digital networks and related technologies make possible.  We do not expect
these negative synergies to occur all at once, however, but rather to manifest
517. For details, see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18, 145-51.
518. See, e.g., Raymond Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (1998); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competi-
tion on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 561 (2001).
519. See E.C. Database Directive, supra note 17, Recitals 6-12; Information Antipiracy Hearings,
supra note 239; Braunstein, supra note 239.
520. Cf. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 266, at 1-3 (stressing the risks of raising the costs of
borrowing ideas and information so high that they “will progressively choke innovation,” and warning
that “[m]ost businesses will be losers, not winners”).
521. Accord Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 432;
Benkler, Constitutional Bounds, supra note 91.
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themselves incrementally, and the opportunity costs they are certain to engen-
der will be difficult to discern.
Particularly problematic is the uncertainty regarding the specific type of
database protection that Congress may enact and any exceptions favoring scien-
tific research and education that such a law might contain.522  As we have tried
to demonstrate, moreover, the economic pressures to privatize and commer-
cialize upstream data resources will continue to grow in any event.523  Legal
means of implementing these pressures already exist, regardless of the adoption
of a sui generis database right.524  Therefore, given enough economic pressure,
that which could be done to promote strategic gains will likely be done by some
combination of legal and technical means.
If one accepts this premise, then the enactment of some future database law
could make it easier to impose restrictions on access to and use of scientific data
than at present, but the absence of a database law or the enactment of a lower
protectionist version of it would not necessarily avoid the imposition of similar
restrictions by other means.  In such an environment, the existing elements of
risk or threat to the sharing norms of public science can only increase unless the
scientific community adopts countervailing measures.
We accordingly foresee a transitional period in which the negative trends
identified above will challenge the cooperative traditions of science and the
public institutions that have reinforced those traditions in the past, with uncer-
tain results.  In this period, a new equilibrium will emerge as the scientific
community becomes progressively more conflicted about their private interests
and their communal needs for data and technical information as a public
resource.  This transitional period will provide a window of opportunity that
should be used to analyze the potential effects of a shrinking public domain and
to take steps to preserve the functional integrity of the research commons.
A. The Challenge to Science: Formulating a Response to the Legal and
Economic Pressures
The trends described above could elicit one of two types of responses.  One
is essentially reactive, in which the scientific community adjusts to the pressures
as best it can without organizing a response to the increasing encroachment of a
commercial ethos upon its upstream data resources.  The other would require
science policy to address the challenge by formulating a strategy that would
enable the scientific community to take charge of its basic data supply and man-
age the resulting research commons in ways that preserved its public good func-
tions without impeding socially beneficial commercial opportunities.
Under the first alternative, the research community can join the enclosure
movement and profit from it.525  Thus, both universities and independent labora-
522. See discussion supra at Part III.B.2.d.(ii).
523. See discussion supra at Part III.B.1.
524. See discussion supra at Part III.B.2.a-c.
525. Cf. Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 373.
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tories or investigators that already transfer publicly funded technology to the
private sector can also profit from the licensing of databases.  In that case, data
flows supporting public science will have to be constructed deal-by-deal with all
the transaction costs this entails and with the further risk of bargaining to
impasse.526  The ability of researchers to access and aggregate the information
they need to produce discoveries and innovations may be compromised both by
the shrinking dimensions of the public domain and by the demise of the sharing
ethos in the nonprofit community, as these same universities and research cen-
ters increasingly see each other as competitors rather than partners in a
common venture.527  Carried to an extreme, this competition of research entities
against one another, conducted by their respective legal offices, could obstruct
and disrupt the scientific data commons.
To avoid these outcomes, the other option is for the scientific community to
take its own data management problems in hand.  The idea is to reinforce and
recreate, by voluntary means, a public space in which the traditional sharing
ethos can be preserved and insulated from the commoditizing trends identified
above.528  In approaching this option, the community’s primary assets are the
formal structures that support federally funded data and the ability of federal
funding agencies to regulate the terms on which data are disseminated and
used.  The first programmatic response would look to the strengthening of
existing institutional, cultural, and contractual mechanisms that already support
the research commons, with a view to better addressing the new threats to the
public domain identified above. The second logical response is collectively to
react to new information laws and related economic and technical pressures by
negotiating contractual agreements between stakeholders to preserve and
enhance the research commons.529
As matters stand, the U.S. government generates a vast public domain for
its own data through creative use of three instruments: intellectual property
rights, contracts, and new technologies of communication and delivery.  By long
tradition, the federal government has used these instruments differently from
the rest of the world.  It waives its property rights in government-generated
information, it contractually mandates that such information should be pro-
vided at the marginal cost of dissemination, and it has been a major proponent
526. Cf. Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 231-47.
527. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 266 (predicting turf wars between rival networks of partners).
528. Cf., e.g., Rai, supra note 33, at 144-51 (advocating norms-based approach to preserving use of
biotech inventions for research purposes).  What unites, or should unite, all these communities is a
common understanding of the historical function of the public domain and a common need to preserve
that function despite the drive for commoditization.  See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 265-66.
Although legislators and entrepreneurs may take time to understand the threat that a shrinking public
domain poses for the national system of innovation, the one group that is best positioned to appreciate
that threat is the nonprofit research sector, whose dependence on the public domain remains a matter
of everyday practice and vital concern.  This sector is also the best positioned to take steps to respond
to the threat by appropriate voluntary collective action.
529. Cf. UNIF. BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS TRANSFER AGREEMENT (UBMTA) (1995), available at
http://www.autm.net/UBMTA/intro.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2003); Rai, supra note 33, at 113, nn.201-
04 (discussing UBMTA).
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and user of the Internet to make its information as widely available as possible.
In other words, the U.S. government has deliberately made use of existing
intellectual property rights, contracts, and technologies to construct a research
commons for the flow of scientific data as a public good.  The unique combina-
tion of these instruments is a key aspect of the success of our national research
enterprise.530
Now that the research commons has come under attack, the challenge is not
only to strengthen a demonstrably successful system at the governmental level,
but also to extend and adapt this methodology to the changing university envi-
ronment and to the new digitally networked research environment.  In other
words, universities, not-for-profit research institutes, and academic investiga-
tors, all of whom depend on the sharing of data, will have to stipulate their own
treaties or contractual arrangements to ensure unimpeded access to, and unre-
stricted use of, commonly needed raw materials in a public or quasi-public
space, even though many such institutions or actors may separately engage in
transfers of information for economic gain.531  This initiative, in turn, will require
the federal government as the primary funder—acting through the science
agencies—to join with the universities and scientific bodies in an effort to
develop suitable contractual templates that could be used to regulate or influ-
ence the research commons.
Implementing our ideas would require nuanced solutions tailor-made to the
needs of government, academia, and industry in general and to the specific exi-
gencies of different scientific disciplines.  The following sections describe our
proposals for preserving and promoting the open availability of government-
generated scientific data, and of government-funded and private-sector scien-
tific data, respectively.  We do not, however, develop detailed proposals for
separate disciplines and sub-disciplines here, as these would require additional
research and analysis.
B. Proposals for the Government Sector
To preserve and maintain the traditional public domain functions of gov-
ernment-generated data, the United States will have to adjust its existing poli-
cies and practices to take account of new information regimes and the growing
pressures for privatization.  At the same time, government agencies will have to
find ways of coping with bilateral data exchanges with other countries whose
governments choose to exercise intellectual property rights in their own data
collections.
530. Mowery & Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 62 (stressing the interaction of federal and private
R&D expentitures).
531. Our proposals go well beyond a “clearinghouse” approach to conflicting proprietary rights,
which some have suggested.  See discussion supra note 454.  A clearinghouse does not deal with the
positive externalities that could accrue from organizing worldwide flows of scientific data online, which
is the real opportunity at stake.
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1. Adjusting Domestic Policies and Practice
We do not mean to imply a need to totally reinvent or reorganize the exist-
ing universe in which scientific data are disseminated and exchanged.  The
opposite is true.  As we have explained, a vast public domain for the diffusion of
scientific data—especially government-generated data—exists and continues to
operate, and much government-funded data emerging from the academic com-
munities continues to be disseminated through well-established mechanisms.532
Facilities for the curation and distribution of government-generated data are
well organized in a number of research areas.  They are governed by long-
established protocols that maintain the function of a public domain, and in most
cases ensure open access (either free or at marginal cost) and unrestricted use
of the relevant data collections.  These collections are housed in bricks-and-
mortar data repositories, many of which are operated directly by the govern-
ment, such as the NASA National Space Science Data Center.533  Other reposi-
tories are funded by the government to carry out similar functions, such as the
archives of the Hubble Space Telescope Science Institute at Johns Hopkins
University.534
Under existing protocols, most government-operated or government-funded
data repositories do not allow conditional deposits that look to commercial
exploitation of the data in question.  Anyone who uses the data deposited in
these holdings can commercially exploit their own versions and applications of
them without needing any authorization from the government.  However, no
such uses, including costly value-adding uses, can remove the original data from
the public repositories.  In this sense, the value-adding investor obtains no
exclusive rights in the original data, but is allowed to protect the creativity and
investment in the derived information products.
The ability of these government institutions to make their data holdings
broadly available to all potential users, both scientific and other, has been
greatly increased by direct online delivery.  However, this potential is under-
mined by a perennial and growing shortage of government funds for such activi-
ties, by technical and administrative difficulties that impede long-term preserva-
tion of the exponentially increasing amounts of data to be deposited, and by
pressures to commoditize data, which are reducing the scope of government
activity and tend to discourage academic investigators from making uncondi-
tional deposits of even government-funded data to these repositories.535
The long-term health of the scientific enterprise depends on the continued
operation of these public data repositories and on the reversal of the negative
trends identified earlier in this article.  Here, the object is to preserve and
enhance the functions that government data repositories have always played,
532. See discussion supra at Parts II.A and II.B.
533. See NASA National Space Science Data Center, at http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/ (last visited Jan.
10, 2003).
534. See Space Telescope Science Institute, at http://www.stsci.edu/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
535. See discussion supra at Parts III.B.1.
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notwithstanding the mounting pressures to commoditize even government-gen-
erated data.
Implementing any recommendations concerning government-generated
data will, of course, require adequate funding, and this remains a major prob-
lem.  In most cases, however, it is not the big allocations needed to collect or
create data that are lacking; it is the relatively small but crucial amounts to
properly manage, disseminate, and archive data already collected that are
chronically insufficient.  These shortsighted practices deprive taxpayers of the
long-term fruits of their investments in the scientific enterprise.  Science policy
must give higher priority to formulating workable measures to redress this
imbalance than it has in the past.
Policy-makers should also react to the pressures to privatize government-
generated research data by devising objective criteria for ascertaining when and
how privatization truly benefits the public interest.  At times, privatization will
advance the public interest because the private sector can generate particular
data sets more efficiently or because other considerations justify this approach.
Very often, however, the opposite will be true, especially when the costs of gen-
erating the data are high in relation to known, short-term payoffs.  Two recent
National Research Council studies have attempted to formulate specific criteria
for evaluating proposed privatization initiatives concerning scientific data.536
The science agencies should make the formulation of such criteria for different
areas of research a top agenda item.  In so doing, the agencies also need to
analyze the results of past privatization initiatives with a view to assessing their
relative costs and benefits.
Once the validity of any given privatization proposal has been determined
by appropriate evaluative criteria, the next crucial step is to build appropriate,
536. The BITS OF POWER report set forth the following conditions for privatization of the scientific
data distribution function:
• Can the distribution of data be separated easily from their generation?
• Is the scientific data set used by others beyond the research community?
• Is the potential market large enough to support several data distributors?
• Is it easy to discriminate prices or differentiate products between scientific users and
other users?  If this is possible, can low prices be mandated contractually for government-
funded data for scientific users?
• Is it costly to separate the distribution of data to scientists from their distribution to other
users, such as commercial users?
“If all of these questions can be answered ‘yes,’ then privatizing the distribution of scientific data should
be an option to be considered.”  BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 120-21.
Concerning the privatization of government data collection and product development functions in
the environmental research context, a more recent National Research Council report recommended the
following:
Before transferring government data collection and product development to private-sector
organizations, the U.S. government should ensure that the following conditions will be satis-
fied: (1) avoidance of market conditions that will give any firms significant monopoly power;
(2) preservation of full and open access to core data products; (3) assurance that a supply of
high-quality information will continue to exist; and (4) minimized disruption to ongoing uses
and applications.
RESOLVING CONFLICTS, supra note 8, at 87.
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public-interest contractual templates into that deal, to ensure the continued
operation of a research commons.  The public research function is too impor-
tant to be left as an afterthought.  It must figure prominently in the planning
stage of every legitimate privatization initiative precisely because the data
would previously have been generated at public expense for a public purpose.
After all, the process of privatization aims to shift the commercial risks and
opportunities of data production or dissemination to private enterprise under
specified conditions that promote efficiency and economic growth.  However,
that process should not pin the functions of the research enterprise to the suc-
cess of any given commercial venture; it must not allow such ventures to other-
wise compromise these functions by charging unreasonable prices or imposing
contractual conditions unduly restricting public, scientific uses of the data in
question.
There are two situations in which model contractual templates, developed
through inter-agency consultations, could play a critical role.  One is where data
collection and dissemination activities previously conducted by a government
entity are transferred to a private entity.  The other is where the government
licenses data collected by a private entity for public research purposes.537  In
both cases, the underlying contractual templates should implement the follow-
ing research-friendly legal guidelines:
(1) A general obligation not to legally or technically hinder access to the
data in question for nonprofit scientific research and educational pur-
poses;
(2) A further obligation not to hinder or restrict the reuse of data lawfully
obtained in the furtherance of nonprofit scientific research activities;538
and
(3) An obligation to make data available for nonprofit research and educa-
tional purposes on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, subject to
impartial review and arbitration of the rates and terms actually applied,
in order to avoid research disasters such as the Landsat deal in the
1980s.539
When the public data collection activity is transferred to the private sector,
care must be taken to ensure that the private entity exercises any underlying
intellectual property rights, especially some future database right, in a manner
consistent with the public interest—including the interests of science.  To this
end, a model contractual template should also include a comprehensive misuse
provision like that embodied in H.R. 1858.540
537. See, e.g., Commercial Space Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-303, 112 Stat. 2843 (Oct. 28, 1998)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14701).
538. Moreover, even in those cases where government data are made available for private sector
uses without any express transfer or contractual arrangements, agencies must give greater consideration
to the need to preserve access to the original public data sets and avoid their de facto capture by a pri-
vate entity.
539. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
540. H.R. 1858 § 106(b), “Limitations on Liability,” provides as follows:
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The larger principle is that, in managing its own public research data activi-
ties, the government can and should develop its own database law in a way that
promotes science without unduly impeding commerce.  This principle is not
new; the government already has a workable information regime, as described
in Part II.  However, the government will need to adapt that regime to the pres-
sures arising from the new high-protectionist legal environment to ensure that
its agencies are consistently applying rational and harmonized public-interest
principles.  Otherwise, the traditional public domain functions of government-
generated data could be severely compromised, an outcome that would violate
the government’s fiduciary responsibilities to taxpayers and raise conflicts of
interest and questions concerning sham transactions.
2. Bridging the Gap with Foreign Law
The federal government will also have to continue to develop policies and
procedures for dealing with data generated by foreign governments that com-
mercialize their data and exploit all available intellectual property rights.
Because international agreements concerning the exchange of scientific and
technical information normally rely on national treatment clauses,541 negotiated
arrangements may be needed to bridge the differences between high and low-
protectionist jurisdictions that could complicate international scientific coopera-
tion.542
Ideally, arrangements with foreign governments should enable the United
States to continue to waive intellectual property rights in government-generated
data distributed abroad while requiring foreign governments similarly to waive
intellectual property rights in government data disseminated in the United
(b) MISUSE—A person or entity shall not be liable for a violation of section 102 if the person
or entity benefiting from the protection afforded a database under section 102 misuses the
protection.  In determining whether a person or entity has misused the protection afforded
under this title, the following factors, among others, shall be considered:
(1) the extent to which the ability of persons or entities to engage in the permitted acts
under this title has been frustrated by contractual arrangements or technological
measures;
(2) the extent to which information contained in a database that is the sole source of the
information contained therein is made available through licensing or sale on reason-
able terms and conditions;
(3) the extent to which the license or sale of information contained in a database pro-
tected under this title has been conditioned on the acquisition or license of any other
product or service, or on the performance of any action, not directly related to the
license or sale;
(4) the extent to which access to information necessary for research, competition, or
innovation purposes have been prevented;
(5) the extent to which the manner of asserting rights granted under this title constitutes
a barrier to entry into the relevant database market; and
(6) the extent to which the judicially developed doctrines of misuse in other areas of the
law may appropriately be extended to the case or controversy.
H.R. 1858; see also Dreier, supra note 68, at 295, 311-12; Ullrich, supra note 504.
541. See, e.g., Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, U.S.-Vietnam, Nov. 17,
2000, cl. 2.2.
542. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18, at 485-500.
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States.  Such a result would preserve the pure public domain approach to gov-
ernment-generated data that has long been official U.S. policy.  However,
European governments accustomed to commercializing their data reportedly
have resisted this approach,543 presumably because they fear re-exports of the
data back into their own more protected markets, or because they do not want
to concede preferences to foreign users that they deny their own citizens.
Requiring foreign governments to subscribe to the U.S. concept of an uncondi-
tional public domain for government-generated data may thus result in those
governments disclosing considerably less data than they might under a two-
tiered structure that conditionally allowed access to such data for nonprofit sci-
entific and educational purposes while restricting its availability to the private
sector.
While the U.S. tradition is squarely opposed to restricted uses of govern-
ment-generated data, many European (and other) governments have sub-
scribed to a different tradition.544  The E.C. Database Directive represents a
powerful new thrust in that direction.  It is worth reiterating that this Directive
enables governments to exercise strong and potentially perpetual exclusive
rights in publicly generated databases, without any mandated obligation to rec-
ognize public-interest exceptions.545
Some fifty countries either belonging to the European Union or having
affiliated status are expected to adopt that model, and we believe that E.U.
trade negotiators are seeking to impose it on other countries as part of regional
trade agreements.  If the United States fails to adopt a different, less protec-
tionist database regime, founded on true unfair competition principles, the
pressures for other countries to follow the E.U. model will become very great.
Moreover, even if the United States adopts a significantly less protectionist
database law, there will be pressures on the United States to protect data gen-
erated by foreign governments and made available to U.S. data centers despite
the “no conditional deposit” rules that bind many of these centers.  The United
States, of course, will not be able to prevent foreign governments from com-
mercially exploiting their public data in territories governed by the E.C. Data-
base Directive.  On the contrary, the fact that governments in the European
Union themselves saw this Directive as a source of considerable income most
likely disposed them favorably toward it, and this fatal attraction seems to be
spreading.546
For these reasons, and despite the general undesirability of a two-tiered
structure in the public sector, the United States must seek to persuade foreign
governments that choose to exercise crown rights (both copyrights and sui gene-
543. Interview with Glenn Tallia, counsel for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, in Silver Spring, Md. (Aug. 20, 2000).
544. For an overview of the public information regimes of the E.U. member states, see Green
Paper, supra note 46, at Annexe 1.
545. See discussion supra at Part III.B.2.d.i.
546. For example, the Republic of Korea is currently considering the adoption of a new sui generis
database protection statute modeled on the E.C. Database Directive.
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ris rights) under the E.C. Database Directive or its analogues to at least imple-
ment a conditional domain in their own countries, with a view to maximizing
access for nonprofit research, educational, and other public-interest purposes.547
Obviously, the better result would be for the E.U. governments to renounce
crown rights in public information altogether and to adopt the public domain
policy of the U.S. government.  Some efforts in this direction are in fact under
way, but the outcome is highly uncertain.548  The overriding need to construct
cooperative, worldwide open-data exchanges in support of public research and
for addressing global problems—including environmental degradation, health,
and the alleviation of poverty—provides a powerful mandate to achieve this
result.
At the same time, there is a real danger that the European Union will con-
tinue to press intergovernmental organizations, as they have the World Mete-
orological Organization, to adopt two-tiered systems that deviate from estab-
lished U.S. norms. 549  The European Union may also be expected to press U.S.
government agencies to conditionally protect the European Union’s data in
intergovernmental exchanges and thus, in effect, to institute a two-tiered
approach for some purposes at U.S. data centers otherwise operating on a pure
public domain basis.  Similarly, the European Union may seek to persuade the
U.S. government to retreat from its full and open data exchange policy in inter-
national scientific research programs.
These divergent pressures indicate that the rules applicable to intergovern-
mental exchanges of data may need to be revisited in the emerging high-protec-
tionist legal environment.  Senior representatives of the U.S. scientific commu-
nity will have to make their voices heard in any such negotiations and argue the
case for an international, open and cooperative public science regime to the
greatest extent possible.550
C. Proposals for the Academic Sector
In putting forward our proposals concerning the preservation of a research
commons for government-funded data, it is useful to follow the distinction
between a zone of formally regulated data exchanges and a zone of informal
data exchanges drawn earlier in this article.  Consistent with our analysis in Part
547. See, e.g., Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Public Access to Environmental
Information, 2000 O.J. (C 337) 402; see also Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Reuse
and Commercial Exploitation of Public Sector Documents, 2002 O.J. (C 227) 207.
548. Id.
549. For a discussion of the Eurpopean Union’s efforts for the World Meteorological Organization
(“WMO”) to adopt a two-tiered data distribution system, see Weiss & Backlund, supra note 7.  For a
statement of the two-tiered data policy that replaced the previous policy of full and open exchange at
the WMO, see WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, EXCHANGING METEOROLOGICAL
DATA: GUIDELINES ON RELATIONSHIPS IN COMMERCIAL METEOROLOGICAL ACTIVITIES (1996),
available at  http://www.wmo.ch/web/pla/WMO837.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
550. This topic is under discussion already at the OECD.  See Background Information on the
Activities of the OECD Follow-up Group on Issues of Access to Publicly Funded Research Data, at
http:/dataaccess.ucsd.edu/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
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II, we emphasize that the ability of government funding agencies to influence
data exchange practices will be much greater in the formal than the informal
zone.
1. Formally Regulated Data Exchanges
When no significant proprietary interests come into play, the optimal solu-
tion for government-generated data and data produced by government-funded
research is a formally structured archival data center also supported by gov-
ernment.  As discussed earlier, many such data centers have already been
formed around large-facility research projects.551  Building on the opportunities
afforded by digital networks, it has now become possible to extend this time-
tested model to highly distributed research operations conducted by groups of
academics in different countries.
The traditional model entails a bricks-and-mortar centralized facility into
which researchers deposit their data unconditionally.  Besides academics, con-
tributors may include government and even private sector scientists, but in all
cases the true public domain status of any data deposited is usually maintained.
Examples include the National Center for Biotechnology Information
(“NCBI”),552 which is directly operated by the National Institutes of Health, and
the National Center for Atmospheric Research (“NCAR”),553 which is operated
by a university consortium and funded primarily by the National Science Foun-
dation (“NSF”).
A second, more recent model, enabled by improved Internet capabilities,
also envisions a centralized administrative entity, but this entity governs a net-
work of highly distributed smaller data repositories, sometimes referred to as
“nodes.”554  Taken together, the nodes constitute a virtual archive whose rela-
tively small central office oversees agreed technical, operational, and legal stan-
dards to which all member nodes adhere.555  Examples of such a decentralized
network, which operate on a public domain basis, are the NASA Distributed
Active Archive Centers under the Earth Observing System program556 and the
NSF-funded Long Term Ecological Research Network.557
551. See supra Part II.A.
552. See discussion supra note 45.
553. See National Center for Atmospheric Research, at http://www.ncar.ucar.edu/ncar/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2003).
554. Many networks of such distributed data nodes now exist.  See, e.g., supra note 130; see also
Planetary Data System, at http://pds.jpl.nasa.gov/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2003).
555. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PRESERVING SCIENTIFIC DATA ON OUR PHYSICAL
UNIVERSE: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ARCHIVING THE NATION’S SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
RESOURCES 47-57 (1995) [hereinafter PRESERVING SCIENTIFIC DATA]; see also supra note 130.
556. See NASA’s Earth Observing System, http://eospso.gsfc.nasa.gov/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2003);
NASA Distributed Active Archive Data Center Alliance, at http://nasadaacs.eos.nasa.gov/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2003).
557. See LTER Net, supra note 130.
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These virtual archives, known as “federated” data management systems,558
extend the benefits and practices of a centralized bricks-and-mortar repository
to the outlying districts and suburbs of the scientific enterprise.  They help to
reconcile practice with theory in the sense that the investigators—most of whom
are funded by government anyway—are encouraged to deposit their data in
such networked facilities.  The very existence of these formally constituted net-
works thus helps to ensure that the resulting data are effectively made available
to the scientific community as a whole, which means that the social benefits of
public funding are more perfectly captured and the sharing ethos is more fully
implemented.
At the same time, some of the existing “networks of nodes” have already
adopted the practice of providing conditional availability of their data: a feature
of considerable importance for our proposals.  By conditional availability we
mean that the members of the network have agreed to make their data avail-
able for public science purposes on mutually acceptable terms, but they also
permit suppliers to restrict uses of their data for other purposes, typically with a
view to preserving their commercial opportunities.559
The networked systems thus provide prospective suppliers with a mix of
options to accommodate deposits ranging from true public domain status to
fully proprietary data that has been made available subject to rules the member
nodes have adopted.  The element of flexibility that conditional deposits afford
makes these federated data management systems particularly responsive to the
realities of present day university research in areas of scientific investigation
where commercial opportunities abound.
a. Basic Recommendations
Our first proposition is that the government funding agencies should
encourage unconditional deposits of research data, to the fullest extent possible,
into both centralized repositories and decentralized network structures.  The
obvious principle here is that, because the data in question are government-
funded, improved methods should be devised for capturing the social benefits
of public funding, lest commercial temptations produce a kind of de facto free-
riding at the taxpayers’ expense.560
When unconditional deposits occur in a true public domain environment
removed from proprietary concerns, the legal mechanisms to implement these
expanded data centers need not be complicated.  Single researchers or small
558. PRESERVING SCIENTIFIC DATA, supra note 555, at 51-52 (describing the elements of a feder-
ated management structure).
559. An example of an international network that operates on the basis of conditional deposits is
the Global Biodiversity Information Network (“GBIF”), headquartered in Denmark, which is substan-
tially supported by U.S. government funding.  See GBIF, supra note 130.
560. We use the term “free-riding” to suggest that privatization should not deprive the public of the
full benefits that it paid for.  At the same time, we recognize that entrepreneurs also pay taxes on their
profits.  Cf. Stephen Berry, Promoting Access to and Use of Not-for-Profit Sector Scientific and Tech-
nical Data—An Assessment of Legal and Policy Options, panel discussion at NRC Workshop, supra
note 428, at Chapter 13.
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research teams could contribute their data to centers serving their specific disci-
plines, with no strings attached other than measures to ensure attribution and
professional recognition.561  Alternatively, as newly integrated scientific commu-
nities organize themselves, they could seek government help in establishing new
data centers or nodes that would accept unrestricted deposits on their behalf.562
Private companies could also contribute to a true public domain model or
organize their own variants of such a model; these practices should be encour-
aged as a matter of public policy.
If the unrestricted data were deposited in federal government sponsored
repositories, existing federal information law and associated protocols would
define the public access rights.563  The maintenance of public-interest data cen-
ters in academia, however, is problematic without government support.  These
data centers can become partly or fully self-supporting through some appropri-
ate fee structures,564 but resort to a fee structure based on payments of more
than the marginal cost of delivery quickly begins to defeat the public good and
positive externality attributes of the system, even absent further use restrictions.
Leaving aside the funding issue, the deeper question that this first proposal
raises is how the universities and other nonprofit research entities will resolve
the potential conflict between the pressure to disclose and deposit their gov-
ernment-funded data and the valuable proprietary interests that are increas-
ingly likely to surface in a high-protectionist intellectual property environ-
ment.565  One cannot ignore the risk that the viability and effectiveness of these
centers could be undermined to the extent that the beneficiaries of government
funding can resist pressure to further implement the sharing ethos and even to
decline to deposit their research data because of their commercial interests.
Despite their educational missions and nonprofit status, universities and
individual academics are both increasingly prone to regard their databases as
targets of opportunity for commercialization.566  This tendency will become
more pronounced as more of the financial burden inherent in the generation
and management of scientific data is shouldered by the universities themselves
561. Academics are particularly concerned about receiving suitable attribution and recognition for
their data-related activities.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 75, at 178.  There is also
evidence that one reason open-source software systems have succeeded is that they confer reputational
(and other non-monetary) benefits on their participants.  See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some
Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002).
562. We note in this connection that many academics have self-organized mini-”data centers”
through their websites with public domain functions, limited only by their technical and financial capa-
bilities.  Groups of academics can similarly construct more ambitious mini-centers, which become less
elaborate versions of the government data model.
563. If, however, data centers are formed outside the scope of direct government control, the
organizers and managers may need to reconstruct the public domain through general public use
licenses to emulate the protocols that govern deposits of data in more traditional government-operated
centers.  See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
564. See, e.g., infra notes 599-601 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss-PROT).
565. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 94-115.
566. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 265 (“[W]hat is striking is how actively universities and firms
are seeking to privatize new information,” not to profit from innovations, but because they “hope
instead to profit from the supply of information or data analysis.”).
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or by cooperative research arrangements with the private sector.  In this con-
text, the universities are likely to envision split uses of their data and will prefer
to make them available on restricted conditions.  They will logically distinguish
between uses of data for basic research purposes by other nonprofit institutions
and purely commercial applications.567  Even this apparently clear-cut distinction
might break down, moreover, if universities treat databases whose principal
user base is other nonprofit research institutions as commercial research tools.
The point is that the universities may not want to deposit data in designated
repositories, even with government support, unless the repositories can accom-
modate these interests, and the repositories could compromise their public
research functions if they are held hostage to too many demands of this kind.
The same potential situation exists for individual databases made available by
universities (as opposed to their contributions to larger, multi-source reposito-
ries). This state of affairs will accordingly require still more creative initiatives
to parry the economic and legal pressures on universities and academic
researchers to withhold data.
With these factors in mind, our second major proposal is to establish a zone
of conditionally available data in order to reconstruct and artificially preserve
functional equivalents of a public domain.  This strategy entails using property
rights and contracts to reinforce the sharing norms of science in the nonprofit,
trans-institutional dimension, without unduly disrupting the commercial inter-
ests of those entities that choose to operate in the private dimension.
To this end, the universities and nonprofit research institutions that depend
on the sharing ethos, together with the government science funding agencies,
should consider stipulating to suitable “treaties” and other contractual
arrangements to ensure unimpeded access to commonly needed raw materials
in a public or quasi-public space.568  From this perspective, one can envision the
accumulation of shared scientific data as a community asset held in a contractu-
ally reconstructed research commons to which all researchers have access for
purposes of public scientific pursuits.
One can further imagine that this public research commons exists in an ever-
expanding “horizontal dimension,” as contrasted with the commercial opera-
tions of the same data suppliers in what we shall call the “vertical” or private
dimension.  The object of the exercise would be to persuade the government, as
primary funder, to join with universities and scientific bodies in an effort to
develop suitable contractual templates that could be used to regulate the
research commons.  These templates would ensure that data held in the quasi-
public or horizontal dimension would remain accessible for scientific purposes
and could not be removed or otherwise appropriated to the private or vertical
567. Cf. Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 242-43 (describing emergence of de facto two-
tiered market in which scientists exchange research tools directly on minimal obligations, while tech-
nology transfer offices haggle over proprietary exchanges and delay research).
568. Cf. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87 (1997); Rai, supra note 33, at 152 (advocating “concerted public and private action centered
around existing norms to preserve the public domain”).
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dimension.  At the same time, these contractual arrangements would expressly
contemplate the possibilities for commercial exploitation of the relevant data in
the private or vertical dimension, and they would clarify the depositor’s rights in
that regard and ensure that the exercise of those rights did not impede or dis-
rupt access to the horizontal space for research purposes.
b. Ancillary Considerations
In fashioning these proposals, we are aware that considerable thought has
recently been given to the construction of voluntary social structures to support
the production of large, complex information projects.569  Particularly relevant in
this regard are the open source software movement that has collectively devel-
oped and managed the GNU/Linux Operating System570 and the Creative
Commons organization,571 which seeks to encourage authors and artists to condi-
tionally dedicate some or all of their exclusive rights to the public domain.  In
both these pioneering movements, agreed contractual templates have been
experimentally developed to reverse or constrain the exclusionary effects of
strong intellectual property rights.
The open source model adopted by the software research and related com-
munities relies on existing legal regulatory regimes to create a social space
devoted to producing freely available and modifiable code.572  Under the
GNU/Linux operating system, components of the cooperatively elaborated
structure are protected by intellectual property rights, in this case copyrights,
and by licensing agreements, but these legal mechanisms are used to enforce the
sharing norms of the open source community.573  Standard-form licensing
agreements are formulated “to use contractual terms and property rights to cre-
ate social conditions in which software is produced on a model of openness
569. See, e.g., Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 198; David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2001); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Dan Burk, Open
Source Genomics, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 254 (2002).
570. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 569.  The Open Source Movement is also known as the Free
Software Movement.  On this terminology, see SAM WILLIAMS, FREE AS IN FREEDOM: RICHARD
STALLMAN’S CRUSADE FOR FREE SOFTWARE, Ch. 11 (2002), available at
http://www.oreilly.co/openbook/freedom/ch11.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2002); see also Free Software
Foundation, Why ‘Free Software’ is Better than ‘Open Source’, at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
software-for-freedom.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
571. See Creative Commons, at http://www.creative commons.org/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
572. McGowan, supra note 569, at 244.
573. Under the Free Software approach, the archtypical “copyleft license” is the GPL or GNU
Public License, by which the copyright owner grants the user the right to copy, modify and distribute
the licensed software without having to get permission or pay any license fee to the owner.  “[I]f you
distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the
rights that you have.” GNU GPL, available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last modified July
15, 2001).  According to Janet Hope, a Ph D. candidate at the Australian National University, open
source was intended as a market stategy to make the “free sofware” concepts attractive to people in the
business community.  Janet Hope, Open Source Biotechnology, paper presented to the workshop on
Science, Intellectual Property and Open Domains, REGNET, Intellectual Property Institute of Aus-
tralia, Canberra, Australia (Dec. 2, 2002).
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rather than exclusion.”574  Under these licenses, “code may be freely copied,
modified, and distributed,” but only if the modifications (derivative works) are
distributed under these terms as well.575  Property rights are “held in reserve to
discipline possible violations of community norms.”576  The end result, as Profes-
sor McGowan recently observed, is not a true commons, but resembles a com-
mons because of the “low cost of copying and using code combined with . . .
broad grants of the relevant licenses.”577
For present purposes, the most relevant lesson to be drawn from the open
source model is the possibility for participants in networks of nodes or other
data sharing arrangements to dedicate holdings protected by IPRs to the rele-
vant scientific community itself, which would hold the collective asset in a kind
of trust to which all members of the community have access.  In effect, the
members of such a community would use any exclusive rights granted by intel-
lectual property laws to exclude exclusivity itself.  While the collective asset—in
this case, typically, a database—and its components could be routinely made
available for commercial applications,578 subject to additional terms and condi-
tions that would have to be negotiated, the general public licenses supporting
the collective asset would prevent any users from appropriating either the entire
asset or its components from the quasi-public or horizontal space in which it
was collectively managed for public research purposes.
The second model of particular interest, the Creative Commons, facilitates
public access to copyrighted literary and artistic works by devising a set of stan-
dard-form contractual templates any author can digitally adopt.579  Once
adopted, these contractual grants permit anyone to make certain uses of the
574. McGowan, supra note 569, at 243.  The movement makes some effort to downplay their reli-
ance on technical rules of contract law as such.  See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Enforcing the GPL,
LINUXUSER & DEVELOPER, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 66.
575. McGowan, supra note 569, at 242.
576. Id. at 244.
577. Id.
578. Open source software makes money for developers in two principal ways.  First, all innovations
made after the initial release are automatically available to the original developers at no cost, which can
be equivalent to having an enormous, unpaid R&D department.  Hope, supra note 573.  The second
type of income stream comes from providing service and support, “which is always a large part of the
market in any high tech industry.”  Id.
579. The Creative Commons offers four standard templates:
Attribution. You let others copy, distribute, display, and perform your copyrighted work—
and derivative works based upon it—but only if they give you credit. . . .
Noncommercial.  You let others copy, distribute, display and perform your work—and deriva-
tive works based upon it—but for noncommercial purposes only. . . .
No Derivative Works.  You let others copy, distribute, display and perform only verbatim
copies of your work, not derivative works based upon it. . . .
Share Alike.  You allow others to distribute derivative works only under a license identical to
the license that governs your work.
Licenses Explained, available at http://www.creativecommons.org/learn/licenses (last visited Jan. 18,
2003).
The service also offers to help people dedicate their work to the pure public domain, with “no rights
reserved,” although it is not provided as one of the four standard options.  See Creative Commons,
supra note 571.
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protected works, which are then digitally encoded, so that the search engines of
would-be users can register them and thus facilitate the uses in question.580  This
technique seems particularly relevant to the goal of linking highly distributed
data holders in virtual archives by digital means, as is further discussed below.581
Although neither of these models were developed with the needs of public
science in mind, both provide helpful examples of how universities, federal
funding agencies, and scientific bodies might contractually reconstruct a
research commons for scientific data that could withstand the legal, economic,
and technological pressures on the public domain identified in this article.  In
what follows, we draw on these and other sources to propose the contractual
regulation of government-funded data in two specific situations: (1) when gov-
ernment-funded, university-generated data are licensed to the private sector,
and (2) when such data are made available to other universities for research
purposes.
c. Licensing Government-Funded Data to the Private Sector
In approaching this topic, one must consider that the production of scientific
databases in academia is not always dominated by activities funded by the fed-
eral government.  It may also entail funding by universities themselves, founda-
tions, and the private sector.  While funding from these non-government
sources seems likely to grow in the future, especially if Congress adopts a data-
base protection right, the government’s role in funding academic data produc-
tion will nonetheless remain a major factor, at least in the near term (though its
role will vary from project to project).  As discussed in Part II, this presence
gives the federal funding agencies unique opportunities to influence the data-
sharing policies of its beneficiary institutions.582
Ideally, funders and universities would agree on the need to maintain the
functions of a public domain to the fullest extent possible, to provide open
access to data for nonprofit research activities, and to encourage efficient tech-
nological applications of available data.  At the same time, technological appli-
cations and other opportunities for commercial exploitation of certain types of
databases will push the universities to enter into private contractual transac-
tions that, if left totally unregulated, could adversely affect the availability of
the relevant data for public research purposes.583  The reconciliation of the con-
flict between enhancing the public research interests and freedom of contract
will require carefully formulated policies and institutional adjustments.584
580. Id.
581. See discussion infra at Part IV.C.2.
582. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
583. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 229 (“Institutions tend to be high-minded
about the importance of unfettered access to the research tools that they want to acquire from others,
but no insitution is willing to share freely the materials and discoveries from which they derive signifi-
cant competitive advantage.”).
584. Cf. Dan L. Burk, Lex Genetica: The Law and Ethics of Programming Biological Code, 4
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 109, 109-11, 113-18 (2002).
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Assuming the existence of sufficient funds, the maximum availability of aca-
demic data for research purposes is assured if those data have been deposited in
the public data centers.585  To the extent that agencies successfully encourage
academics and their universities to deposit government-funded data into either
old or new repositories established for this purpose, the research-friendly poli-
cies of these centers should automatically apply.  As long as these policies are
not themselves watered down by commercial and proprietary considerations,
they should generally immunize the research function from conflicts deriving
from private transactions.586
However, the universities or their academics may very well balk at contrib-
uting commercially valuable data to these repositories unless they retain some
degree of autonomy to negotiate the terms of their private transactions and
impose restrictions on the uses of the data deposited for commercial purposes.
This raises two important questions.  The first concerns the willingness of data
centers themselves—whether of the bricks-and-mortar variety or networks of
nodes—to accept conditional deposits that impose restrictions on use for certain
purposes in the first place.  The second question, closely tied to the first, con-
cerns the extent to which federal funding agencies should further seek to define
and influence the relations between universities and the private sector to pro-
tect the public research function—especially when the data in question have not
been deposited in an appropriate repository or when they have been so depos-
ited but the repository permits conditional deposits.
i. Key Questions
Regarding the first of these questions, we previously observed that the
emerging network of nodes model is more likely to accommodate conditional
deposits or availability than are the traditional centralized data centers.587  Nev-
ertheless, the practice remains controversial in scientific circles in that it devi-
ates from the traditional norm of full and open access.  For present purposes,
we simply state our view that the possibilities for maximizing access to scientific
data for public nonprofit research will not be fully realized in a highly protec-
tionist legal and economic environment unless the scientific community agrees
to experiment with suitably regulated conditional deposits.588
The second question, concerning the need to regulate the interface between
universities and the private sector with regard to government-funded data,
acquires important contextual nuances when viewed in the light of the policies
and practices that currently surround the Bayh-Dole Act and related legislation.
The Bayh-Dole Act encourages universities to transfer the fruits of federally
585. See, for example, the data centers mentioned in supra note 45.
586. Moreover, there are likely to be significant positive externalities when private companies can
freely use the public research data.  See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 263-65.
587. See supra Part IV.C.1.
588. Cf. Patrinos & Drell, supra note 23, at 11.
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funded research to the private sector by means of the patent system.589  In a
somewhat similar vein, federal research grants and contracts allow researchers
to retain copyrights in their published research results.  By extension, the same
philosophy could apply to databases produced with federal funding, especially if
Congress were to adopt a sui generis database protection right, with incalculably
negative results unless steps were taken to reconcile the goals of Bayh-Dole
with the dual nature of data as both an input and an output of scientific research
and of the larger system of technological innovation.590
It would also be a mistake for the science policy establishment to wait for
the enactment of database legislation before considering the implications of
blindly applying the spirit of Bayh-Dole to any database law that Congress
might adopt.  Because databases differ significantly from either patented inven-
tions or copyrighted research results, policy-makers should anticipate the
advent of some database legislation and address the problems it may cause for
science—particularly with regard to government-funded data.  Special consid-
eration must be given to how the power to control uses of scientific data after
publication would be exercised once a database protection law was enacted.
We do not mean to question the underlying philosophy or premises of Bayh-
Dole,591 which has produced socially beneficial results.  Its very success, how-
ever, has generated unintended consequences and raised new questions that
require careful consideration.592  In advocating a program for a contractually
reconstructed research commons, one of our explicit goals is, indeed, to ensure
that academics and their universities benefit from new opportunities to exploit
research data in an industrial context.  This goal reflects the policies behind
Bayh-Dole.593  At the same time, it would hardly be consistent with the spirit of
Bayh-Dole to allow the commercial partners of academic institutions to dictate
the terms on which government-funded data are made available for purposes of
nonprofit scientific research.
On the contrary, a real opportunity exists for government funding agencies
and universities to develop agreed contractual templates that would apply to
commercial users of government-funded data in general.  In effect, the public
scientific community would thus develop a database protection scheme of its
own that would override the less research-friendly provisions of any sui generis
589. Even without a database right, Bayh-Dole prods universities to exploit data as part of the trans-
fer of technology to the private sector.  See also Rai, supra note 33, at 97, 109-15.
590. Of course, Bayh-Dole does not, and need not, apply to database protection rights as such.  See
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (limiting policy to use of the patent system).  But universities would still remain
unrestricted owners or assignees of government-funded databases, who could make their own rules,
while Bayh-Dole already accustoms them to the commercial exploitation of their intellectual property
rights.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13; Powell, supra note 13, at 255 (stressing the new
role of universities as both creators and retailers of intellectual property).
591. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (“Policy and Objectives”).
592. See Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 120; Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 121;
see also Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 117.
593. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (listing, inter alia, the goal “to promote colatoration between commercial con-
cerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities”).
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regime that Congress might adopt.  In so doing, the scientific community could
also significantly influence the data-licensing policies and practices of the pri-
vate sector, before that sector ends up influencing the data-licensing practices of
university technology transfer offices.594
ii. Value-Adding Uses and Management Costs
If one takes this proposal seriously, a capital point of departure would be to
address the problem of follow-on applications, which has greatly perturbed the
debate about database protection in general.  The critical role of data as input
into the information economy weighs heavily against endowing database pro-
prietors with an exclusive right to control follow-on applications.  This principle
becomes doubly persuasive when the government itself has defrayed the costs
of generating the data in question, in which case an exclusive right to control
value-added applications takes on a cast of reverse free-riding.595
One solution is to allow second-comers to extract and use data from any
given collection freely for bona fide value-adding purposes in exchange for ade-
quate compensation of the initial investor based on an expressly limited range
of royalty options.596  If the rules developed by universities and funding agencies
imposed this kind of “compensatory liability” regime on follow-on applications
of government-funded academic data, in lieu of any statutorily created exclusive
right, there is reason to believe it could significantly advance both technological
development and the larger public interest in access to scientific data.597
Universities and funding agencies could also adopt clauses similar to those
proposed above in the context of government-generated data,598including a gen-
eral prohibition against legally or technically hindering access to any database
built around government-funded data for purposes of nonprofit scientific
research.  Clauses that prohibit private partners from hindering the reuse of
data in the construction of new databases to address new scientific research
objectives seem particularly important, as are clauses requiring private partners
to license their commercial products on fair and reasonable terms and condi-
tions.  Also desirable are clauses forbidding misuse of any underlying IPRs and
establishing guidelines that courts should apply in evaluating specific claims of
misuse.
Moreover, when considering relations with the private sector, attention
should be given to the high cost of managing and archiving data holdings for
scientific purposes and the possibilities of defraying some of this cost through
594. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 114 (reporting instances in which the “[r]esidual norms of academic
research may even have had some influence on the conduct of [biotech] industry actors”).
595. In the sense that it makes the public pay twice for some of the social benefits that public fund-
ing was designed to cover.
596. Cf. Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 164; Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra
note 4; Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18, 462-63, 479-80.
597. Cf. Powell, supra note 13, at 264 (fearing exclusive license mentality that, if applied to Cohen-
Boyer patent on recombinant DNA technology, would have retarded progress in biotechnology).
598. See supra Part II.B.1.
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commercial exploitation.  While government support ought to increase, espe-
cially as the potential gains from a horizontal e-commons become better under-
stood, the cost of data management will also increase with the success of the
system.  For this reason, universities may want to levy charges against users in
the private sector or the vertical dimension, in order to help defray the cost of
administering operations in the horizontal domain and to make this overall
approach more economically feasible.
One controversial example of an attempt to supplement the data manage-
ment costs of a government-funded database is provided by the Swiss-PROT
Protein Knowledgebase, a university-administered entity that collects and
curates data concerning protein sequences contributed by academic and corpo-
rate researchers from various countries.599  The highly specialized data in this
collection are reviewed, annotated, and made available online under a condi-
tional arrangement that operates largely on an honor system.600  While nonprofit
uses are allowed gratis, uses by private firms are licensed on an annual subscrip-
tion fee basis that differentiates by the size of the corporate user (and, pre-
sumably, its ability to pay).  Payments are made directly to the Swiss-PROT
management entity and, reportedly, there has been minimum evasion of the
rules thus far.601
Another interesting example is the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to nego-
tiate a public-private partnership to manage a Human Mutations Database,
which would have integrated university-generated data from around the world
concerning genomic mutations into a single, openly available database.602 The
motivating idea was that a private firm, Incyte, would put up the funds to
organize the database and make the data openly available to all users online, on
the condition that all of the relevant data would have been channeled through
Incyte alone and not its competitors.  Incyte expected to gain lead time advan-
tages from early access to the data and also to benefit from traffic-building
effects on its website, but there was to be no fee charged for use of the muta-
tions data as such.  In the end, however, it proved impossible to coordinate the
disparate interests of the participating entities, and the project was aborted
before its feasibility could be tested.603
In evaluating these experiments, one may view the so-called open access
system adopted by Swiss-PROT with a degree of skepticism.  First of all, the
relevant user community is so small and tightly knit, and so accurately moni-
tored by tracking the electronic footprints of those who access the database,
that non-compliance would pose unacceptable costs in loss of reputation, peer
pressure, and possible denial of privileges.  Second, the administrators are able
599. See Swiss-PROT, at http://www.ebi.ac.uk/swissprot/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
600. See http://www.ebi.ac.uk/swissprot/information/information.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
601. Reported through an informal discussion at a European Science Foundation, Funding Agencies
Workshop on Public Domain of Digital Research Data, Strasbourg, France, Oct. 15, 2002.
602. Maurer, Inside the Anticommons, supra note 465.
603. Id.
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tacitly to rely on the default rules, valid against the world, that derive from the
E.C. Database Directive, which effectively holds every user who fails to comply
with the posted conditions of access, extraction, and reuse liable for infringe-
ment.
Swiss-PROT nonetheless exemplifies one potential use of an agreed con-
tractual template, and it anticipates techniques the Creative Commons initiative
has recently further refined.  It illustrates that, even in the presence of a high-
protectionist intellectual property regime, contractual templates can be fash-
ioned to promote the research commons without unduly obstructing commer-
cial opportunities (although there are questions about Swiss-PROT’s specific
practices in this regard).604
The Swiss-PROT example also supports an otherwise intuitive inference
that, under certain conditions, an intellectual property right in collections of
data can encourage—rather than discourage—disclosure for scientific purposes
by reducing the risk of free-riding appropriations.  This comes as no surprise to
the authors of this article, given that we have elsewhere advocated the adoption
of a minimalist database protection regime, sounding in unfair competition law
(liability rules) rather than in exclusive property rights.605  A database protection
statute based on true unfair competition principles could close any demonstra-
ble gaps in existing law with acceptable social costs and would provide a moder-
ate, alternative model for other countries to consider.606  It should be clear, how-
ever, that the stronger the underlying intellectual property right, the more
necessary it becomes to devise suitable contractual templates regulating rela-
tions between universities and the private sector (and inter-university relations
themselves), with a view to ensuring the smooth operation of a contractually
reconstructed research commons.
Moreover, complexities and coordination problems are likely to arise when
the data in question are of interest to a much broader and more heterogeneous
non-expert user base than in the two examples above.  In this situation, more
refined contractual templates could reduce both friction and transaction costs
due to strategic behavior, by, for example, differentiating categories of users
who may be denied access for specified lead time intervals; regulating the
timing of competing or derivative publications; prospecting the possibilities of
strategic cross-licenses for certain purposes; and even ensuring that grant-back,
reach-through, and other clauses, sometimes appropriate in the private sector,
604. It should be noted that Swiss-PROT’s default provision for nonprofit users was not to modify
the database for any purpose, unless expressly allowed for “a valid scientific or technical reason”
depending on “how the information will be presented and distributed.”  Maurer, Promoting and Dis-
seminating Knowledge, supra note 259, at 47.  This was a scientifically serious limitation.  The NCBI,
which previously incorporated Swiss-PROT data into its own “Reference Sequence” and “Predicted
Genes” databases, stopped doing so when Swiss-PROT added this encumbrance and eventually
replaced the Swiss-PROT data with data from other sources.  Id.
605. See generally Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection, supra note 4; Reichman & Samuelson,
supra note 18.
606. See generally Reichman, Database Protection in a Global Economy, supra note 18, at 493-96.
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are not allowed to disrupt public research.607  However, the more complicated
the situation becomes and the greater the degree of coordination required, the
more likely worthwhile pooling initiatives will never get off the ground—as
occurred with the human mutations database project itself.608
In addition, if such a project were successfully launched and the data in
question became potentially of value to a broad user base, a further enforce-
ment problem might arise due to the potential for leakage of data, supplied at
preferential prices, to research users in ways that could damage the interests of
users in the vertical dimension.  It will be recalled that, on the horizontal plane,
the option to charge for research uses (when otherwise unavoidable) is intended
to entail a corresponding burden to positively discriminate in favor of science
and its research goals.609  This need for price discrimination favoring research
uses correspondingly requires that the difficult problem of leakage be
addressed.  Any solution here would certainly benefit from congressional
enactment of a minimalist database protection right.610
When administrative complexities appear particularly daunting, the better
solution may be for participating entities to deposit their data with a designated,
external administrative agency or service charged with the tasks of negotiating,
formulating, and implementing the general public licenses or agreed contractual
templates.  These operations should remain subject to the guidance, govern-
ance, and oversight of the participating universities, government funding agen-
cies, and other affected institutions.  We also envision the need for mediation,
arbitration, and dispute settlement facilities, which could be appropriately
located within any oversight group that might be established.611
Finally, care must be taken to reduce friction between the scientific data
commons as we envision it and universities’ patenting practices under the Bayh-
Dole Act.  For example, any agreed contractual templates might have to allow
for deferred release of data, even into repositories operating as a true public
domain, at least for the duration of the one-year novelty grace period during
which relevant patent applications based on the data could be filed.612  Other
607. Cf. Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 226-31 (evidencing disruptive effects of such
clauses at present in regard to biotech research tools).
608. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 34, at 129-35; Maurer, Inside the Anticommons, supra note 465.
609. This practice is, of course, further restrained to the extent that the U.S. government provides
the bulk of the data in the true public domain, which intrinsically restricts the amount of data available
for providers who seek to opt into the conditional domain, with price-discriminated operations, along
the horizontal research plane in addition to commercial operations at full rates along the vertical axis.
See supra Part II.A.1.
610. The leakage problem might require administrators of a scientific e-commons to adopt and
apply “access management systems” even though strong “digital rights management techniques” would
be inappropriate in the interests of implementing and enforcing the community’s norms.  Institutional
users are unlikely to disregard contractual access terms.  See Peter Eckersley et al., Neuroscience Data
and Tool Sharing: A Legal and Policy Framework for Neuroinformatics, 1 NEUROINFORMATICS 8-10
(forthcoming 2003).
611. Cf. id. at 10-11 (discussing a collection society model for similar purposes).  A logical organiza-
tional locus for such operations would be the professional scientific societies working within the frame-
work of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
612. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see also 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (provisional patent applications).
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measures to synchronize the operations of the e-commons with the ability of
universities to commercialize their holdings under Bayh-Dole would have to be
identified and carefully addressed.  We also note that there is an interface
between our proposals for an e-commons for science and antitrust law,613 which
would at least require consultation with the FTC and might also require ena-
bling legislation.  A detailed analysis of these issues lies beyond the scope of this
article.
In sum, to successfully regulate relations between universities and the pri-
vate sector in the United States, where most of the scientific data in question
are government-funded (if not government-generated), considerable thought
must be given to devising suitable contractual templates that universities could
use when licensing such data to the private sector.  These templates, which
should aim to promote the smooth operation of a research commons and facili-
tate general research and development uses of data as inputs into technological
development, could themselves constitute a model database regime that opti-
mally balances public and private interests in ways that any federally enacted
law might not.  To succeed, however, these templates must be acceptable to the
universities, the funding agencies, the broader scientific community, and the
specific disciplinary sub-communities—all of whom must eventually weigh in to
ensure that academics themselves observe the norms that they would thus have
collectively implemented.
In so doing, the participating institutions could avoid a race to the bottom in
which single universities might otherwise trade away more restrictions on open
access and research to attract more and better deals from the private sector.
Unless science itself takes steps of this kind, there is a serious risk that, under
the impetus of Bayh-Dole, the private sector will gradually impose its own
database rules on all government-funded data products developed with their
university partners.614
d. Inter-University Licensing of Scientific Data
Whatever the merits of our proposals for regulating transfers of scientific
data from universities to the private sector, the need for science policy to regu-
late inter-university transfers of such data seems irrefutable.  In this context,
most of the data is generated for public scientific purposes and at public
expense, and the progress of science depends on continued access to, and fur-
ther applications of, such data.  Not to construct a research commons that could
withstand the pressures to privatize government-funded data at the inter-uni-
versity level would thus amount to an indefensible abdication of the public trust
by encumbering nonprofit research with high transaction and exclusion costs.615
613. Cf. Dreier, supra note 68, at 311-12; Ullrich, supra note 504, at 367-98.
614. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 111-12 (reporting instances in which this has occurred regarding bio-
tech patents).
615. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 234 (“When progress in research depends on
the relatively unfettered flow of low value exchanges of information and materials among scientists, a
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All the same, implementing this task poses very difficult problems that are
likely to exacerbate the conflicts of interests between the open and cooperative
norms of science and the quest for additional funding sources we previously
identified.616
i. Policy Considerations
One may note at the outset that these conflicts of interest are rooted in the
Bayh-Dole approach to the transfer of technology itself.  This legislative
framework stimulates universities to protect federally funded research results
through intellectual property rights and to license those rights to the private
sector for commercial applications.  If Congress enacted a strong database-pro-
tection law, it could extend Bayh-Dole to this new intellectual property right.
In such a case, Bayh-Dole would simply pass the relevant exclusive rights to
extract and reutilize collected data straight through the existing system to the
same universities and academic researchers who now patent their research
results and would thus end up owning all the government-funded data they had
generated.  Even without such legislation, nothing impedes the universities
from commercially exploiting protected databases in the spirit of Bayh-Dole,
subject to any exceptions or immunities favoring research that a database law
may have codified.
Moreover, the Bayh-Dole legislation makes no corresponding provision for
beneficiary universities to give differential and more favorable treatment to
other universities when licensing patented research products.  On the contrary,
there is evidence that in transactions concerning patented biotech research
tools, at least, universities have viewed each other’s scientists as a target market,
in the exploitation of which they have virtually the same commercial interests as
private producers of similar tools for scientific research.617  Inter-university deals
have accordingly been constructed on a case-by-case basis, often with consider-
able difficulty, by technology transfer offices normally striving to maximize all
their commercial opportunities.618
Without any agreed restraints on how universities are to deal with collec-
tions of data in which they had acquired statutorily conferred ownership and
exclusive exploitation rights, their technology transfer offices could simply treat
databases like patented inventions—despite the immensely greater impact this
could have on both basic and applied research.  In this milieu, reliance on good
faith accommodations hammered out by the respective technology transfer
offices619 would, at best, make inter-university exchanges resemble the compli-
cated transactions that already characterize relations between highly distributed
proliferation of intellectual property claims . . . may impose transaction costs that consume the gains
from exchange.”).
616. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.b.
617. See Eisenberg, Public Research, supra note 120; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 117 at 297-99.
But see id. at 300-06 (countervailing efforts to preserve benefits of research commons).
618. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 228-48.
619. See COHEN & MERRILL, supra note 452.
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laboratories and research teams in the zone of informal exchanges of scientific
data.620  All the vices of that zone would soon be imported into the more formal
zone of inter-university relationships.  At worst, this would precipitate a race to
the bottom as universities tried to maximize their returns from these rights, in
which case some technology transfer offices could be expected to contractually
override any modest research exceptions a future database law might have codi-
fied.621
At the same time, the Bayh-Dole legislative framework may itself suggest an
antidote for resolving these potential conflicts of interest, or, at least, a sound
point of departure for addressing them.  The Act explicitly recognizes that the
public interest in certain patented inventions may outweigh the benefits usually
anticipated from private exploitation under exclusive property rights.  In such
cases, it authorizes the government to impose a compulsory license or otherwise
exercise “march-in” rights and take control of the invention it has paid to pro-
duce.622  In fact, these public-interest adjustments have never successfully been
exercised in practice,623 and on the one known occasion when they were
invoked, the government encountered stiff and questionable resistance from a
major university.624
Nevertheless, the principle (if not the actual practice) behind these provi-
sions presents a platform on which universities and federal funding agencies can
build their own mutually acceptable arrangements to promote their common
interest in full and open access to government-funded collections of data.  Our
goal, indeed, is to persuade them to address this challenge now, before a data-
base protection law is enacted, by examining how to ensure the smooth and
relatively frictionless exchange of scientific data between academic institutions,
regardless of any exclusive property right they may eventually acquire and not-
withstanding any other commercial undertakings with the private sector they
may pursue.  Absent such a proactive approach, we fear a slow unraveling of
the traditional sharing norms in the inter-university context and an inevitable
race to the bottom.
ii. Structuring Inter-University Data Exchanges
Because the issues under consideration here pertain to uses of government-
funded data produced by academics for university-sponsored programs, one
looks to full and open access as the optimal guiding principle and to the sharing
620. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
621. At present, there are no such proposed exceptions of any real value in the pending U.S. exclu-
sive rights model.  See supra Part III.B.2.  Even if this were to change, that model allows database pro-
ducers to override such exceptions by contract, and the usual status of sole-source provider on many
scientific niche markets provides the market power to do so.
622. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000); see, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 70, at 402-03.
623. In the private sector, the use of “march-in rights” could raise the specter of uncertainty and
hamper investment.  But this risk is of secondary importance in the inter-university environment.
624. In the case of CellPro, Johns Hopkins University successfully opposed a competitor licensee’s
request for a compulsory license that would have brought an effective cancer diagnosis tool to the
market years ahead of its own patented invention.  See Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 121.
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norms of science as the foundation of any arrangement governing inter-univer-
sity licensing of data.  On this approach, the government-funded data collec-
tions held by universities would be viewed as a single common resource for
inter-university research purposes.  The operational goal would be to nurture
and extend this common resource within a horizontally linked administrative
framework that facilitated every university’s public research functions, without
unduly disrupting commercial relations with the private sector that some
departments of some universities will undertake in the vertical dimension.
To achieve this goal, universities, funding agencies, and interested scientific
bodies would have to negotiate an acceptable legal and administrative frame-
work, analogous to a multilateral pact, that would govern the common resource
and provide day-to-day logistical support.  Ideally, the participating universities
or their designated agents would operate as trustees for the horizontally con-
structed common resource, much as the Free Software Foundation does with
the GNU system.625  In this capacity, the trustees would assume responsibility
for ensuring access to the holdings on the agreed terms and for restraining devi-
ant uses that violate those terms or otherwise undermine the integrity of the
commons.  The full weight of the federal granting structure could then be made
to support these efforts by mandating compliance with agreed terms and
directly or indirectly imposing sanctions for non-compliance.
Alternatively, a less formal administrative structure could be built around a
set of agreed contractual templates regulating access to government-funded
data collections for public research purposes.  On this approach, the participat-
ing universities would retain greater autonomy, there would be less need for a
fully fleshed out multilateral pact, and the monitoring and other transaction
costs might be reduced.  The Swiss-PROT arrangement discussed earlier626 pro-
vides some elements of an approach that could be adapted in a highly protec-
tionist environment to promote certain inter-university data exchanges along
these lines.
In a less than perfect world, however, there are formidable obstacles stand-
ing in the way of a negotiated commons project, over and above inertia, that
would have to be removed.  Initially, the very concept of an e-commons needs
to be sold to skeptical elements of the scientific community whose services are
indispensable to its development.  Academic institutions, science funders, the
research community, and other interested parties must then successfully negoti-
ate and stipulate the pacts needed to establish it, as well as the legal framework
to implement it.  Transaction costs would need to be monitored closely and,
whenever possible, reduced throughout the development phases.
Once the research universities became wholeheartedly committed to the
idea of a regime that guaranteed them universal access to, and shared use of,
625. See Eben Moglen, Why the FSF Gets Copyright Assignments from Contributors, at
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/why-assign.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2002); see also supra notes 572-581
and accompanying text.
626. See supra notes 599-601, 604-606 and accompanying text.
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the government-funded data that they had collectively generated, these organ-
izational problems might seem relatively minor.  The difficulties of winning
such a commitment, however, cannot be over-estimated in a world where uni-
versity administrators are already conflicted about the efforts of their technol-
ogy transfer offices to exploit commercially valuable databases in the genomic
sciences and other disciplines with significant potential for commercial devel-
opment.  The prospect that Congress will eventually adopt a hybrid intellectual
property right in collections of data could make these same administrators
reluctant to lock their institutions into a kind of voluntary pool of any resulting
exclusive property rights, even for public scientific research purposes.627
Conceptually, the problems inherent in organizing a pool of intellectual
property rights so as to preserve access to, and use of, a common resource have
become much better understood than in the past—owing to the experience
gained from both the open-source software movement and the new Creative
Commons initiative.628  These projects demonstrate that there are few, if any,
technical obstacles that cannot be overcome by adroitly directing relevant
exclusive rights and standard-form contracts to public, rather than private, pur-
poses.
The deeper problem is persuading university administrators that they stand
to gain more from open access to each others’ databases in a horizontally
organized research commons than they stand to lose from licensing data to each
other under more restrictive, case-by-case transactions.  The more that “the
nature of the rivalry between . . . [universities] would shift from cooperative
competition to turf wars, with rival networks of partners looking to delay, deter,
and defend themselves against competitors,”629 the more they could make
research data artificially scarce for them all.  While we believe they stand to
gain more from open access, following the implications of that conviction could
amount to an act of faith, albeit one that resonates with the established norms
of science and the primary mission of universities.
To the extent that universities may have to be sold on the benefits of an e-
commons for data, with a view to rationalizing and modifying their disparate
licensing policies, this project would require statesmanship, especially on the
part of the leading research universities.  It may also require pressure from the
major government funders and standard-setting initiatives by scientific sub-
communities.  Funding agencies, in particular, must be prepared to discipline
would-be holdouts and to discourage other forms of deviant strategic behavior
that could undermine the cohesiveness of those institutions willing to pool their
resources.630
627. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 113 n.204 (noting failure to negotiate an improved version of the Uni-
form Biological Materials Transfer Agreement of 1995 and major deviations from that Agreement in
inter-university transactions).
628. See supra notes 571-579 and accompanying text.
629. Powell, supra note 13, at 266.
630. Account will have to be taken as well of the universities’ patenting interests, which will need to
be suitably accommodated.
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
444 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:315
Assuming a sufficient degree of organizational momentum, there remains
the thorny problem of establishing the terms and conditions under which par-
ticipating universities could contribute their data to a horizontally organized
research commons.  The bulk of the departments and sub-disciplines involved
would almost certainly prefer a bright-line rule that required all deposits of
government-funded data to be made without conditions and subject to no
restrictions on use.  This preference follows from the fact that most science
departments currently see no realistic prospects for licensing basic research
data, even to the private sector, and have not yet experienced the proprietary
temptations of exclusive ownership that a sui generis intellectual property right
in non-copyrightable databases might eventually confer.
At the same time, such a bright-line rule could utterly deter those sub-disci-
plines that already license data on commercial terms to either the private or
public sectors, or that contemplate doing so in the near future.  These sub-disci-
plines would not readily forego these opportunities and would, on the contrary,
insist that any multilateral negotiations to establish a horizontal commons
devise contractual templates that protected their commercial interests in the
vertical dimension.  If, moreover, Congress enacts a de facto exclusive property
right in collections of data, it would probably deter other components of the
scientific community, who might become unwilling to forego either the prospec-
tive commercial opportunities or other strategic advantages such rights might
make possible.
A bright-line rule requiring unconditional deposits in all cases could thus
defeat the goal of linking all university generators of government-funded data
in a single, horizontally organized research commons.  At the same time, the
goal of universality could, paradoxically, require negotiators seeking to estab-
lish the system to deviate from the norm of full and open access by allowing a
second type of conditional deposit of data into the horizontal domain by those
disciplines or departments that are unwilling to jeopardize present or future
commercial opportunities.
iii. Resolving the Paradox of Conditional Deposits
Science policy in the United States has long disfavored a two-tiered system
for the distribution of government-funded data.631  Under such a system, data-
base proprietors envision split (or two-tier) uses of commercially valuable data
and will only make them available on conditions that govern the different types
of uses they have expressly permitted. In practice, there is growing evidence
that, with regard to the exchange of biotechnology research tools, at least, uni-
versity scientists “appear . . . to be creating a two-tiered market.”632
Formalized, split-level arrangements typically distinguish between relatively
631. Such two-tiered systems for government or academic data distribution have been favored and
promoted by the scientific community in the E.U., but these initiatives have been strongly opposed by
U.S. science agencies and academics.  See, e.g., FULL AND OPEN EXCHANGE, supra note 8.
632. Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 242 (comparing the “free exchange tier” with the
“proprietary tier” in the emerging two-tiered market in the exchange of research tools).
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unrestricted uses for basic research purposes by nonprofit entities and more
restricted uses for commercial applications by private firms that license data
from scientific entities.633  The latter conditions may range from a simple menu
of price-discriminated payment options to more complicated provisions that
regulate certain data extractions, seek grant-backs of follow-on applications by
second-comers, or impose reach-through clauses seeking legal or equitable
rights in subsequent products.634  In some cases, moreover, the distinction
between profit and nonprofit uses of scientific data becomes blurred, and the
two categories may overlap, which adds to the cost and complications of
administration.635  For example, universities may treat some databases as com-
mercial research tools and impose a price discrimination policy that provides
access to the research community at a lower cost than to for-profit entities.636
We recognize that a decision to allow participating universities to make
conditional deposits of government-funded data to a collectively managed
research consortium represents a second-best solution: one that conflicts with
the goal of establishing a true public domain based on the premise of full and
open access to all users.  The allowance of restrictions on use breaks up the con-
tinuity of data flows across the public sector and necessitates administrative
measures and transaction costs to monitor and enforce differentiated uses.  It
also entails measures to prevent unacceptable leakage between the horizontal
and vertical planes, and may result in charges for public-interest uses that
exceed the marginal cost of delivery, even in the horizontal plane.
We nonetheless doubt that a drive for totally unconditional deposits of gov-
ernment-funded data could succeed in the face of mounting worldwide pressure
to commoditize scientific data,637 and we fear that excessive reliance on the
633. Cf. UNIF. BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS TRANSFER AGREEMENT (UBMTA) (1995), available at
http://www.autm.net/UBMTA/intro.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2003) (allowing academic recipients of
biological materials to use them, for noncommercial teaching and research purposes without having to
negotiate a licensing agreement).
634. Cf., e.g., Eisenberg, Patenting Research Tools , supra note 123; Eckersley et al., supra note 610;
Frischmann, supra note 70; Rai, supra note 34, at 113 n.204.
635. The importance of this distinction diminishes to the extent that any data provider—whether
operating in industry or academia—actually accepts the conditions that contractually regulate the
research commons.  That is a major objective of our proposals.
636. This approach becomes likely when there is a private sector partner.  Cf. Rai, supra note 34, at
111.  Scientific data can also be made available in a “conditional public domain” through complicated
three-way funding arrangements typically initiated by government science agencies under Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements (“CRADAs”).  Complications in this instance arise from ten-
sions between the government’s continued interest in promoting public access and the legislative poli-
cies embodied in the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourage commoditization of government-funded
research results.  Even here, however, the fact that the government’s financial contribution to the
project may predominate gives it the clout to impose conditions favorable to public-interest research
uses.  At present, this power is not sufficienctly utilized.  Cf. Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note
121; Rai & Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole, supra note 117, at 297-300.  But a major purpose of establishing a
solid legal framework for conditional deposits would be to provide standard-form licenses that clearly
reinforce and implement favorable public-interest terms and conditions, without unduly compromising
the relevant commercial interests.
637. European governments have already embarked on a policy of commercial exploitation of pub-
licly generated data and even insist on conditional deposits in various governmental scientific organiza-
tions and cooperative research activities.  Some academic scientific communities have recently tried to
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orthodox position would, in the end, undermine—rather than save—the sharing
ethos.638  Even if one disregards the prospects for strengthened intellectual
property protection of non-copyrightable databases, too many universities have
already begun to perceive the potential financial benefits they might reap from
commercial exploitation of genomic databases in particular and biotech-related
databases in general.  Their reluctance to contribute such data to a research
commons that allowed private firms freely to appropriate that same data could
not easily be overcome.639
Even if a consortium of universities were to formally consent to such an
unconditional arrangement, their technology transfer offices might soon be
demanding an exceptional status for any databases that contained components
produced without government funds.640  They could persuasively argue that pri-
vate funds for most jointly created data products could decrease or even dry up
if both customers and competitors could readily obtain the bulk of the data
from the public domain.  Once it became clear that an admixture of privately
funded data could elicit the right to deposit data in a research commons on
conditions that protected commercial exploitation of the databases in question,
academics with an eye to cost recovery and profit maximization would logically
make persistent efforts to qualify for this treatment.  They would thus seek
more private investment for this purpose or obtain the university’s own funds
for the project.  Either way, there would be a perverse incentive to privatize
more data than ever if the only legitimate way to avoid dedicating it all to the
public domain was to show that some of it had been privatized.
In other words, if the quasi-public research space accommodated only
unconditional deposits of data, it could foster an insuperable holdout problem
as participating universities found ways to detach and isolate their commercially
valuable databases from such a system.  In these circumstances, a failure to
obtain a best-case scenario premised on full and open access would quickly
degenerate into a worst-case scenario, characterized by growing gaps in the
communally accessible collection and an unraveling of the sharing ethos that
commercialize biotechnology databases of considerable public research value on a two-tiered basis, see,
e.g., Maurer, Across Two Worlds, supra note 34, while others have succeeded with controversial results,
see the discussion of the Swiss-PROT at supra notes 599-606 and accompanying text.  The reality is that
U.S. universities intend to commercialize some of their data and support minimalist legislation to this
end.
638. While we sympathize with the philosophy behind this position, our six years of focused study
on issues concerning the legal protection of databases compels us to consider the realities of a growing
trend toward two-tiered distributive activities to determine whether such activities can be operated in a
manner that preserves the benefits of a public domain, notwithstanding the mounting pressures for
commoditization.  See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 18; Reichman & Uhlir, Database Protection,
supra note 4.
639. Adoption of a database protection law would then magnify this reluctance and encourage the
respective technology transfer offices to find more ways to commercially exploit more of the govern-
ment-funded data products that were subsequently invested with proprietary rights.  If the Bayh-Dole
philosophy is factored into this equation, the prospects for persuading the universities both to agree
and actually enforce a true public-domain model for all government-funded databases appear dim
indeed.  Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 109-11 (describing impact of Bayh-Dole on prior research norms).
640. Cf. id. at 110-11 (describing growth of joint ventures and impact on MTAs).
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would require case-by-case construction of inter-university data flows, and
could sometimes culminate in bargaining to impasse.641
In our estimation, the worst-case scenario is so bad, and the pressure to
commoditize could become so great in the presence of a strong database right,
that steps must be taken to ensure universal participation in a contractually
reconstructed research commons from the outset by judiciously allowing condi-
tional deposits of government-funded data on standard terms and conditions to
which all stakeholders have previously agreed.  Indeed, the goal is to develop
negotiated contractual templates that clearly reinforce and implement terms
and conditions favorable to public research without unduly compromising the
ability of the consortium’s member universities to undertake commercial rela-
tions with the private sector.
At stake in this process is not just a few thousand patentable inventions, but,
rather, every government-funded data product that has potential commercial
value to other universities as a research tool or educational device.  Sound data
management policies thus point to a second- best solution that would preserve
the integrity of the inter-university commons by disallowing the principal
ground on which concerted holdout actions might take root, by ensuring that
only research-friendly terms and conditions applied in both the horizontal and
vertical dimensions,642 and by making it too costly for any institution to deviate
from the agreed regulatory framework governing the two-tiered regime.
Those who object to this proposal will argue that it unduly undermines the
full and open access principle by tempting more and more university depart-
ments or sub-disciplines to opt for conditional deposits than would otherwise
have been the case.  On this view, once a negotiated two-tiered model was set in
place, universities would come under intense pressure to avoid the true public
domain or open access option even when there was no need to do so.
However, a universal and functionally effective inter-university research
commons simply cannot be constructed with a bright-line, true public domain
rule applied across the board for the reasons we have previously set out.  A
bright-line rule also carries with it the well-recognized difficulty of distinguish-
ing for-profit from not-for-profit research activities when single laboratories
increasingly engage in both.  In contrast, a regime based on conditional deposits
overcomes this problem by allowing a scientific entity to contribute to and
benefit from the data commons so long as it respects the agreed norms bearing
on that arrangement.  In this respect, a normative accommodation will have
displaced legal distinctions that cannot feasibly be enforced.643
641. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 266 (predicting “disputes, duplication, and discord” in anala-
gous situations).
642. Data managed by a consortium would presumably also be subject to its agreed contractual
templates regulating the licensing of government-funded data to the private sector.  See discussion
supra, at Part IV.C.1.c..
643. Cf. Rai, supra note 33 (expressing preference for normative solutions).
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Moreover, the very contractual templates that make the construction of
such a commons feasible in a two-tiered system should also mitigate its social
costs.  Even if conditional deposits are allowed, many sub-disciplines will con-
tinue to have no commercial prospects and no need to invoke the contractual
templates that regulate them.  When this is the case, peer pressure reinforced by
the funding agencies should make it difficult, if not impractical, for members of
those communities to opt out of the traditional practice of making data avail-
able unconditionally.644
When, instead, given communities find themselves forced to deal with seri-
ous commercial pressures, the negotiated contractual solutions that enable
them to make data conditionally available for public research purposes should
also tend to preserve and implement the norms of science.  In particular, the
applicable contractual templates should immunize deposited data from the
vagaries of case-by-case transactions under the aegis of university technology
transfer offices645 and should also limit the kinds of restrictions private-sector
partners might otherwise seek to impose on universities.
At the end of the day, a set of agreed contractual templates permitting con-
ditional deposits in the interest of a horizontally linked research commons
would provide a tool universities could use with more or less wisdom.  If used
wisely, this tool should ensure that more data are made available to a contrac-
tually reconstructed research commons than would be possible if member uni-
versities could not protect the interests of their commercial partners.  This same
tool may also provide incentives for the private sector to work with universities
to produce better data products than the latter alone could generate with their
limited funds.
iv. Other Hard Problems
Allowing universities to deposit government-funded data into a contractu-
ally reconstructed research commons, on conditions designed to protect their
commercial relations with the private sector, solves two difficult problems.
First, it avoids the risk that large quantities of government-funded data would
remain outside the system on the ground that they had been commingled with
privately funded components.  Second, it ensures that any negotiated contrac-
tual templates the research consortium adopts to govern its horizontal space
will apply to all the data holdings within its jurisdiction, including databases to
which the private sector had contributed.  However, it does not automatically
determine the precise conditions that the agreed contractual templates should
apply to inter-university licensing of data within their collective jurisdiction.  In
the process of defining these conditions, moreover, those who negotiated the
644. Cf. id. at 112 (“Major research universities have sought to maintain certain aspects of tradi-
tional scientific norms even while embracing the development-promoting aspects of property rights.”)
(citing examples).
645. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 243 (stressing the extent to which technology
transfer professionals “become ever more wary of free exchange and more assiduous about restricting
its domain”).
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multilateral pact between universities, federal funders, and scientific bodies
needed to launch the consortium would have to resolve a number of conten-
tious issues.
The guiding principle that should apply to inter-university licensing of data
available from the quasi-public space is that depositors may not impose any
conditions that impede the customary and traditional uses of scientific data for
nonprofit research purposes.  A logical corollary is that they should affirma-
tively adopt the measures that may prove necessary to extend and apply this
principle to the online environment.646  Because the data under discussion are
government-funded for academic purposes to begin with, the open access and
sharing norms of science should then color any specific implementing templates
that regulate access and use.
(a) Access.  With regard to access, the customary mode of implementing
these norms would be to make data available to other nonprofit institutions at
no more than the marginal cost of delivery.  In the online environment, these
marginal costs are essentially zero.  This represents the preferred option when-
ever the costs of maintaining the data collection are defrayed by public subsidy
or by non-exclusive licenses to private firms in the vertical dimension.
If, however, the policy of free or marginally priced access appears unable to
sustain the cost of managing a given project at the inter-university level, an
incremental pricing structure may become unavoidable.  The options for such a
pricing structure range from a formula allowing partial incremental cost recov-
ery when a project is partially subsidized to a formula providing full cost recov-
ery when this is necessary to keep the data collection alive.647  Examples of sub-
communities that have found it necessary to rely on the second option are
largely in the laboratory physical sciences.648
The prices charged other nonprofit users to access data in the research
commons should never exceed the full incremental cost of managing the collec-
tive holdings.  This premise follows from the fact that the initial cost of collect-
ing or creating the data was defrayed by the government or some combination
of sources (including private sources) that normally subscribe to the open access
principle.
When, however, private firms have defrayed a substantial part of the cost of
generating the database in question, there are few, if any, standard solutions.
646. Cf. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 268, at art. 10; Agreed Statement Concerning art. 10,
WIPO.doc.CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 20, 1996).
647. This may be accomplished through a paying inter-university consortium, such as the Inter-Uni-
versity Consortium for Political and Social Research (“ICPSR”) at the University of Michigan, or by
means of more ad hoc cost-recovery methods. Institutional membership dues for the year 2002 ranged
from $2,000 per year for institutions in developing countries to $15,000 per year for full membership
status by large U.S. institutions. See Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
648. Databases operated on a cost recovery basis may be found primarily in the areas of ceramic,
pharmaceutical, chemical, and metallurgical research, as well as in state-of-the-art manufacturing
operations.  Telephone Interview with Prof. Robert L. Snyder, Ohio St. Univ. (Aug. 30, 2002).
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Occasionally, even a private partner might view the collective holdings as a
valuable resource for its own pursuits, to which it agrees to contribute on an
eleemosynary basis.649  In the more typical cases, the private partner is likely to
view the research community as the target market for a database it paid to cre-
ate and from which it must derive its expected profits.650
In that event, the collection of additional revenues from private sector
access charges should depend entirely on freedom of contract, while a likely
demand that public research users pay access charges that exceed data man-
agement costs would pose a hard question.  On the one hand, as beneficiaries of
government funding, the universities should forego profits from charges levied
to access their partly publicly funded databases for public research purposes.
On the other hand, a private partner will not readily forego such profits, espe-
cially if it had invested in the project precisely because of its potential commer-
cial value as a research tool.651  If the university shared these profits with its pri-
vate partner, this practice would deviate from the basic principle governing
inter-university access generally, and would encourage other universities to
seek private partners for this purpose, which in turn would yield both social
costs and benefits.
In these cases, care must be taken to avoid adopting policies that would dis-
courage either the formation of public-private partnerships for the development
of socially beneficial data products or the inclusion of such products in a hori-
zontal, quasi-public research space.  At the same time, there is a potential loop-
hole here that would allow universities to deviate from the general rules appli-
cable to that space if the private partner could impose market-driven access
rights for nonprofit research purposes, and its partner university shared in those
profits.
We know of no standard formula for resolving this problem.  If the database
is also of interest to the private sector, price discrimination and product differ-
entiation are the preferred techniques for reducing access charges levied for
public research.  In any event, the trustees that manage the inter-university
system should monitor and evaluate these charges, and their power to challenge
unreasonable or excessive demands would become especially important in the
absence of any alternative or competing source of supply.652
This strategy, however, begs the question of whether and to what extent the
universities should be allowed to retain their share of the profits from access
649. Cf. Rai, supra note 33, at 114 (discussing case of Celera’s refraining from claiming certain
intellectual property rights in the genome).
650. Cf. id. at 111, 141 (documenting restrictive conditions imposed upon researchers under MTAs
arising from joint ventures between universities and private firms).
651. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bargaining, supra note 13, at 229 (“When one research institution’s
research tool is another firm’s end product, it is difficult to agree upon a universe of materials that
should be exchanged on standardized terms.”).
652. Because the data in question are partly government-funded by definition, a reasonable terms
and conditions clause should automatically apply.
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charges levied against public research users.653  As matters stand, this is an issue
that can only be addressed by the relevant discipline communities themselves,
in the absence of some general norm that would not pose insuperable adminis-
trative burdens to implement.
(b) Use.  Once access to databases available to the research commons has
legitimately been gained, further restrictions on uses of the relevant data should
be kept to a minimum.  In principle, contractual restrictions on reuse of publicly
funded data for nonprofit research purposes should not be permitted.  This
principle need not impede the use of conditions that require attribution or
credit from researchers who make use of such data,654 and it can also be recon-
ciled with provisions that defer access by certain users for specified periods of
time or impose restrictions on competing publications for a certain period of
time.655
This ideal principle runs into trouble, however, when confronted with the
difficult problem posed by commercially valuable follow-on applications
derived from databases made available to the research commons.  It is one
thing to posit that the academic beneficiaries of publicly funded research should
be limited to the recovery of costs through access charges and should not be
entitled to additional claims for follow-on uses by other nonprofit researchers.
Quite different situations arise when the funding is public, but a private firm has
invested its own resources to develop a follow-on application for commercial
pursuits or when the initial data-generating project entailed a mix of private and
public funds and the product subsequently gives rise to a commercially valuable
follow-on application.  These hard cases become even harder if the follow-on
product primarily derives its commercial value from being a research tool uni-
versities themselves need to acquire.
Assuming, as we do, that a primary objective of any negotiated solution is to
avoid gaps in the data made available for public research purposes in the hori-
zontal domain, there is an obvious need for agreed contractual templates that
would respect and preserve the commercial interests in the vertical plane identi-
fied above.  This goal directly conflicts, however, with the most idealistic option
set out above, which is to freely allow all follow-on applications based on data
made available to the research commons, regardless of the commercial pros-
pects or purposes and without any compensatory obligation beyond access
charges (if any).
This option would represent a true public domain approach to government-
funded data and would fit within the traditional legal framework applied in the
past to collections of data.  However, it might be expected to discourage public-
private partnerships formed to exploit follow-on applications of publicly funded
653. If these charges were administered by trustees or designated agents, they could be redistributed
in the form of grants.  Cf. Eckersley et al., supra note 610, at 10.
654. See, e.g., discussion of the Creative Commons templates, supra note 579.
655. Cf. Patrinos & Drell, supra note 23.
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databases, contrary to the philosophy behind the Bayh-Dole Act, although this
risk is tempered by the fact that all would-be competitors who invested in such
follow-on applications would find themselves on equal footing in this respect.
This option would certainly discourage public-private partnerships formed to
produce scientific databases from making them available to the commons if that
decision automatically deprived them of any rights to follow-on applications.
A second option is to leave the problem of commercially valuable follow-on
applications to freedom of contract, in which case universities and their private
partners could license whom they please and exclude the rest.  This solution is
consistent with proposals to enact a de facto exclusive property right in non-
copyrightable databases and with the philosophy behind Bayh-Dole.  It would
also alleviate disincentives to make databases derived from a mix of public and
private funds available to the nonprofit research community.
However, this second option would relegate the problem of follow-on appli-
cations to the universities’ technology transfer offices once again, which might
be tempted routinely to impose the kind of grant-back and reach-through
clauses that are already said to generate anticommons effects in biotechnology656
and are inconsistent with the dual nature of data as both inputs and outputs of
innovation.  Just as a true public domain approach tends unintentionally to
impoverish the commons we seek to construct, so too a true laissez-faire
approach undermines the effectiveness of that same commons and triggers a
race to the bottom, as universities seek private partners solely for the purpose
of occupying a privileged position with respect to follow-on applications.
A third option is freely to allow follow-on applications of databases made
available to the research commons for commercial purposes while requiring
their producers to pay reasonable compensation for such uses under a prede-
termined menu that fixes a range of royalties for a specified period of time.657
For maximum effect, a corollary “no holdout” provision should obligate all uni-
versities engaged in public-private database initiatives to make the resulting
databases available to the research commons under this compensatory liability
framework.
This approach would enable investors in public-private database initiatives
to make their data available for public research purposes without depriving
them of revenue flows from follow-on applications needed to cover the costs of
R & D or the opportunities to turn a profit.  At the same time, it would avoid
impeding access to the data for either commercial or noncommercial purposes,
in which aspect it would mimic a true public domain and create no barriers to
entry.658  Moreover, a compensatory liability approach would implement the
656. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 33 at 149.
657. For details, see discussion of compensatory liability approach in Reichman, Of Green Tulips,
supra note 164.  See also Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 164; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note
18, at 145-51.
658. Transaction costs can be kept low by means of standard-form deals administered by the man-
agers of the system.  See Eckersley et al., supra note 610, at 10-11 (proposing collective licensing organi-
zation for analogous purposes).
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policies behind the Bayh-Dole Act without the overkill that occurs when pub-
licly funded research results are subjected to exclusive property rights that
impoverish the public domain and create barriers to entry to boot.
These, or other, options would require further study and analysis as part of
the larger process of reconstructing the research commons we propose.  It
should be clear, moreover, that any solutions adopted at the outset must be
viewed as experimental and subject to review in light of actual results.
2. Informal Data Exchanges
As constituted at the present time, the zone of informal data exchange is
populated by single researchers or laboratories or by small teams of associated
researchers whose work is typically expected to lead to future publications.
Because this zone operates largely in a pre-publication environment, the con-
straints of government funders on uses of data are relatively less prescriptive,
and a considerable amount of the data being produced may not be funded by
federal agencies at all.  If funding is provided by other nonprofit sources or by
state governments, the end results still pertain to public science and its ultimate
disclosure norms, but the controls are not standardized.  To the extent that pri-
vate sector funding is also involved, even the norms of public science may not
apply.
Quantitatively, the amount of scientific data held in this informal zone
appears large.  Despite the relative degree of invisibility that pre-publication
status confers, these holdings are also of immense qualitative importance for
cutting-edge research endeavors.  Although these data may not be as well pre-
pared as those released for broad, open use in conjunction with a publication,
they typically reflect the most recent findings.
Moreover, this informal sector seems destined to grow even more important
in the near future as it increasingly absorbs scientific data that were not released
at publication as well as data researchers continue to compile after publication.
If Congress were to adopt a strong intellectual property right in non-copy-
rightable databases, this informal zone could expand further to include all the
published data covered by an exclusive property right that had not otherwise
been dedicated to the public domain.
As previously discussed, actual secrecy is taken for granted in this zone, and
disclosure depends on individually brokered transactions often based on reci-
procity or some quid pro quo.659  These fragile data streams, which have always
been tenuous due to personal and strategic considerations, have increasingly
broken down owing to denials of access and to a trading mentality steeped in
commercial concerns that is displacing the sharing ethos.
Our previous analysis showed that, left to themselves, the legal and eco-
nomic pressures operating in the informal zone are likely to further reduce dis-
closures over time and make the informal data exchange process resemble that
659. See supra notes 482-484 and accompanying text.
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of the private sector.660  That trend, in turn, undermines the new opportunities to
link even highly distributed data holdings in virtual archives or to experiment
with new forms of collaborative research on a distributed, autonomous basis, as
digital networks have recently made possible.  The positive synergies expected
from organized peer-to-peer file sharing on an open access basis cannot be
realized if researchers decline to make data available at all out of a fear of sacri-
ficing new-found commercial opportunities or other strategic advantages.  Nor
will these new opportunities fully develop if those who are nominally willing to
make data available impose onerous licensing terms and conditions—reinforced
by intellectual property rights—that multiply transaction costs, unduly restrict
the range of scientific uses permitted, or otherwise embroil those uses in anti-
commons effects.
Here, the immediate goal of science policy should be to reduce the techni-
cal, legal, and institutional obstacles that impede electronic peer-to-peer file
exchange and to generally facilitate exchanges of data on the most open terms
possible across a horizontal or quasi-public space.  At the same time, the meas-
ures adopted to implement this policy must avoid compromising or inhibiting
the interests of individual participants who seek commercial application of their
research results in a private or vertical sphere of operations.  This two-pronged
approach could stabilize the status quo and reinvigorate the flagging coopera-
tive ethos in the zone of informal data exchange, as more individual researchers
and small communities experience the benefits of electronically linked access to
virtual archives and discover the productive gains likely to flow from collabora-
tive, interdisciplinary, and cross-sectoral uses.
From an institutional perspective, however, organizing and implementing
such a two-pronged approach to data exchange in the informal zone presents
certain difficulties not encountered in the formal zone of inter-university rela-
tions.  Here, the playing field is much broader, the players are more autono-
mous and unruly, and the power of federal funders directly to impose top-down
regulations has traditionally been weak or under-utilized.  The moral authority
of these funders nonetheless remains strong, and peer pressure in support of the
sharing ethos would become more effective if a consensus developed that the
two-pronged approach we envision actually yields tangible benefits at accept-
able costs.
Much therefore depends on short-term, bottom-up initiatives that rely on
individual decisions to opt for standardized, research-friendly licensing agree-
ments in place of the defensive, ad hoc transactions that currently hinder the
flow of data streams in this sector.  The solution is to provide individual re-
searchers with a toolkit for constructing prefabricated exchange transactions on
community-approved terms and conditions.  The toolkit would contain a menu
of standard-form contractual templates that individual researchers could use to
license data, and the templates adopted would be posted online to facilitate
660. See supra Part III.C.1.a.ii (discussing the effects of a highly protectionist regime on informal
data exchanges).
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electronic access to networks of nodes.661  These templates would cover a variety
of situations and offer a range of ad hoc choices, all aimed at maximizing disclo-
sure in both digital and non-digital mediums for public research purposes.
For this endeavor to succeed, however, the templates in question would
clearly need to allow participating researchers and their communities to make
data available on conditions that expressly preclude licensees from unauthor-
ized commercial uses or follow-on applications.  While this suggests the need to
deviate from true public domain principles once again, one should remember
that, in the informal zone as it stands today and is likely to develop, secrecy and
denial of access are already well-established, countervailing practices.  One can
hardly argue that permitting conditional availability would undermine the
norms of science in this zone, given the inability of those norms to adequately
defend the interests of public research in unrestricted flows of data at the pres-
ent time.
The object is, rather, to invigorate those sharing norms by reconciling them
with the commercial needs and opportunities of the researchers operating in the
informal zone, in order to elicit more overall benefits for public science under a
second-best arrangement than could be expected to emerge from brokered
individual transactions in a high-protectionist legal environment.  This strategy
requires a judicious resort to conditionality that would make it possible to forge
digitally networked links between individual data suppliers and that would let
their data flow across those links into a quasi-public space relatively free of
restrictions on access and use for commercial purposes.
Given the large number of players and the disparity of interests at stake, a
logical starting premise is that only a small number of standard contractual
templates seems likely to win the support of the general scientific community, at
least initially.  A true public domain option should, of course, be available for
all willing to use it.  For the rest, a limited menu of conditional public domain
provisions, such as those offered by the Creative Commons, should suffice.662
Clauses that delay certain uses for a specified period, or that delay competing
publications based on, or derived from, a particular database for a specified
period of time should also pass muster, so long as they remain consistent with
the practices of the relevant scientific sub-community.  In the absence of any
underlying intellectual property right, an additional clause reserving all other
rights and excluding unauthorized commercial uses and applications would
complete the limited, “copyleft” concept.  We believe that even a small number
of standard contractual templates that facilitate access to and use of scientific
data for public research purposes could exert a disproportionately large impact
on the increasingly open, collaborative work in the networked environment.
In the scientific milieu, however, difficult problems of leakage and enforce-
ment could also arise.  To address these problems, the scientific community,
661. See Creative Commons, supra note 571 and accompanying text.
662. See discussion supra, note 579.
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perhaps under the auspices of the American Association for the Advancement
of Science, would need to consider developing institutional machinery capable
of assisting individual researchers who feared that their data had been used in
ways that violated the terms and conditions of the standard-form licensing
agreements they elected to employ.
More complex or refined contractual templates are also feasible, but their
use should normally depend less on individual choice and more on the consen-
sus approval of discipline-specific communities.  Moreover, in the informal
zone, efforts to influence the terms and conditions applicable to private-sector
uses seem much less likely to succeed than similar efforts in the inter-university
context.663
Attempts to over-regulate the zone of informal data exchange should gener-
ally be avoided at this stage, lest they stir up unwarranted controversy and deter
the more ambitious efforts to regulate inter-university transactions described
above.  The success of those efforts in the zone of formal data exchanges should
greatly reinforce the norms of science generally.  It would also exert consider-
able indirect pressure on those operating in the informal zone to respect those
norms and emulate at least the spirit of any agreed contractual templates that
had proved their merit in that context.
The more that universities succeed in amalgamating their government-
funded holdings into an effective, virtual archive or repository, the more pres-
sure that would bring to bear on individual researchers, research teams, and
small communities to similarly make their data available in more formally con-
stituted repositories.  As a body of practice develops in both the formal and
informal zones, the most successful approaches and standards will become
broadly adopted, and the desire to obtain the greater benefits likely to flow
from more formalized arrangements should grow.664
Meanwhile, efforts to regulate the zone of informal data exchanges should
be viewed as an opportunity to strengthen the norms of science and to facilitate
the creation of virtual networked archives electronically linking disparate and
highly distributed data-holders.  The overall objective should be to generate
more disclosure than would otherwise have been possible if all the players exer-
cised their proprietary rights in total disregard of the need for a functioning
research commons for nonprofit scientific pursuits.  If successful, these modest
efforts in the informal zone could alleviate some of the most disturbing erosions
of the sharing ethos that have already occurred, and could encourage federal
funding agencies to take a more active role in regulating broader uses of
research data.  A successful application of “copyleft” techniques to the informal
zone of academic research could also serve as a model for encouraging disclo-
sure for public research purposes of more data generated in the private sector.
663. It seems unlikely, for example, that any standard grant-back or reach-through clauses for com-
mercial applications of databases could serve the varied interests of the different communities operat-
ing in the informal zone.
664. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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D. Proposals for the Private Sector
Scientific data produced by the private sector are logically subject to any
and all of the proprietary rights that may become available, as surveyed earlier
in this article.665  Here, the policy behind a contractually reconstructed research
commons is not to defend the norms of science so much as to persuade the pri-
vate sector of the benefits it stands to gain from sharing its own data with the
scientific community for public research purposes.  The goal is thus to promote
voluntary contributions that might not otherwise be made to the true public
domain or to the conditional domain for public research purposes on favorable
terms and conditions.666
From the perspective of public-interest research, of course, corporate con-
tributions of otherwise proprietary data to a true public domain is the preferred
option.  While the copyright paradigm reflected in the Supreme Court’s Feist
decision presumably made the factual contents of commercially valuable com-
pilations published in hard copy available for such purposes,667 some federal
appellate courts have lately rebelled against Feist and made it harder for sec-
ond-comers to separate non-copyrightable facts and information from the
elements of original selection and arrangement that still attract copyright pro-
tection.668
Online access to non-copyrightable facts and data is further restricted by the
stronger regime that prohibits tampering with technological fences that was
embodied in the DMCA,669 although the full impact of these provisions on scien-
tific pursuits remains to be seen.  Meanwhile, many commercial database pub-
lishers may be expected to continue to lobby hard for a strong database protec-
tion law on the E.U. model that would limit unauthorized extraction or reuse of
the non-copyrightable contents of factual compilations, and it appears likely
that Congress will seek to enact a database protection statute in 2004.670
In contrast to the research-friendly legal rules under the print paradigm, all
the factual data and non-copyrightable information collected in proprietary
databases are increasingly unlikely to enter the public domain and will instead
come freighted with the restricted licensing agreements, digital rights manage-
ment technologies, and sui generis intellectual property rights that characterize
a high-protectionist legal environment.  Under such a regime, open access and
unrestricted use become possible only if private-sector database compilers
donate their data to public repositories or contractually agree to waive proprie-
665. See discussion supra, Parts II.C, III.B.2.
666. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-
Scale cDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 557, 559 (1996); Rai, supra note 33, at 134
(discussing Merck & Co.’s practice of putting into the public domain the results of an EST identifica-
tion project it sponsored at Washington University).
667. See supra notes 78, 85-89 and accompanying text.
668. See supra notes 283-287 and accompanying text.
669. See discussion supra, Part III.B.2.b.
670. See supra note 376.
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tary restrictions on controls that would otherwise impede access and use for
public research purposes.671
Some examples of both donated and contractually stipulated public domain
data collections from the private sector already exist.  In the first category, for
instance, three major energy companies recently donated large collections of
proprietary rock samples to the University of Texas at Austin.672  The samples
and related data are managed as a public research resource by the University.
The companies also donated land, buildings, equipment, and additional funds to
provide the physical infrastructure and a partial endowment for operating
expenses, while retaining no proprietary interest in the donated materials.673
An example of the second type of arrangement is the SNP Consortium Ltd.,
a nonprofit foundation created by thirteen pharmaceutical and information
technology companies and Wellcome Trust, whose stated purpose is to provide
genomic data to the public domain.674  The motivation for this apparent corpo-
rate largess was to save substantial money by pooling resources and to prevent
any other private sector entity from capturing the data or otherwise encumber-
ing access to them.675  The Consortium partners have found this approach to be
very successful.  Instead of spending $250 million to identify 150,000 single
nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”), 676 as was originally estimated by one of the
partners, the shared project cost amounted to $44 million and yielded almost 1.8
million SNPs—all freely available to researchers on the open website.677  Two
other projects are now being planned by the SNP Consortium partners using
the same public domain model—a protein structures consortium and a public
DNA database in the United Kingdom, the latter in collaboration with the
Department of Health and the Medical Research Council.678
Although pure public domain models initiated by industry will no doubt
continue to be the exception rather than the rule, the availability of data on a
conditional public domain basis, or at least on preferential terms and conditions
to the not-for-profit research community, should enjoy far broader acceptance
and ought to be promoted.  Certainly, the existence of contractual templates,
671. This will also depend to a large extent on the exceptions for nonprofit research built into the
database protection law itself.
672. See Shirley Dutton, Corporate Donations of Geophysical Data, in NRC SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 10; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GEOSCIENCE COLLECTIONS AND DATA:
NATIONAL RESOURCES IN PERIL, (2002) at 25 (detailing no examples of transfer from corporate-
owned repositories to state geological surveys).
673. Dutton, supra note 672.
674. See SNP Consortium at http://snp.cshl.org/ (last updated Feb. 5, 2003).
675. Michael Morgan, The SNP Consortium, in NRC SYMPOSIUM, supra note 10.
676. Single nucleotide polymorphisms are common DNA sequence variations among individuals.
Although approximately 99.9% of the three billion nucleotides in each person are identical, there are
nonetheless three million differences in the remaining 0.1% that are distributed throughout the three
billion nucleotides.  By identifying and mapping out these differences, it then becomes possible to cor-
relate them with human susceptibility to disease (for example, diabetes or cancer) and their respon-
siveness to various drug therapies.  See Morgan, supra note 675.
677. Id.
678. Id.
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along the lines being developed by the Creative Commons, could help to
encourage private sector entities to make conditional deposits of data for rela-
tively unrestricted access and use by public-interest researchers.679  Indeed, some
enlightened CEOs have acknowledged the benefits that derive from enriching
the contents of an information commons that all researchers can use for further
innovation,680 and worldwide efforts to compile databases of traditional knowl-
edge gleaned from indigenous populations point in the same direction.681
Scientific publications by private sector scientists provide another valuable
source of research data.  However, these scientists labor under increasing pres-
sures either to limit such publications altogether or to insist that publishers
allow supporting data to be made available only on conditions that aim to pre-
serve their commercial value.682  Although many academics in the scientific
community oppose this practice,683 it is exactly what would proliferate if private
sector scientists held exclusive property rights in the data that allowed them to
retain control even after publication.  This sobering observation might induce
the scientific community to reconsider the need to allow private sector scientists
to modify the bright-line disclosure rules otherwise applied to public sector sci-
entists, in order to encourage them to disclose more of their data for nonprofit
research purposes.
Even when companies remain unwilling to make their data available to
nonprofit researchers on a conditional public domain basis, there is ample expe-
rience with price discrimination and product differentiation measures favorable
to academics.684  To the extent that the public research community does not con-
stitute the primary market segment of the commercial data producer, either of
these approaches would help promote access and use by noncommercial
researchers without undue risks to the data vendor’s bottom line.  The condi-
tions under which such arrangements might be considered acceptable by com-
mercial data producers will vary according to discipline area and type of data
product, but it is in the interest of the public research community to identify
such producers in each discipline and sub-discipline and to negotiate favorable
access and use agreements on a mutually acceptable basis.
The terms and conditions acceptable to private firms that do opt to deposit
data into a public access commons arrangement might be fairly restrictive in
their allowable uses, as compared with the conditions applicable under the
679. See supra note 579.
680. See Edward Shonsey, Biotechnology: An Idea Before Its Time?, Presentation at The
University of Minnesota Conference on Governing GMOs: Developing Policy in the Face of Scientific
& Public Debate, (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.lifesci.consortium.umn.edu/conferences/
gmosconf/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
681. See, e.g., Dutfield, supra note 114; Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Indige-
nous Culture, Symposium presented at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Feb. 21-22, 2002).
But see van Caenegem, supra note 113, at 328-30 (stressing risks of dispossessing indigenous claims to
knowledge).
682. See generally COMMUNITY STANDARDS, supra note 74.
683. Id. (views of the biological sciences community).
684. See, e.g., BITS OF POWER, supra note 1, at 124-25.
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
460 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:315
standard-form templates that researchers themselves would normally adopt.
Nevertheless, the goal of securing greater access to privately generated data
with fewer restrictions justifies this approach because it would make data avail-
able to the research community that would otherwise be subject to commercial
terms and conditions in a less research-friendly environment.
Finally, the importance of regulating the interface between university-gen-
erated data and private sector applications was treated at length above, with a
view to ensuring that the universities’ eagerness to participate in commercial
endeavors did not compromise access to, and use of, federally funded data for
public research purposes.685  Here, in contrast, it is worth stressing the benefits
that can accrue from data transfers to the private sector whenever a framework
for reducing the social costs of such transfers has been worked out to the satis-
faction of both the research universities and the public funding sources.  These
arrangements are especially important if the exploitation, or applications of,
any given database by the private sector would not otherwise occur in a non-
proprietary environment.
Price discrimination and product differentiation can also facilitate socially
beneficial interactions between the private sector and universities.  For exam-
ple, companies might consider licensing certain data to commercial customers
on an exclusive-use basis for a limited period of time, after which the data in
question would be licensed on preferential terms to nonprofit users or even
revert to an open access status.  This strategy might work successfully in the
case of certain environmental data, in which most commercially valuable appli-
cations are produced in real time or near-real time and can then be made avail-
able at lower cost and with fewer restrictions for retrospective research that is
less time dependent.686  Such an approach might not work in other research
areas, such as biotechnology, however, in which a delay in access may not be an
acceptable tradeoff or that delay is too long to preserve competitive research
values.687
Especially serious problems seem likely to arise when the public research
community becomes the target market for the commercial data supplier, and
there is a resulting tension between freedom of contract and the needs and
capabilities of the nonprofit research sector.  In principle, one expects that a
supplier will not price itself out of the market.  In practice, some science pub-
lishers have adopted exorbitant pricing strategies that do limit scientists’ abili-
ties to access and use their products.
If a database protection law is enacted and sole-source science publishers
control databases of major importance to scientific sub-communities, access and
use will increasingly depend on any exceptions and immunities favoring
685. See discussion supra, Part IV.C.i.c.
686. See, for example, the Sea Wide Field Sensor example in the NASA data purchase program, at
http://seawifs.gsfc.nasa.gov/SEAWIFS.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
687. The trend in industry may in fact lie in the direction of less flexibility and accommodation to
nonprofit research interests.  See Nelson, supra note 132.
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research that are built into the law, and on any misuse provisions requiring
database licensors to adopt reasonable terms and conditions.  If and when these
problems become acute, as may well happen, the science community will have
to consider appropriate actions including both collective bargaining arrange-
ments (to the extent permitted by antitrust laws) and concerted efforts to inde-
pendently develop alternative sources of supply for public research purposes.
V
CONCLUSION
The importance of public domain data for scientific research is so taken for
granted that it becomes difficult to identify the precise boundaries of that
domain, to describe its operations, and especially to evaluate the normative and
legal infrastructure that supports those operations.  At the outset of this article,
we undertook to map the public domain for scientific data as it actually func-
tions today, with a view to addressing two new challenges.  One is the advent of
digital networks, which is transforming the traditional modes of exchanging
scientific data and could considerably magnify the payoffs that science (and
industry) derive from a policy of full and open access to public research data.
The other is an array of economic, legal, and technical pressures that threaten
to impede or disrupt the continued operations of that same public domain for
scientific data as it was traditionally constituted.
Our investigation reveals that the policy of open access to public research
data rests on a surprisingly fragile foundation in both the legal and normative
sense.  As scientists and universities increasingly aspire to commercialize their
research products (partly in response to the Bayh-Dole Act and related legisla-
tion), their willingness to exchange data, along with other research tools, has
begun to suffer. There is evidence that informal exchanges of data in some
fields, such as biomedical research, have become severely compromised, while
inter-university exchanges are subject to high transaction costs, delay, and a
growing risk of anticommons effects.  As relations between universities and
industry become more intense, the ability of the industrial partners to impose
restrictions on the open availability of research data also increases and could
pose a formidable obstacle in the future.
In this already delicate situation, the advent of strong new intellectual prop-
erty rights in databases could have disproportionately adverse effects on the
operations of the public domain for scientific data.  A database protection law
would remove data from their traditional public domain status under copyright
law.  It could invest scientists and universities with exclusive property rights in
collections of data—including government-funded databases—that would sur-
vive both the publication of research results in scientific journals and the disclo-
sure of such results in patent applications.  Database rights, when added to
other economic and technical pressures, could thus become the hub of an enclo-
sure process that progressively fences off the public domain for scientific data
and undermines its functions.  This process could greatly reduce the flow of
REICHMANUHLIR_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:43 PM
462 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:315
data as a basic input into both scientific research and the national system of
innovation.
We have argued that science policy should take steps now to address these
challenges to ward off the threat of undue enclosure and to exploit of the poten-
tial benefits of digitally linked data resources.  We focused particular attention
on government-funded data because of its overall importance to the scientific
enterprise and because it already benefits from a regulatory structure that could
be appropriately adjusted and strengthened to preserve crucial public domain
functions even in a highly protectionist intellectual property environment.  We
suggest that science policy should treat data produced with government funds as
a collective resource for research purposes.  Government agencies, research
universities, and scientific bodies should accordingly negotiate and develop a
regulatory framework to preserve the functions of a research commons by con-
tractual means that constrain private rights to serve the public interest.
It is not necessary for this purpose that universities forego their growing
opportunities to participate in commercial applications of research results.  It is
necessary, however, to curb the ability of their industrial partners to restrict the
flow of data as a collective research resource.  It is even more necessary to
develop a strong legal and normative infrastructure that would preserve open
access to, and use of, the data generated by participating universities for public
research purposes.  However, this outcome can only be achieved by realistic
contractual arrangements that also preserve the participants’ ability to license
data to the private sector while ensuring that scientists can access and use the
same data on reasonable terms and conditions.
We believe that science policy stands at a critical threshold.  If nothing is
done to address the challenges we identify, the unraveling of the sharing ethos
that already characterizes what we have termed the zone of informal data
exchanges between individual scientists will spread to universities, and a trading
mentality will further contaminate inter-university exchanges of data.
If, instead, science policy takes timely action to address these problems, the
benefits could be spectacular, given the new opportunities for scientific collabo-
ration that digital networks make possible.  If government-funded data at the
university level do enter a contractually reconstructed research commons along
the lines we advocate, it would put considerable pressure on single scientists
and laboratories to conform their own data exchange practices to the broader
normative and regulatory ethos by means of suitable contractual templates.
The formulation of these templates could, in turn, make it possible to link up
the highly distributed databases of cutting-edge disciplines into “networks of
nodes.”  On this scenario, the research commons—instead of shrinking and
becoming increasingly dysfunctional—could yield positive externalities and
network effects that exceeded anything that the scientific community had previ-
ously experienced.
